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The collective writing effort that led to this book began with a brainstorm-
ing workshop at Gadjah Mada University in July 2005. We talked about the 
rapid social changes surrounding Indonesia’s 1998 economic crisis, 
democratization, and decentralization. Previous work on the nation’s 
local politics had made several of us aware of the mediated nature of 
these complex processes (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007b; Van 
Klinken and Barker 2009; Aspinall and Van Klinken 2011). People in inter-
mediate social and geographical locations influenced outcomes just by 
being able to pass on information and resources to others. Why had so 
little research been done on the middle classes in provincial towns who 
did much of this mediating work? we asked ourselves. We decided to put 
‘Middle Indonesia’ on the research agenda.
In March 2007, most of the junior and senior researchers associated 
with the research programme ‘In Search of Middle Indonesia’ met for the 
first time in Leiden. Our host was the Royal Netherlands Institute of 
Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV), secretariat for the pro-
gramme. We had been awarded generous funding by the Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) under the second Scientific 
Program Indonesia-Netherlands (SPIN). KITLV also contributed research 
funding of its own.
Altogether 17 researchers joined in - five PhD candidates (one funded 
from outside), four postdoctoral research fellows who came to KITLV for a 
year or more, and eight postdoctoral fellows on shorter visits. About half 
came from Indonesia, the rest from all over the world. Three Dutch insti-
tutions participated in the consortium along with KITLV and Gadjah 
Mada: the University of Amsterdam, Leiden University, and the Institute 
of Social Studies (The Hague). Together with six senior supervisor-
researchers, and a healthy number of outside friends, we enjoyed many 
workshops and conferences, in Indonesia and the Netherlands. If this vol-
ume has any merit, it is due to the unforgettable collegiality of those 
meetings. Of the many people who pushed us to sharpen our thinking, 
two deserve special mention. The Oxford University economist Barbara 
Harriss-White, whose work on Indian provincial towns had inspired many 
of us, was a stimulating presence at the conference in September 2010. 
And Henk Schulte Nordholt, research director at KITLV, was our most 
unstintingly loyal supporter and critic throughout.
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The present volume represents only a sample of the output the pro-
gramme produced. Its authors were asked to explain what fresh light their 
empirical work shed on this extraordinarily productive yet poorly under-
stood social zone we had called Middle Indonesia. We hope by this 
approach to stimulate others to focus on the exchanges taking place in the 
middle levels of this complex society.
As anyone who has done it can testify, producing a coherent edited vol-
ume is a time-consuming task. My colleague Ward Berenschot came to it 
after the Middle Indonesia researchers had gone home; yet he applied 
himself to his editorial task with energy and grace. All the authors and 
editors are grateful for two detailed and incisive anonymous reviewers 
reports obtained by the press. We thank S. Chris Brown for most of the 
photographs that grace this book. They show part of an exhibition com-
missioned by the programme and now hanging at KITLV. We also thank 
Klarijn Anderson-Loven, who went through the entire manuscript with 
an eagle’s eye and prevented many errors and infelicities from reaching 
the printed page. Rosemarijn Hoefte, KITLV’s liaison person at Brill, and 
Patricia Radder, senior editor at Brill, were unfailingly helpful throughout 
the publication process.
Gerry van Klinken 
(coordinator, In Search of Middle Indonesia research programme, 
2005–2012) Leiden, July 2013
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Fig. 1. TERNATE:  Punk pals bask in the glow of friendship and the orange eve-
ning sky, in between running odd jobs for market vendors. 
June 2010: photo by  S. Chris Brown. 
<UN> <UN>
© Gerry van Klinken, 2014.
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-NonDerivative 3.0 Unported (CC-BY-NC-ND 3.0) License.
INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRACY, MARKETS  
AND THE ASSERTIVE MIDDLE
Gerry van Klinken
Di mana bumi dipijak di sana langit dijunjung – Where the feet touch the 
ground, there the sky is held up
(‘Respect local values’, localist slogan common in provincial politics since 
the 1950s)
Introduction
Asia’s middle classes are in the news. The story is bewitching. Not only are 
their numbers said to be shooting up towards half the total population, 
they are democratic and market-friendly. Indonesia’s middle class too, 
according to this story, has exploded in the ten years from 1999–2009. 
An Asian Development Bank (hereafter: ADB) study of consumption 
patterns concluded it had grown from 25% to 43% in that period. 
This corresponds in absolute terms to more than a doubling in a decade 
from 45 million to 93 million people (ADB 2010:11–12). These astronomical 
figures are partly due to an accounting trick – the per-capita household 
expenditure threshold has been reduced to a very low US$2 a day. 
Anybody not in absolute poverty is assigned to the middle class. But the 
trick does bring to light a surge of millions of poor people who have 
recently crossed over the poverty threshold due to slight income rises. The 
increase was spread fairly evenly between urban and rural areas. 
A Roy Morgan survey conducted in Indonesia in 2012 showed that 74% 
owned a mobile phone and 81% lived in a household with a motorcycle. 
‘Middle-class’ households, defined by the simultaneous possession of a 
television, a refrigerator and either a car or a motorcyle, constituted 45% 
of the population, up from 29% just two years earlier (Guharoy 2012). 
The latter figure is in the same league as that of the ADB, though derived 
from consumption rather than income patterns. By contrast, in 1980 just 
8.9% of all households owned a motorcycle, and 5.6% a TV, leading to an 
estimate of 5% for the middle class then (Mackie 1990:100, quoting 
Crouch). Miraculously enough, the new middle class not only consumes 
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1 John Parker, ‘Burgeoning bourgeoisie: For the first time in history more than half 
the world is middle-class – thanks to rapid growth in emerging countries’, The Economist, 
12 February 2009.
but is also said to be democratic.1 Other sweeping statistical reports have 
presented similar breathtaking conclusions, which hold for all Asia 
(Birdsall 2010; Kharas 2010; Ravallion 2009).
The present book examines this expanding Indonesian middle class up 
close. Instead of statistics, it contains ethnographic studies conducted in 
provincial towns, where most of its members live. Our studies confirm 
that the middle class is larger than previously assumed. The radically 
expanded notion of the middle class proposed by the Asian Development 
Bank, Roy Morgan and other institutions captures something real. But 
whereas these institutions are mainly interested in consumption, our 
ideas on the middle class have been shaped by more relational, political 
questions. Class is not essentially a question of income or expenditure 
categories; it is a political concept, intended to explain why differences 
remain between the behaviour of rich and poor people over matters of 
the common good. By watching how they behave, we have come to know 
a very different middle class than the one the ADB saw in the statistics. 
In our experience, the booming provincial middle class favours economic 
protectionism, wants more state and not less, and practises a flawed 
patronage democracy.
Less than by changing consumption patterns, we were driven to radi-
cally expand our idea of the Indonesian middle class by political events 
over the last twenty years. After 1998 it became evident that the elite polit-
ical forces dominating the analysis no longer had the field to themselves. 
The strong push for decentralization amidst the democratization that 
followed did not come from the national elite, but from a much broader 
provincial middle class. Since reformasi a wave of fresh studies on con-
temporary Indonesia has shifted the focus from the ‘commanding heights’ 
to the middle reaches of the polity. They are conveniently summarized 
and partly reinterpreted in some of our own work (Van Klinken and 
Barker 2009; Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007b). Where the earlier 
studies had applied the term ‘middle class’ to what had actually been a 
national bourgeoisie ensconced within their gated communities on the 
green outskirts of Jakarta, it now became clear we could no longer under-
stand Indonesia through their interests alone. A much broader group of 
people was evidently driving the new politics of democratic regional 
autonomy, the democratic mediascape, the assertiveness of Islamic 
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conservatism, and (not to overlook the dark side) new forms of corrup-
tion and communal tension. Somehow it was necessary to expand our 
view of the politically active public to incorporate those who felt much 
more at ease with the great mass of the poor than the national elite had 
done. New research questions had led to a broadened notion of the mid-
dle class, though the exact definition was usually left unwritten.
This meant a sharp break with long-standing common wisdom among 
scholars of Indonesian society that the middle class constitutes no more 
than 10% of the whole society. Howard Dick in a seminal 1985 article 
quoted its size at a mere 16.6% in urban Java based on consumption crite-
ria (which he linked to the ‘privatization of the means of consumption’) 
(Dick 1985). This translated to an even smaller percentage of the national 
population, and for decades afterwards scholars and politicians alike rou-
tinely said the middle class made up around 10% of the population. In our 
minds this figure is now outdated, both because many more people than 
this have become consumers and because recognizably middle class 
political behaviour has changed.
We have something to say both to the economic statisticians and to our 
fellow scholars of Indonesian society. To the statisticians we say, the pos-
session of consumer durables says nothing about new political commit-
ments. Simply reducing the income threshold to the poverty limit and 
calling everyone above that ‘middle class’ begs many analytical questions 
about political action. The Economist exemplified the problem when it 
breezily sketched all those earning just over US$2 a day as ‘people who are 
not resigned to a life of poverty, who are prepared to make sacrifices to 
create a better life for themselves’ (12 February 2009, quoting Brazilian 
economist Eduardo Giannetti da Fonseca). This is not only to suggest 
without any evidence that the poor are resigned to their fate, it begs the 
question what kind of action the non-poor are prepared to undertake to 
make their escape from poverty permanent, and how their action might 
differ from that of those who forgot long ago what poverty feels like. The 
only way to find out is to go to the field.
To our colleagues in the humanities and social sciences we say, the new 
political commitments are there if you care to look. Class links the more 
or less coherent material interests of a large group of people. One way to 
recognize it is when its members act politically in similar ways, even if 
they are hardly aware of their commonalities. This implies a historical 
approach that goes well beyond statistics; it moreover suggests there can 
be no standard definition of a particular class, but that it depends on the 
question the researcher wants to ask. During the New Order, scepticism 
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2 Other studies emphasizing middle-class support for Indonesian authoritarianism 
include Tanter and Young 1990 and Dhakidae 2001. Similar studies appeared on other 
Asian countries (D. Jones 1998; Koo 1991; Masataka 2003). A ‘new’ middle class of profes-
sionals and managers emerged alongside the ‘old’ middle class of senior bureaucrats, 
but this class, too, was restricted to the big cities (Arita 2003; Funatsu and Kagoya 2003). 
One author who bucked the trend by depicting a broader middle class was Solvay Gerke 
(2000), who defined them as the ‘just enough’ class (kelas cukupan), situated between the 
poor and the rich.
about the common assumption that the middle class sponsors democracy 
made a great deal of sense. The assumption hardly seemed to apply dur-
ing Indonesia’s New Order when the middle class was on the rise. Indeed, 
the first studies of the middle class in Indonesia were framed by questions 
about the stability of the authoritarian New Order (1966–1998). Studies 
focusing on the middle class as a political force in effect had in view a 
national bourgeoisie confined to metropolitan areas. This is perhaps the 
real reason why scholars who have been writing about the middle class 
since the New Order have also been reluctant to let go of the 10% esti-
mate. The focus of their studies was the hegemonic power of national 
elites. They sought to identify social support for a strong centralizing and 
authoritarian state (Hill 1994; Schwarz 1994). A widely deployed idiom of 
orderly ‘state corporatism’ drew on parallels in the junta-led countries of 
Latin America (King 1982).2 Subsequent studies of middle-class lifestyles 
similarly had in mind metropolitan consumerism – the ‘new rich’ (Pinches 
1999; Robison and Goodman 1996), who were ‘lost in mall’ (Van Leeuwen 
2011) – but these tended to conform to this elitist idiom rather than chal-
lenge it. Yet today hardly anyone doubts that Indonesia is a consolidated 
democracy, albeit one with ‘adjectives’. The reason is not only to be found 
in intra-elite disunity or a change of heart among that 10% at the top of 
Indonesian society; it also arises from a new assertiveness among a much 
larger proportion of the population, particularly out in the provinces. 
This book aims to bring to life that surprisingly large group we may readily 
call ‘middle class’ for its self-confident consumerism as well as for its new 
political activism.
Recovering the ‘Middle’ in Middle Class
An eloquent argument for paying attention to a much larger middle class 
than commonly assumed has been made by Diane Davis (2004). She 
began by regretting the excessively narrow notion of ‘middle class’ that 
had occupied scholars of the Third World after the 1960s. In the 1950s, 
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3 Davis plots the likelihood of middle classes allying themselves with either workers or 
the bourgeoisie on the basis of that nation’s particular history of industrialization – from 
‘early’ late industrialization in Latin America to ‘late’ late industrialization in East Asia. 
This argument need not detain us now.
optimistic modernization theorists had thought the middle classes would 
be transformative and defined them broadly; but as one newly indepen-
dent democracy after another collapsed into authoritarianism this opti-
mism wilted. The progressive influences of a broad middle class appeared 
to have been largely chimerical. After that, middle classes virtually disap-
peared from mainstream social science research. The dependency theory 
that largely took the place of modernization theory continued to speak of 
‘middle classes’, but in practice it had raised the membership threshold 
and now saw them as effectively part of the ruling elite. They belonged to 
one extreme in a highly polarized society, in which the other extreme 
consisted of ‘popular masses’. D. Davis (2004:57) concluded that while ‘the 
extremes were theorized as most relevant, the middle classes were not 
considered relevant’.
The down-side to this focus on extremes was that large numbers of 
people who did not belong to either extreme were left out. Explaining 
change by incorporating a middle in which polarization is less marked 
certainly complicates the analysis – on this more below. But the evidence 
that classes in the ‘middle’ do act in distinctive ways has been mounting 
for Indonesia since reformasi in 1998, and it forces us to deal with the 
added complexity. It includes an enthusiasm for democracy and decen-
tralization that is uncharacteristic of national elites. The same goes for 
provincial protests against the central government’s bias towards global 
capital – leading to local government pressure to partly nationalize for-
eign mining companies, for example. Diane Davis coined the expression 
‘disciplinary regimes of development’ for those historical trajectories in 
which the pure interests of global capital are ‘disciplined’ by middle 
classes with interests of their own. Those interests might, for example, 
include smaller, family-based businesses, or rural investment. Middle 
classes who manage to impose such discipline are defined more broadly 
than the national bourgeoisie. They may include state workers, the urban 
self-employed, and small-scale farmers.3
Somewhat earlier, Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens (1992) 
had also argued for a renewed focus on non-elite classes on the grounds 
that they play a distinctive role. They charted the histories of a large 
number of nations in the twentieth century to learn why most capitalist 
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4 For example, Franck 1993; Nas 1986; Persoon and Cleuren 2002; Titus and Hinderink 
1998; Titus and Van der Wouden 1998. In addition, a large and valuable body of unpub-
lished Indonesian theses and dissertations on the sociology of individual towns (for exam-
ple, at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta) remains practically unexamined by foreign 
scholars.
economies were also democracies. A little like Davis was to do later, they 
discovered that democracy comes about not because capitalists want 
it but because less privileged classes push for it. Capitalism produces 
contradictions, and these in turn boost demands for political equality by 
non-elite classes and class coalitions. Where working classes provide 
most of the energy for these demands, democratic reform is the most 
inclusive. Middle classes are more ambivalent. They will resist democracy 
if that means also empowering the poor, but will support it if it means 
gaining an edge over the national bourgeoisie, notably on regional issues. 
It is precisely this ambivalent role that Indonesia’s middle classes, now 
broadly conceived, have played since Independence.
Insights from political economy such as those provided by D. Davis, 
and Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens will help us answer 
questions about democracy in Indonesia. But we need more: a spatial 
dimension. Part of the impulse for a renewed interest in a broad middle 
class arose from the turbulent process of decentralization that took place 
at the same time as democratization. Its very territoriality forced us to 
think about political geography, ‘the study of how politics is informed by 
geography’ (M. Jones, Jones and Woods 2004:2). The natural setting for 
the middle classes who provided the political steam pressure for both 
democracy and decentralization was not the globalized metropolis, but 
the provincial town – a place that foreign researchers rarely visit. The self-
employed medium scale entrepeneurs, the private and public sector 
clerks, the Golkar apparatchiks, the teachers – and the youth aspiring to 
these positions – who populate this book, belong to a world of their own. 
They are only partly assimilated with the national bourgeoisie. They may 
share elite global consumerist aspirations, but their economic interests 
differ. Their incomes are less secure, their networks of relations more local 
(where they may be more intense than in the big city), their religion more 
conservative – in short, their horizon is more parochial. Yet their control 
of the towns gives them a national clout that belies their relative lack of 
affluence.
We were not the first social scientists to turn our attention to the 
urban environment in Indonesia, yet the field has been surprisingly under- 
populated. Human geographers have been its main practitioners.4 
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These scholars offer valuable material on uneven urbanization, urban 
bias, employment and urban–rural relations (on the last of which, see also 
Leinbach 2004; Rotgé, Mantra and Ryanto Rijanta 2000). Larger questions 
of the economy and politics, however, have rarely been posed in a spatial 
way. Howard Dick, one of the few who did pose them that way, remarked 
perceptibly that most have treated the economy as ‘a peculiarly disem-
bodied thing, having a sectoral structure but no identified spatial struc-
ture’ (2002: xxi). Much the same can be said of many political studies, 
which have treated a politics of elites and (sometimes) masses as if they 
do not have to span great physical distances. Towns are the nodes in these 
interactions across distance. One of the first major studies of the provin-
cial town in Indonesia done with such large questions in mind was the 
Mojokuto project conducted by a research team from MIT in the 1950s. 
Clifford Geertz was to become its most famous member. Perhaps because 
what they did was for so long not repeated, their conclusions proved 
highly influential. In our opinion, however, they also fell short of an ade-
quate explanation. This book attempts to show why.
Questions
We felt the post-1998 surge of studies on local politics in Indonesia had 
moved the subject of Middle Indonesia back to centre stage. To draw 
attention to the many productive puzzles that a focus on the surprisingly 
assertive (lower) middle classes in provincial towns can help to illumi-
nate, we coined a term for this social zone: Middle Indonesia. The term 
is deliberately ambiguous. It may suggest Middle America, with John 
Updike’s ‘clean, sad scent of linoleum’ (even if Middle Indonesia probably 
smells more of deep-fried gorengan than of linoleum). This is where 
the inquisitive must go to meet a ‘mainstream’ American, as opposed to 
a member of some minority class, ethnicity, gender or culture. Middle 
England and Middle Australia have similar connotations of the conserva-
tive lower-middle-class majority. At the same time the term Middle 
Indonesia suggests a mediating function between two extremes – between 
upper and lower, or centre and periphery. This second meaning is likely 
to reveal a darker side, in which the middle extracts a surplus from its 
hinterland (as in Cronon’s (1992) magnificent study of Chicago and the 
Great West), or in which numerous mid-sized towns mediate the imposi-
tion of central administrative order on the countryside (as in the long 
discussion that started with Christaller; see C. Smith 1976).
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By the time we began this project, it had become obvious to us from 
previous work (including our own, referenced above) that Middle 
Indonesia generates significant political forces at the national level. Our 
task was now to explain how that came about. Our leading question could 
be formulated as follows: Why is Middle Indonesia so influential, locally 
and in Indonesia as a whole, though it is neither particularly rich nor par-
ticularly central in geographic terms? This question would lead us to 
focus on agency in particular localities, and force us to identify who the 
actors were. Answering it would take us into three related thematic are-
nas, namely class, the state, and everyday culture. Class, and questions 
related to the market, was the most fundamental of these, and would 
inform the other two. Underlying all our work lies the question: How con-
flictual are the power relations that make Middle Indonesia influential?
Our research questions were informed by recent work done by others 
elsewhere in Asia. Two scholars were particularly important to us. One 
had written on the political economy of an expanded and largely lower 
middle class, the other on the spaces in which these lower-middle classes 
were the masters, namely provincial towns. To begin with the first, the 
question the economist Barbara Harriss-White posed in her work on 
provincial India was: How might an understanding of this expanded 
middle class help explain political differences between them and both 
the national bourgeoisie as well as the poor? In an agenda-setting book 
on this question, she emphasized the informality of what she called ‘the 
economy of the 88 per cent’. While everyone has heard of the Indian 
economic miracles worked in the steel mills of Jamshedpur and the sky-
scrapers of Mumbai, this formal corporate economy is largely insulated 
from another, much more populous and traditional economy that retains 
a great deal of vitality. She wrote: ‘While India is fast being reinvented 
discursively, there is a great deal of continuity in the real economy at 
the local level’ (Harriss-White 2003:71). The economy of small-town 
India in which she did her research has almost no modern industry and 
revolves around agriculture and trade. Almost all labour in these sectors 
is informal. Where the formal law is ineffective, people regulate contrac-
tual relations through personal networks and on the basis of local norms. 
The lower-middle-class traders, small-scale producers, agrarian elites and 
local state officials who dominate this economy incorporate the poor into 
it on highly discriminatory clientelistic terms. Other poor groups, such as 
the dalits, are excluded completely simply on the basis of cultural norms. 
In Indonesia, too, two thirds of the labour force is informal, in the sense of 
working in the unregistered economy.
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The second piece of research that informed our own broke open the 
question of spatiality. What difference does it make that these surpris-
ingly assertive lower middle classes are most visible in provincial towns? 
How might the various types of flows passing through provincial towns 
help explain their political influence within the nation? In an important 
book that we had partly seen in draft, Malcolm McKinnon (2011) com-
pared the human geography of three large Asian cities with three provin-
cial ones. Whereas life in the cities, he concluded, is shaped to a great 
extent by the kinds of globalizing processes that have made Asia’s mega-
cities look much like megacities anywhere in the world, that is not (yet) 
the case in Asia’s provincial towns. According to McKinnon, two other 
processes are equally, if not more, important there, namely urbanization 
and nation-building. In Europe these processes flourished in the nine-
teenth century and were essentially complete by the twentieth, but in 
Asia they are contemporary. Urbanization has long stabilized in Europe 
at around 80%, but in Indonesia it is still in progress and only half com-
plete. Global production chains have penetrated to these provincial 
towns to a far lesser extent than to the megacities (as Barbara Harriss-
White also argued). The wage differentials between town and countryside 
that drive urbanization arise more from a vigorous domestic capitalism 
than from the global economy. Nation-building, meanwhile, is the pro-
cess of identity-formation that takes place when the child of peasant 
parents comes to town to go to school and stays to seek a better future. 
This, too, is a contemporary process. People are still alive who remember 
Indonesia’s anti-colonial revolution in the late 1940s. Most of the identity 
issues that occupy people in town are regional or national rather than 
global in scope. One reason is, surely, that the state is a major source 
of employment for educated people in many Indonesian provincial 
towns. The state has a presence in these towns because it is essentially 
territorial – it needs to be everywhere to retain its sovereignty.
If these hunches based on preliminary reading were to prove correct, 
then Middle Indonesia promised to considerably complicate the received 
picture of a globalizing, consumerist and democratic middle class.
How We Did Our Studies
Indonesia’s urbanization level was 42% in 2006 (Firman, Kombaitan and 
Pradono 2007). Contrary to the popular image of exploding Asian mega-
cities, about half of those urban Indonesians live in towns of less than a 
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million. Indonesia is thought to have about 170 provincial towns with pop-
ulations between 50,000 and a million (projections calculated from 
appendices in Rutz 1987). They are scattered all over the map. About 80% 
of the population lives within the sphere of influence of towns like those 
that are the subject of this book. Considering that provincial town resi-
dents make up a quarter of the world’s fourth most populous nation, that 
they are found in every corner of the vast archipelago and that their world 
touches practically everything that happens in the country, it is surprising 
they have not been paid more scholarly attention. The doubling of the 
ADB’s ‘middle class’ also took place in these towns. The streets are filled 
with an exploding number of motorcycles and mobile-phone outlets. 
Yet foreigners hardly know these towns, and thus they go home without 
having their preconceived ideas challenged about what this urbanizing 
transition means economically and politically. Most of the authors in this 
book are anthropologists rather than geographers, and we confess we 
came rather late to the discovery that geography matters. Like new con-
verts to an old faith, however, we now believe the most important next 
step in the burgeoning study of decentralized Indonesia is to become 
more sensitive to the implications of geography.
We chose to do ethnographic work in a few of Indonesia’s hundreds of 
provincial towns. We expected the effort put into doing ‘thick’ observa-
tion in Middle Indonesia to lead to insight into issues of national impor-
tance. As Ben White correctly points out in this volume, we studied 
various social processes taking place in these towns, rather than the towns 
themselves. Each town became a project for one PhD project. We were 
looking for towns with populations under a million, because big cities are 
likely to have dynamics of their own. The choice was partly made for us on 
practical grounds such as the knowledge and access our Indonesian part-
ners at Gadjah Mada University had of and in the regions. The main 
underlying divide in our minds was economic. At least two of our towns 
should have economies that were largely market-driven, while two should 
have economies that were largely state-driven. For the former we settled 
on Pekalongan and Cilegon, two towns in Java with substantial private 
sectors, and for the latter on Ternate and Kupang, both outside Java and 
with middle classes dominated by officialdom. Later we were joined by a 
fifth PhD candidate with funding of her own, who studied Pontianak, an 
outer-island town with a mixed state-market economy. Some PhD proj-
ects focused on political economy – those on Kupang and Pekalongan – 
while others focused particularly on youth – those on Pontianak, Cilegon 
and Ternate. The youth studies have been brought together elsewhere 
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5 The full list of publications, funding and institutional details can be found in the 
KITLV annual reports (http://www.kitlv.nl/home/Organization?subpage_id=349).
(Spyer and White 2012). A number of postdoctoral researchers also came 
to work in the programme. Some looked at the same four or five towns, 
while others went elsewhere. Only a selection of the research is included 
in the present volume.5
Looking back, our learning trajectories looked less like the boot 
imprints left by a disciplined platoon on the march than like the swoop-
ing arcs a flock of birds trace in the air. Certainly this introduction repre-
sents a work of synthesis rather than a summary of everything everyone 
wants to say in their respective chapters. In the first place we have gotten 
to know a huge cast of unforgettable characters: Wenty Marina Minza’s 
Lia, a smartly dressed 24-year-old in Pontianak who wants nothing so 
much as a civil servant’s job but who worries that she belongs to the 
wrong ethnic group to get one; Cornelis Lay’s Crazy Wadu, a Kupang 
vagrant in the 1970s who walked around town naked and did ‘yoga’ every 
day, sleeping with his head down and his legs in the air next to the bridge. 
So many ordinary people become immortal in these accounts of little 
provincial dramas. But we always attempted to discern in their personal 
stories those much larger social processes that were shaping their lives. 
It is to these processes that we now turn.
Why so Influential?
If the national significance of an assertive Middle Indonesia seems obvi-
ous today, it was not to the first scholars who turned to this subject. Since 
their work continues to resonate today, it is worthwhile revisiting it 
briefly. These researchers tended to see provincial towns as passive zones 
of top-down diffusion rather than as assertive places. The first post-war 
students of the Indonesian town were inspired by modernization theory. 
They saw the town as a zone of transmission. They wanted to know how 
well it was facilitating the gradual diffusion of modernity to ordinary folk 
around the country. The Australian Lance Castles (1967) studied Islamic 
cigarette manufacturers in one provincial town to see if they were devel-
oping a distinctive middle-class ethos of ‘this-worldly’ secularism (not 
many were). Most famous of all is the series of studies researched in the 
1950s by Clifford Geertz and his colleagues of the MIT Indonesia project, 
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6 While Clifford Geertz was the most prolific member of this project (C. Geertz 1963b, 
1965,1968, to mention only those concerned with towns), other members who produced 
important work on towns in their rural context were Donald Fagg (1958), Robert Jay (1963), 
and Hildred Geertz (1963).
centring on a Javanese town they called ‘Mojokuto’.6 When the MIT group 
went to Mojokuto they did not consider that the town’s relationship with 
the national centre could be anything other than dependent. They saw it 
as the (distressingly inert) terminus for modernizing ideas from the cen-
tre. Clifford Geertz in particular was impressed with the degree to which 
this cultural frontier remained immobilized by tradition. The town was a 
‘no man’s land’, he wrote (C. Geertz 1963b:16). He thought this ‘provi-
sional, in-between, “no man’s land” quality of Mojokuto social life’ was ‘its 
most outstanding characteristic.’ Stagnation caused by a massive influx of 
resourceless and fatalistic peasants was also the essence of the Indonesian 
provincial town depicted in an influential paper by Warren Armstrong 
and Terry McGee (1968). Their term ‘urban involution’ drew on Geertz’s 
idea of ‘agricultural involution’.
The successful diffusion of global and national modernizing influences 
through the town remains one of the major criteria urban geographers 
use to assess the benefits of urbanization (Rondinelli 1983). It features 
strongly in the most systematic inventory of the history and functions 
of Indonesian towns we have today, by Rutz (1987). Maps portray towns 
as nodes in a gradually spreading and hierarchical network of roads, 
shipping routes and administrative districts. In an overwhelmingly rural 
archipelago, towns grew up to fill the needs of modern administration, 
first colonial and then republican, as this penetrated ever-remoter regions. 
They also serviced local economies of trade, plantations, mining and 
manufacturing that followed colonial pacification in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Networks diffuse innovations and thus help build social capital. 
They hold the country together.
Clearly this ecological perspective on the role of towns in the social 
landscape captures something real. Our own studies sometimes con-
firmed the diffusive character of the town, particularly in culture. Ideas 
and resources that originate in bigger cities continue to flow through 
the town to the surrounding countryside. Think of government pro-
grammes, new religious practices or global fashions. Every town in 
Indonesia now radiates ‘Indonesianness’. Even the streetscapes look the 
same everywhere. People move around these networks in all directions, 
driven by their own desires as well as by the authority that radiates from 
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7 Diane Davis (1999) helpfully depicted a network space spanning four dimensions – 
geographical space, class, institutions and culture. Each dimension is hierarchical. Some 
places are more desirable than others (halls of power); classes are by definition hierarchi-
cal; some institutions have greater power than others; most nations have a dominant cul-
ture. People want to move towards the end that offers them better chances – closer to the 
state – hence urbanization, upward social mobility and political and cultural struggles.
8 Many flights now cost less than the boatfare, as 4 or 5 airlines compete to service a 
single provincial town; internet cafes cost 50 eurocents an hour; mobile telephony costs a 
tenth in Indonesia of what it does in Europe; roads, particularly in Java, are full of fast, 
cheap and frequent buses.
its nodes.7 Town is an attractive destination for rural young people, a 
modern settlers’ town with its own pleasures. Migrant Malays come to 
Pontianak town to study (in Wenty Marina Minza’s chapter). Farm kids 
come to Cilegon town with their parents, who, however, still expect 
them to behave like rural kids (as Suzanne Naafs (2012) has described in 
her dissertation on Middle Indonesia). At times the provincial town also 
attracts people from the metropole. Post-1998 decentralization made 
provincial towns once more attractive to Jakarta-siders (Vel 2007). 
Physical distances have shrunk rapidly in recent years, also for non-elite 
travellers. Indonesia’s airports, built for a tiny flying elite, are crammed 
with small-town folk clutching budget tickets. Internet and mobile tele-
phony costs almost nothing.8 Some elites commute to and from Jakarta 
every weekend. For them, the provincial town has practically merged 
with the metropolis. For non-elites the town remains more a home 
(the difference produces a provincial brain-drain), but even for them, 
often a temporary one. In short, towns are nodes of mobility. This shrink-
ing of physical distance has implications for national integration. 
Provincial town politics are more like metropolitan politics than they 
used to be (the state comes to the provincial town, as Deasy Simandjuntak 
(2009) puts it). The fact that Indonesia no longer suffers from the inchoate 
rural revolts that afflicted it in the 1950s must be at least partly due to this 
shrinkage of distance.
However, processes of smooth diffusion are only half the story of the 
provincial town. They overlook the political agency that emerged in the 
towns as a result of these very flows. Since the late 1980s, urban studies 
around the world have taken an active interest in agency over ecology 
(Gottdiener and Feagin 1988; Savage, Warde and Ward 2003). Even as the 
1950s American researchers sweated in somnolent Mojokuto feeling that 
little was happening, people in somewhat larger towns such as Padang 
and Menado, in the regions beyond Java, were organizing armed revolts 
against Jakarta. Assertive processes originate in the town itself and are 
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turned against the metropolis, or against the village, or against other 
classes within town. Think of demands for local autonomy, resistance to 
global markets, or exploitation of the poor. Even as the MIT team was 
beginning to draw its conclusions about the town as a ‘no man’s land’, 
the Dutch sociologist W.F. Wertheim was writing about the enormous 
dynamism in the towns. By the 1950s he had been in the archipelago 
for decades. His book on Indonesian social change focused on agency 
in the urban environment long before the paradigmatic shift of the 1980s. 
He wrote:
This new Indonesian culture was to be a typically urban culture….However 
small a percentage of Indonesians may have lived in the towns, these towns 
were the most dynamic element in Indonesian society and thus assumed a 
very great influence on the social and political events throughout the archi-
pelago. (Wertheim 1959:185; see also Wertheim 1958.)
Indeed, Wertheim was not alone. A perceptive young American researcher 
in Indonesia at the time, Gerald Maryanov, described who the provincial 
folk were who provided this dynamism. They were an urbanized, 
semi-educated group of non-agricultural workers, then numbering about 
2 million out of the national population of 82 million. It was they who cre-
ated public opinion: ‘The definition of problems takes place within this 
group, and it sets the climate of opinion in which problems are discussed 
and solved. We would further suggest that the desirability or acceptability 
of particular policies will be entirely determined here….This…group is 
characterized [also]…by its distance from the cultural patterns of the 
ideal type of traditional village community’ (Maryanov 1959:63).
In one of the ironies of academic history, it was one of the MIT research-
ers who put her finger most precisely on who this new middle class was. 
Hildred Geertz’s (1963) long neglected chapter still provides us with a 
good baseline description of town life. Whereas the metropoles of Jakarta, 
Surabaya, Bandung, Medan, Palembang and Makassar were cosmopoli-
tan, the provincial towns, she felt, were primarily local in orientation. 
They had grown rapidly but not through industrialization. Trade and 
government dominated their economies. The ‘urban middle class’ she 
saw there was broad in scope, even if its membership was then far smaller 
than today. It consisted of clerks and shopkeepers working in Chinese-
owned retail and wholesale stores, of the conservatively Islamic owners 
of smaller shops and market stalls, and of government-salaried staff 
in administration, schools and the army. Culturally, the wealthy and 
educated in town adhered to an ‘Indonesian metropolitan superculture’, 
characterized by political ideologies of egalitarianism, socialism, economic 
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development and national advancement; a liking for colloquial Indonesian 
language and popular films; and a desire for overseas travel and automo-
biles. Far below this risk-taking group with a metropolitan outlook was 
the ‘urban proletariat’, underemployed in the bazaar and ‘only a step 
away in terms of sophistication and skills and non-labour resources from 
the countryside in which most of them were not long ago born’. As social 
status moved down towards the poor urban masses, the culture shifted 
towards ‘a large variety of traditional ethnic ways of life’.
Today, a focus on agency in urban studies is surely unavoidable. In 
India as in Indonesia, urban landscapes were created by middle classes 
exercising their political muscle. They began to flex those muscles during 
and shortly after the struggle for independence. The state socialist mea-
sures introduced at that time worked mainly to their advantage. After the 
regional revolts of 1957 the government under President Sukarno intro-
duced measures that penalized large capital and subsidized politically 
assertive provincial middle classes. The measures included politically 
driven import and export licensing, nationalization and the virtual disap-
pearance of personal taxation (Mackie 1971). Under the New Order, state 
rhetoric turned against this class and towards the virtues of direct foreign 
investment that rather favoured a national bourgeoisie. Yet the oil boom 
allowed the government at the same time to continue to subsidize provin-
cial middle classes to buy their loyalty, in ways the World Bank at the time 
considered inefficient. Thus Frans Hüsken (1989) discovered that New 
Order policy had actually encouraged rural ‘decommercialization’ while 
creating rural elites with strong state connections but weak entrepreneur-
ial capacities.
After 1998, Padang, Menado and many other towns were again the 
scene of rowdy demands by its urban middle classes for special consider-
ation by central state institutions in Jakarta. They succeeded in forcing 
Jakarta to match its post-1998 democratizing measures with a ‘big bang’ 
decentralization programme handing budgetary and appointment pow-
ers to the regions. They then set about successfully demanding the subdi-
vision of administrative districts into numerous new districts, each to be 
graced by a new district capital built by well-connected local contractors. 
In fifteen years since the mid-1990s, the number of districts in Indonesia 
has more than doubled to over 450, in the face of opposition from Jakarta 
which regards subdivision as wasteful (Booth 2011). It is true that provin-
cial towns no longer take up arms against Jakarta (though there is a rural 
separatist revolt in Papua and until recently another in Aceh), but several 
of them did host more or less serious communal violence in the chaotic 
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transition to democracy around the year 2000. Some provincial capitals 
such as Pekanbaru and Samarinda even threatened to secede, ‘like East 
Timor’. The demands were not new; they had merely come out into the 
open. Such threats coming from the far-flung, resource-rich regions of 
Indonesia had been voiced quietly within the halls of power throughout 
the New Order. Expressed in velvet voices rather than with guns, they 
forced Jakarta to institutionalize a system of government funding for the 
regions that was determined less by performance than by loyalty:
A massive patronage system was created in which the central government 
awarded local governments with budget allocation in exchange for loyalty. 
Budget allocations were not based on performance or need, but rather on 
how close local governments were with the central government, and how 
well local elites could lobby decisions-makers in Jakarta. The resulting rent-
seeking system was effective in rapidly building the economy, but was not 
transparent or sustainable and created great regional dissatisfactions (there 
are demands for independence from all the above-mentioned resource-rich 
provinces). (Antlöv 2003:143.)
After reformasi the negotiations between centre and regions became 
far more openly political. Resource-rich districts managed to keep more 
fiscal revenue for themselves, thus depriving resource-poor ones of devel-
opment funds. As before, the state patronage benefited not only the elite 
who negotiated it, but also the thousands of ordinary public servants who 
got paid for spending most of the day doing little but chatting in govern-
ment offices all over a town like Kupang, as Sylvia Tidey demonstrates in 
her Middle Indonesia dissertation (2012a). Here the ‘middle’ was asserting 
itself in a way that belied passivity, and that was not entirely within the 
control of the commanding heights. Local desires to gain more control 
over the resources available from the increasingly affluent central state 
after 1998 led to chaotic competition that sometimes turned violent. 
Investigating this conflictual side to some provincial town life was for 
one of us an important precursor to the Middle Indonesia programme 
(Van Klinken 2007).
Class
Let us now zoom in on the middle class in its provincial-town setting. 
What does it look like up close in the early 2000s? What sources of eco-
nomic power does it tap? How do its members relate to the poor in their 
immediate environs? How wide and how deep is the gap that separates 
them from the poor within town and beyond it? If the gap amounts to a 
<UN> <UN>
 democracy, markets and the assertive middle  17
ravine, any democracy that empowers both sides is likely to be difficult to 
achieve. Would we find, as the Lynds did in provincial America (Lynd and 
Lynd 1929, 1937), a town riven by internal class conflicts? Or would our 
towns look, as Lloyd Warner and Paul Lunt’s (1941) did elsewhere in 
America, and as Clifford Geertz’s did in Central Java, like a peaceful, inte-
grative middle, a smooth transition zone?
A provincial urban middle class consisting of bureacrats, traders, 
medium-scale businesspeople, clerks and professionals are central actors 
in our stories. On the national level, these occupations largely belong to a 
lower middle class, but within town they are more likely to be seen as an 
‘elite’. The chapters by Nico Warouw and Cornelis Lay make this contrast 
particularly clear. This complexity was one reason why the researchers in 
this book had difficulty agreeing on a common nomenclature or even a 
precise definition of the class of people in question. Some stayed with the 
term ‘intermediate class’, as first proposed by Michal Kalecki (1972) with 
its petit bourgeois associations (notably Ben White and Nico Warouw, 
following Harriss-White 2003). Most preferred the more common term 
(lower) middle class. Although this does not have the same precise asso-
ciation with intermediary political action, it has been adopted in the pres-
ent chapter because it is likely to be more familiar to the reader.
Of greatest interest to us was political action emerging from this group 
of people towards other groups. As far as influence is concerned, its mem-
bers still resemble the political public described in the 1950s, whether 
defined in terms of culture as by Hildred Geertz (1963); of newspaper 
readership as by Herbert Feith (1962:109–113); or of education as by Gerald 
Maryanov (1959:63). But the middle class has grown in size. At the same 
time its members share the consumerism familiar from the ADB reports 
and other studies of the middle class done in bigger cities. They enjoy 
considerable mobility – flying to Jakarta is now affordable for them from 
almost anywhere. Their career choices are wide open (see the chapter 
here by Wenty Marina Minza). Culturally, many can still be seen as adher-
ents of a metropolitan superculture, interested in contemporary forms of 
religious pluralism (see Noorhaidi Hasan’s contribution to this volume). 
Their religious and even their eating habits differ markedly from those in 
the kampung class in their own town, as Cornelis Lay shows in his child-
hood reminiscences set in 1970s Kupang.
Recent studies of class tensions in urban Indonesia, though few in 
number, led us to expect no easy answers to the question of their severity. 
Some have emphasized rather stark class differences. Howard Dick begins 
his economic history of twentieth-century Surabaya with a focus on 
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industrialization and ends with the human-rights abuse that the resultant 
land grabs caused among poor urban residents. His final chapter portrays 
rather brutal ‘class conflict’ between a bureaucratic indigenous middle 
class and impoverished kampung dwellers (Dick 2002:472). Kathryn 
Robinson’s (1986) study of a new mining town in Sulawesi showed that, as 
the village of Soroako grew into a town, a class structure began to emerge 
that created new ideological and cultural forms in everyday life. However, 
others cautioned that prevailing tensions did not seem to follow conven-
tional class lines. In his theoretically sophisticated history of Padang, 
Freek Colombijn (1994) found that ‘conventional class analysis’, such as 
that being advocated for urban studies at the time by the sociologists 
Manuel Castells and Henri Lefebvre, was insufficient to explain social 
relations in his town. Instead of cleavages based on possession of the 
means of production, Colombijn saw a (Dahrendorfian) conflict between 
those in and out of power. Like many provincial cities and towns in 
Indonesia, but unlike Surabaya, Padang had and has little industry to 
speak of. Trade and state employment dominate its economy. Colombijn’s 
observation is important for our search for Middle Indonesia, which looks 
for it not in Jakarta and Surabaya, but in the more numerous middle-size 
towns around the archipelago.
Here we offer a synthetic alternative interpretation that yet gives a cen-
tral place to class. The argument goes as follows. The politically active 
core of the provincial middle class is indigenous and bureaucratic, with 
their commercial allies. (Members of the ethnic Chinese middle class, 
whose wealth is purely commercial, until recently hardly participated in 
formal politics, though many have long maintained backroom political 
relations.) The source of indigenous wealth in the middle class is on the 
whole not control over the means of production (rich batik producers in 
Pekalongan are an exception), but control over rents they obtain from the 
state or from managerial positions. In one notable reinterpretation of Karl 
Marx by Aage Sørensen (2000), rent-seeking replaces the labour theory of 
value. The exploiters have access to assets that earn them rents while the 
exploited do not. Assets do not have to be money but can be many other 
things, such as knowledge (education) or official power. Clearly the power 
to deny others similar access is a form of exploitation. The power provin-
cial bureaucrats exercise, in other words, is also a kind of class power. 
They wield that power in formal bureaucratic ways. Education is an 
important qualification for entry to this privileged group in town. Those 
who finish high school have a chance of making it into the public service 
or even a big firm in Jakarta, while those without are likely to get stuck 
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selling mobile-phone cards in front of the local mall (as Wenty Marina 
Minza richly illustrates). But bureaucratic power is also expressed in 
informal, social and cultural ways. Corruption and ethnic, religious or 
kinship favouritism are widespread in provincial towns, as Minza and 
Savirani both make clear. It is a central part of the bureaucratic politics 
in town.
Informality in the economy is the crucial matrix for local-elite power. 
Middle Indonesia’s economy is strikingly informal. More than half of all 
urban workers are informal, and in the trade and agricultural sectors the 
figures rise above 80% (Angelini and Hirose 2004:6–9). Jan Newberry 
writes evocatively in the present volume that ‘the kampung class is pro-
foundly shaped through its economic role in the Indonesian economy’ 
[providing] ‘cooking candy to be sold, name card printing, piecework 
labour, haircutting, a small snack and drink stall, numbers games, as well 
as the spiritual help to win at them’. Globalization actually stimulates 
growth in the informal sector rather than deflating it as people move into 
formal industry. An authoritative study by Alejandro Portes writes that 
the informal economy is ‘the realm where the embeddedness of economic 
action in social networks and the unanticipated consequences of purpo-
sive official action emerge most clearly’ (2010:161). Socially embedded 
power plays out within the informal economy, operating through local 
cultural values to produce mechanisms of exclusion as well as inclusion. 
Examples in this book are the religious teachers who exploit contract 
labour in Cilegon, and the ethnic Dayak bosses who seize bureaucratic 
turf in Pontianak. Part of this informal economy is moreover illegal, con-
sisting for example of unregistered timber cutting, prostitution or the 
smuggling of stolen motorcycles, drugs or oil. This domain, too, is domi-
nated by provincial middle classes (including corrupt police, military and 
state prosecutors) rather than by the poor or the very rich.
The political power developed at the intersection of the formal and the 
informal can be exercised downward against the local poor, or outward 
towards the central state. We consider the first here, and the second in a 
subsequent section on the state. Nico Warouw in this book describes 
political operators in the town of Cilegon who finance their political 
careers by winning informal labour contracts under the corporate social 
responsibility (CRS) programme of the gigantic steel manufacturer 
Krakatao. For factory managers, having locals paint their sheds and 
maintain their machinery through CRS represents small change. But for 
the underemployed in Cilegon’s kampung communities it is a lifeline, 
even if it means working for an unscrupulous local boss who gives 
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9 Medan’s crime-ridden Amblas and Binjai suburbs contrast with the elite Helvetia 
suburb. Jakarta has the impoverished Kampung Melayu or Ciliwung River slums on the 
one hand, and the gated communities in southern Jakarta on the other. I base these state-
ments on my own (unpublished) calculations of an ‘index of dissimilarity’ for several cities 
using 2005 Susenas census data at the neighbourhood (kelurahan) level.
them zero protection on labour standards. In the chapter by Minza, 
poor job-seekers place great hopes on possible patrons in their environs, 
but the rich can afford to follow their ideals of self-realization while 
enjoying the services of the poor. Unlike the socially isolated tycoons of 
Jakarta, lower-middle-class provincial actors, such as these bureaucrat-
politicians-cum-labour brokers, can swing power in the informal system 
of social relationships in which they are immersed. Such ‘non-price insti-
tutions for achieving social order’, as the new institutional economist 
Janet Landa (1994) put it, dominate life in the provincial town and its 
informal economy to a far greater extent than they do in the city with its 
skyscrapers and factories.
Gauging the level of tension these power differences generate was 
not an easy task. Ben White points out in his chapter on this question 
that ‘you don’t find classes unless you look for them’. He suggests that 
researchers in the 1950s Mojokuto project did not look. Not all of us looked 
equally hard, but even those who did, did not notice a high degree of 
class polarization. At the time that we studied them, our five towns were 
largely peaceful. Everyday discourse in town is not strongly class-oriented. 
Indeed, the Gini index of inequality is somewhat lower in Indonesia’s 
trade-, agriculture- and bureaucracy-dominated provinces than in the 
industrialized cities (Akita and Lukman 1999). The town has an internal 
spatial structure consisting of business and government quarters, middle-
class housing, and lower-class kampungs, not so different from that once 
described by Wertheim (1959:180–1). The level of spatial segregation by 
income class is not as high in most provincial towns as it is in big cities 
such as Medan or Jakarta.9 The slums are less wretched, the villas of the 
rich somewhat less ostentatious, and the spatial segregation less clear 
than in Jakarta, Sylvia Tidey finds in her survey of Kupang in this volume. 
We think it is fair to conclude that Middle Indonesia is relatively unpolar-
ized. Inasmuch as Middle Indonesia is dominated by a broad middle class, 
that class, too, is ‘non-polar’. Both Barbara Harriss-White and Diane Davis 
deploy the same term in their own recent discussions of middle classes.
While tensions are not confronting, however, they are certainly pres-
ent, and they may be rising. Sylvia Tidey noticed that though Kupang’s 
middle class do not always live in enclaved housing estates, they do 
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increasingly prefer them. These estates did not exist in the small town 
that preceded today’s Kupang. Other authors noticed that while members 
of the middle classes did not talk about class, those of the lower classes 
did. When Nico Warouw visited the fishers kampungs on the outskirts of 
Cilegon and Pekalongan, he heard class talk all the time. People com-
plained that they were excluded from politics by those who had better 
access to the state than they. They called the excluders ‘elites’, though 
in reality these were lower-level civil servants, people who would gener-
ally be classified lower-middle class. Among the excluded were factory 
workers (including skilled migrant labour), contract workers and infor-
mal workers. Wenty Marina Minza writes of the different life chances 
for Malay and Dayak youths of the ‘lower middle class’ versus those of 
mainly ethnic Chinese ‘middle class’ origin. The former fervently hope 
to become civil servants – any type will do – whereas the latter can afford 
to dream of developing their own unique potential as professionals. Janice 
Newberry, writing about a kampung in Yogyakarta, distinguished a self-
conscious ‘kampung’ class of informal workers (many of them women) 
from an ‘urban middle class’ of white-collar workers.
There was a time when the communist party mobilized on these 
resentments – indeed this was happening in the very years the MIT team 
was still in Mojokuto. The Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia, or PKI) explicitly aimed to wean the poor off their dependency 
relations with patrons (Huizer 1974:100–1). In 1965/66 provincial towns 
around the country became the scene of bloody pogroms against com-
munists. Members of provincial middle classes collaborated with the 
military, turning the massacres into the denouement of suddenly white-
hot local class conflict (Kammen and McGregor 2012). Perhaps half a mil-
lion people were killed, and many more detained for years without trial. 
Here the ‘middle’ was not asserting itself so much against Jakarta as 
against their own poor.
After the destruction of the communist party, memories of this episode 
were quickly encouraged to fade. Few of our researchers heard locals talk 
about them. Clientelistic attachments to middle-class patrons once more 
became the best option for the poor. Jan Newberry describes patron– 
client links between the kampung and urban middle classes that even 
extend to giving away their children in the desperate hope of improve-
ment. She writes: ‘[H]ierarchical relationships are described in familial 
terms. The poorer, lower-status man is child to his senior officer (anak 
buah or literally, fruit child). Many poor people in my acquaintance hope 
to become the anak buah of a powerful man, and thus derive the benefits 
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(often economic) in exchange for loyalty (often political).’ Anyone who 
does not belong to a clientelist network gets nothing. Wenty Marina 
Minza spoke with poor Dayaks in Pontianak who felt that they lacked 
the koneksi to make the most of the greater Dayak access to civil-service 
jobs that recent patronage democracy had created. One of them told her: 
‘My parents say that they can seek help from my father’s friend. But his 
friend’s position is not strong. The position will probably go to someone 
else with a stronger connection.’
Clientelist networks are marked by mutual obligations that can only 
be enforced by social sanctions. The trust that lies at the basis of these 
unequal relationships is often drawn from some family-like identity, 
which can be neighbourhood-based, religious or ethnic. The informality 
of state and market that is so characteristic of Middle Indonesia (as it is 
of Third World towns everywhere – see Datta 1990) makes clientelism 
pervasive. Rivalry between clientelist networks therefore often takes on 
communal dimensions. The most striking social differences within town 
are in fact ethnic. Others who examined provincial societies in Indonesia 
have noted that claims to local power seem to be based, not on possession 
of the means of production, as conventional analysts would expect, but 
on ethnicity and religion (Amal 1992; Asnan 2007; Schiller 1996). Several 
of our authors mention them, but Minza’s chapter revolves around them. 
It seeks to explain why in Pontianak, as she put it, ‘[e]ntering the bureau-
cracy was apparently not a matter of acquiring the right qualifications 
but of being born into the right ethnic group’. In three of our five towns – 
Kupang, Ternate and Pontianak – people still recalled vividly an extensive 
episode of communal violence that took place in their town almost a 
decade earlier. These episodes were associated with the introduction 
of democracy, and the result has been to increase the salience of ethnic 
differences in these towns until the present day.
Much political-science literature about Indonesia revolves around 
the clientelistic relations that exist within government and between 
government and citizenry at the national level (Crouch 1979, 2009). 
Recent studies have demonstrated the prevalence of neo-patrimonial 
relations also at much more local levels (Van Klinken and Barker 2009). 
In the present study they turn out to be ubiquitous in provincial kam-
pungs everywhere, particularly among poorer sections of the community. 
Most local-government and market institutions are ‘socially embedded’ 
in such patron–client networks. The networks are both integrative 
(by connecting people they build social capital) and oppressive (they 
often prevent citizens from claiming their rights). These interactions 
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produce the kind of business and politics for which provincial towns are 
best known – clientelistic, anti-liberal and, sometimes, intimidatory. 
‘Intermediate-class’ operators, as we see them in the chapters by Nico 
Warouw, Wenty Marina Minza and Amalinda Savirani, mobilize, dis-
pense patronage and threaten rivals with violence, all in an attempt to 
monopolize access to state contracts for their own network. The absence 
of formal legal sanctions to adjudicate these personalized deals creates 
considerable insecurity, as Minza’s chapter makes particularly clear. 
Civil society, too, remains elusive, although Nico Warouw sees signs 
of it emerging as electoral democracy becomes more routine at the local 
level. Provincial societies are dominated, not by citizens who are free 
to speak truth to power, but by collusive, Gramscian blocs of bureaucrats, 
legislators, entrepreneurs, NGOs and journalists who are the state in 
their town.
There are some signs that the urban poor are increasingly looking for 
alternatives to a clientelistic arrangement. Nico Warouw describes local-
neighbourhood actions to resist the patrons that they call ‘elites’ because 
they feel democracy offers them the chance for direct access to state 
resources. If inequalities continue to rise within Middle Indonesia – as 
experience elsewhere leads us to expect, at least until urbanization 
reaches maturity at around 70% – and if democracy holds, we may see 
clientelism give way once more to open class politics. This could make 
urban middle classes lean once more towards authoritarianism, as 
Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens (1992) predicted, and as 
had actually happened in Indonesia in 1965. The Bangkok unrest of 2010 is 
a recent Southeast Asian example of how this might happen.
State
This section returns to the question of the disproportionate political 
influence Middle Indonesia has on national issues such as democracy and 
the role of the state in the economy. Unlike middle classes in the conven-
tional western imagination, Middle Indonesia’s lower middle classes gen-
erally love the state. Nearly every indigenous university student Wenty 
Marina Minza interviewed in Pontianak told her they wanted to become 
a civil servant; not because the work fascinated them, but because it pro-
vided a steady income with which they could help mum and dad. Nearly 
every construction contractor Amalinda Savirani spoke to in Pekalongan 
told her they relied on state procurement for their living. The politics in 
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which these members of provincial middle classes engage are not about 
reducing state power over their lives, but about gaining more direct con-
trol over state resources. They are not about giving the market more room 
to breathe, but about increasing state powers to redistribute market prof-
its to non-market players. This is most clearly the case in a town like 
Kupang, whose economy has little of interest to a middle class other than 
the state, as Sylvia Tidey shows. But it also holds for Pontianak, which is a 
trading entrepot for the resource-rich interior as well as a bureaucratized 
provincial capital. Minza demonstrates that its economy is segmented in 
such a way that the numerous and growing indigenous lower middle class 
is excluded from the middle and upper reaches of the market. The civil 
service is still the only place for them to go. As Kracauer’s (1998 [orig. 
German 1929]) white-collar salariat of Berlin became for the first time in 
history the formative power in the public sphere in Weimar Germany, so 
Middle Indonesia’s bureaucratic middle class shapes public life more 
than any other social force. The mutually constitutive role of the state and 
the provincial middle class is one of the most important emphases in the 
present set of studies.
If the economy had been largely formal and transparent, and if the 
state had been capable of acting coherently everywhere in its territory, 
then these lower-middle-class preferences would be a losing proposition. 
They would be a sign of their marginalization in a world in which states 
aim largely to facilitate global capitalism. But in Indonesia the provincial 
economy is overwhelmingly informal, and central state institutions are 
hardly capable of exercising their will without appeasing local bosses. 
The hidden strength of the provincial middle classes lies precisely in the 
opacity of the economy of their towns, caused by the informality of their 
intricate local arrangements and their impenetrability to central supervi-
sion. The fact that Middle Indonesia controls what Harriss-White for 
India called ‘the economy of the 88 percent’ creates political realities in 
Indonesia as well (Van Klinken 2009a). Provincial middle classes are not 
exactly rich in comparison with the national bourgeoisie, yet their 
demands for local autonomy have managed to keep the latter off balance. 
Their control of the local informal economy allows them to organize on 
their own turf. The local ‘big men’ Nico Warouw describes in Pekalongan 
and Cilegon – religious leaders and other community leaders – are essen-
tial to the state as political operators because they control territory to 
which the central state needs to have access too. The process of state for-
mation that they represent resembles the ‘strong man centered politics’ 
that Patricio Abinales described in his history of Mindanao (2000:12), and 
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the street-level authority so essential to governance in Joshua Barker’s 
(2009) Bandung.
Provincial assertiveness thus has its roots in the economy. Economic 
relations between subnational regions and national and global markets 
are complex. We have not studied them in detail – something we hope 
others will do. But what we have seen suggests that these relations are as 
politically charged as the administrative ones. On the one hand, private 
and public investment remains crucial to the economies of all provincial 
towns. But on the other, distrust of big capital is stronger among provin-
cial business entrepreneurs than it seems to be in Jakarta. Provincial 
enterprises are smaller than those in the big cities. Entrepreneurs and 
local-government leaders know each other well. Together they organize 
to resist what they regard as threatening incursions from outside. Contrary 
to the suggestion created by the ‘shared poverty’ that Clifford Geertz 
detected in small-town Indonesia in the 1950s, these towns do have an 
economy to protect. Amalinda Savirani describes local officials who col-
lude with construction contractors in town to circumvent new rules 
demanding transparent tendering. They fear these rules are a wedge in 
the door for an invasion of bigger builders from Jakarta. They have a 
shared interest in keeping outsiders out, and networks in the town are 
tight-knit enough to develop control over the process of awarding govern-
ment contracts. Middle-class bureacrats and their class allies increase 
their rents by subverting institutions and regulations intended to improve 
market operation. Rents are thus earned through the political process, by 
building political alliances, rather than on the basis of quality of service 
and a perfect market.
At the same time, Middle Indonesia loves democracy, provided it 
comes with local autonomy. The present book offers only glimpses of 
the way Middle Indonesia practises democracy – with a gritty and often 
manipulative kind of energy and without nostalgia for centralized 
military rule. Other scholars are devoting a great deal of attention to it. 
Their work is too rich to summarize here, but among the most analytical 
is Ryan Tans’ (2012) typology of local political actors. We recognize his 
depiction of local actors who combine some highly predatory behaviours 
with competitive mobilizational work that is sometimes good for democ-
racy. Their skill at building coalitions sometimes brings previously 
excluded groups into politics. This helps them trump rivals who would 
have defeated them under a centralized authoritarian system. Particularly 
in those poorly governed, thinly populated areas that we here call Middle 
Indonesia, the central state is happy to appease rather than enforce rules. 
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Democracy has offered the local elites who populate our studies chances 
they would not have had under a more centralized regime. As noted 
above, this might change if the poor demand a bigger slice of the cake of 
provincial state rents than they do at present. But that possibility remains 
hypothetical at the moment.
Everyday Culture
Culturally, Middle Indonesia is a crossroads, a skein of mediatory pro-
cesses. These processes are relatively unpolarized within the town, but 
they tend to be localist within the nation. The mediatory function of 
Middle Indonesia is at the heart of Joseph Errington’s analysis of everyday 
language use in Kupang. Kupang Malay differs from both standard 
Indonesian and from local languages spoken in the rural province of East 
Nusa Tenggara. Faced with striking differences among these languages, 
everyone in town has to negotiate which combination of Kupang Malay 
and Indonesian they will use in any particular setting. The boundaries in 
these negotiations seem to be shifting towards Kupang Malay, as local 
status markers adapt to the town’s growing confidence in its regional 
autonomy. ‘Mixed use of the two languages serves to create a way of talk-
ing that is socially intermediary’, he concludes. ‘It allows speakers to enact 
middle-class identities grounded in both the city and the nation.’ Mixed 
language use is ‘mediating in an integrationist dynamic’. At the same 
time, these shifting patterns are the linguistic counterpart to rising local-
ist sentiment. Visitors from the centre are regularly reminded of the popu-
lar injunction, mentioned at the start of this chapter, ‘where the feet touch 
the ground, there the sky is held up’ (Di mana bumi dipijak di sana langit 
dijunjung), meaning ‘respect local values’. Kupang has no history of sepa-
ratism, yet its distinctive language mediates a kind of regional identity. 
This, too, is an expression of Middle Indonesian assertiveness.
If there are class tensions in town, they do not extend to culture wars. 
At least at first sight, internal differences seem minimal. But much 
depends on the vantage point of the analyst, and some observers have 
seen striking differences. In the eyes of the town’s better-off denizens, 
integrative, diffusive processes of modernization appear to be the most 
powerful. Noorhaidi Hasan describes established provincial middle 
classes who introduce cosmopolitan religious ideas to the town from the 
big cities that they so frequently visit. The talk they stimulate in public is 
an optimistic and universalizing one of democratic, consumerist Islamic 
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piety. The top layer of the provincial society enjoys almost the same 
lifestyle as in Jakarta or Hong Kong. To the wealthiest members of the 
provincial middle class – successful entrepreneurs, education profession-
als, religious leaders and senior officials – the town feels not that much 
different from the big city. Their culture sets the tone for the whole town 
in terms of formal dress codes, architectural taste, publicly funded enter-
tainment or religious events. They have ensured that their towns have 
mediated the hegemonic metropolitan cultures and practices well, facili-
tated by ever-tighter political, economic and infrastructural integration 
throughout the twentieth century. The education system they run is 
among the most powerful means at their disposal. Noorhaidi Hasan 
describes the Islamic members of provincial middle classes whom he met 
as ‘active negotiators between the global and the local, and between the 
cosmopolitan centre and the hinterland’. As a result, he writes, ‘Indonesian 
Islam has experienced a process of gentrification, favouring global high-
technology and consumerist Islamic appetites’. This way lies civility. 
Contrary to the arguments of some that globalization makes people 
withdraw defensively into local cultures (Juergensmeyer 2005), Noorhaidi 
finds the global flows smoothly into the provincial and is welcomed there. 
It has to be said that opposition from the more traditional provincial 
conservatism remains somewhat understudied in this account, as is the 
dark side of the hegemony the town’s establishment exercises over the 
permissible public discourse. Half of Kebumen town is classified as ‘poor’, 
yet the public discourse is not one of dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, the 
contribution that the town makes to the diffusion of global values remains 
an important argument of this book, even if that contribution is not with-
out limits.
Cornelis Lay, by contrast, provides a view from below. His reminis-
cences of growing up in a lower-class kampung in Kupang in the 1970s 
bring to light a culture at odds with that of the town’s middle class. Contra 
the MIT team in the 1950s, and contra those who source today’s provincial 
localism to the ill-educated poor, kampung values were not ‘traditional’. 
They were proletarian. The poor enjoyed a loud and somewhat irreverent 
neighbourly solidarity that expected little from the wider world. Not 
resigned involution, but strong aspirations for upward mobility circulated 
there. Meanwhile the culture of personal piety, restraint and hygiene 
practised in the homes of the ‘bosses’ in town – nearly all civil servants – 
was to Kupang’s poor a source of wonderment. The days when they could 
vent that irreverence in loud protests against ‘bureaucratic capitalists’ 
(kapitalis birokrat, or kabir) had passed shortly before, amidst the brutal 
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anticommunist purges of the mid-1960s, which Connie Lay still remem-
bers vaguely. By the 1970s, as in Jan Newberry’s account of the kampung 
poor in today’s Yogyakarta, the route to upward social mobility lay in 
approaching the bosses for patronage. The basis was there in the town’s 
cross-class bonds of ethnic community, as well as in a paternalistic faith 
in progress through hard work that glowed in the bossoms of the bosses. 
This is how Cornelis Lay got his scholarship to the university in Java. 
Not everyone was so lucky. Repeated disappointment creates real resent-
ment. The poor still believe fervently that education offers them a way up, 
but the usual meritocratic principles do not work well (see the chapter by 
Wenty Marina Minza). Today, the urban poor know democracy has not 
yet brought equality to them. That awareness of their rights makes them 
part of a wave of rising expectations washing the globe from Burma to 
Morocco.
Further Research
As the title of this book indicates, Middle Indonesia is not a set of con-
clusions but a research programme or, more accurately, another step 
forward in an effort that scholars have now been pursuing for some time. 
This section highlights three broad suggestions for pushing research into 
Indonesia’s middle classes forward.
The first is to learn more from the ‘spatial turn’ in the social sciences in 
recent years. The premise of that turn can be expressed very simply as 
follows: ‘[W]here things happen is critical to knowing how and why they 
happen’ (Warf and Arias 2008:1). Many social processes of practical 
importance in a large country such as Indonesia are spatially selective. 
Industrialization creates employment near large cities (and a few towns 
like Cilegon), but rural peasants dispossessed by advancing cash crops are 
likely to become a permanent ‘surplus population’ (Li 2009). Religious 
conservatism is more mobilizable in provincial towns than in villages or 
large cities. In Indonesia’s complex political geography, Jakarta Golkar 
apparatchiks are slowly gaining ground over local party ‘mafias’ in densely 
settled coastal areas, but not in thinly populated, poorly governed upland 
areas (Tans 2012). In short, whether focused on the impact of globaliza-
tion or ‘islamo-fascism’, governance or electoral politics, the most fruitful 
research agendas will include spatial comparisons. Provincial towns play 
important roles in these extended spaces.
The second is to broaden research on class beyond the present, pre-
dominantly cultural, interests (such as questions about glocalization and 
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hybridity) to include material interests, antagonism and exploitation. 
In Indonesia, class in this sense has not been a focus for many years 
(Farid 2005). Many well-known factors have led to a decline in such 
studies over the last two decades: the Cold War has ended; class tensions 
seem to be muted everywhere, except in Latin America; liberalization 
has caused the prestige of central states that were once the object of 
class struggles to decline; identity struggles appear to assume greater 
prominence the closer the anthropologist approaches a local arena. 
Yet the emotions on the streets of crisis-hit southern European cities are 
class emotions, harbingers of more if the global economy and, with it, 
the capitalist narrative continue to falter. Class antagonisms were overt in 
the Red versus Yellow battles that paralysed Bangkok in 2010, and they 
underlie the Chinese Communist Party’s fears about explosive urban–
rural inequalities. The present book has begun to explore the subtle inter-
play of dependence and antagonism, of identity and class, of clientship 
and citizenship, that can be seen in the everyday relations in provincial 
towns where these concern access to the resources of the local state.
The third broad suggestion is to do more with networks, no longer 
merely as a metaphor, but also as a complex map of actual relationships. 
Networks have always been prominent in the lexicon of human geogra-
phers. They are now also central to the spatial turn pioneered by social 
scientists such as Bruno Latour, David Harvey, Doreen Massey and 
Manuel Castells. They offer a way of resolving the contradictory observa-
tions about diffusion and an assertive middle by introducing key notions 
such as mediation and brokerage. On the one hand, the network idiom is 
appropriate for the patron–client ties that characterize so much social 
interaction within the town, as well as for the politics of decentralization 
that have boosted Middle Indonesia’s influence. Networks emphasize 
interconnectivity, they build social capital, and this is reflected in much of 
the positive work of diffusion that we have observed in Middle Indonesia. 
On the other hand, just as important (though less often remarked) is the 
fact that networks of antagonism also exist. Brokerage can be extortion-
ary under certain circumstances – think of the lucrative chokepoints along 
the Rhine that made Germany’s robber barons rich. Gatekeeping, even 
sabotage, are also brokerage functions. The regional revolts of 1957 can be 
seen as Middle Indonesian brokers ganging up on the centre. ‘Urban bias’ 
occurs when towns grow fat at the expense of the countryside – they are 
acting like brokers who charge commission. Such behaviour is typical of 
provincial towns in Indonesia (G. Jones 1988:150), and, to a much greater 
extent, of the cities of sub-Saharan Africa (Bates 2008; Kitching 1980). 
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These more complex aspects of network theory could help us vizualize 
the simultaneous existence in town of uneasy class tensions between 
patrons and clients on the one hand, and communal rivalries between 
multiple middle-class patrons on the other. The political economy of 
gatekeeping games played by members of provincial middle-class ‘elites’ 
is not the simple binary one of capitalists and workers, but the more com-
plex one of control over sources of rents. These games can possibly be 
described either in terms of ‘non-polar’ classes or of network brokerage.
Summing Up
Our Middle Indonesian studies are producing a grounded explanation for 
many features of Indonesian social and political life once attributed 
vaguely to an abstract Indonesian culture. Among them are the resur-
gence in Islamic piety and of ethnic identities; the tradition of gotong 
royong kampung solidarity; and a messy interplay of democracy, corrup-
tion and anti-market sentiments. These beliefs and practices turn out to 
be most visible in particular spaces, namely provincial towns, while their 
agents are members of particular social classes, namely provincial (lower) 
middle classes. That is what Middle Indonesia is about – the power of 
the middle to impress itself on the whole. The idea is that we can explain 
higher-level processes (national democratization, anti-market sentiment, 
religion, conservative types of solidarity) by means of lower-level 
processes.10
A focus on Middle Indonesia offers a new interpretation of the massive 
growth in the number of people who can afford more than the absolute 
basics in life. The increase in purchasing power as well as in political 
influence has been rapid particularly among an overwhelmingly lower 
middle class. They resemble less the comfortable bourgeoisie of nine-
teenth-century Europe than an anxious and conservative petit bourgeoi-
sie. Historically this politically active group has been created by the 
state – they are teachers, government clerks, police officers and their 
private business partners. In recent times the proportion coming from 
the private sector has grown – though probably less so in provincial towns 
than in the big cities. The prosperity even of those in the private sector 
also depends on connections with the state through government con-
tracts and subsidies. Informality and social embeddedness characterize 
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Globe, 27 March 2012.
all state and market institutions at this provincial, lower-middle-class 
level. Perhaps it is true that people’s behaviour there constitutes the con-
sumer revolution that excites the ADB, but it is not matched with a revo-
lution in the economic productivity to underpin it. The threatening 
‘middle-income trap’11 has its home in Middle Indonesia too.
Democracy is important to this group because it promises them greater 
access to the resources of the state and the state-managed market. 
This distinguishes them from the national bourgeoisie who already had 
all they wanted under the authoritarian New Order. In 1998 many observ-
ers feared the new democracy might have been merely the unintended 
consequence of an intra-elite spat, to be withdrawn once elite unity 
was restored. The fact that today Indonesia is a consolidated democracy 
is due as much to those millions in Middle Indonesia who continue to 
make it work as to a bourgeoisie who initiated it. That said, the quality 
of democracy also bears the imprint of Middle Indonesia’s peculiarly 
clientelistic and informalized class tensions. Scholars of provincial poli-
tics elsewhere in Southeast Asia have made similar discoveries. Daniel 
Arghiros (2001:273) summed up Thai provincial democracy by naming 
‘just two phenomena: vote buying and political clientelism’ (see also 
McVey 2000; Ockey 2004). The ‘gangsters’ in an edited volume entitled 
Gangsters, democracy, and the state in Southeast Asia were mainly provin-
cial operators (Trocki 1998). We have called what they do ‘patronage 
democracy’ (Van Klinken 2009b).
Decentralization, not human rights or justice for the poor, was for 
this bureaucratic middle class the central reform. Indeed, whenever the 
poor do organize today, the charge of communism is quickly heard from 
the mouths of these same provincial democrats, with all its echoes of 
the death of democracy in 1965. The analysis of Rueschemeyer, Huber 
Stephens and Stephens suggests that the single most important explana-
tion for the deficiencies in Indonesia’s democratization is the minimal 
role that the poor have played in the post-1998 reforms.
In short, Middle Indonesia on the whole resists rather than welcomes 
globalized, open markets (while of course enjoying the consumer goods 
on sale). The picture here is not wholly unambiguous, as seen for example 
in the globalized provincial-elite lifestyles in Noorhaidi Hasan’s chapter, 
but it is strong enough to be a core argument of the book. In the political 
arena, Middle Indonesia enjoys democracy but uses its political skills and 
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clientelistic networks to make the system work to its own advantage, 
which is not necessarily that of either the national elites or the poor.
We make no predictions about the future of Middle Indonesia. Those 
who think it represents a rearguard conservatism, bound eventually to 
wither under the onslaught of global capital, may be right, as may those 
who think Middle Indonesia represents the core of an admittedly flawed, 
yet ultimately hopeful, resistance to that same global capital. As Ben 
White points out here, this question was already raised by the originator 
of the ‘intermediate-class’ concept, Michal Kalecki, in the 1970s, and it 
remains an open one. But we do claim that the social and geographical 
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BETTING ON THE MIDDLE? MIDDLETOWN, MOJOKUTO  
AND ‘MIDDLE INDONESIA’
Ben White
Intermediate Towns and Intermediate Classes
As explained in the introduction, the various chapters in this book are 
based on a research project that set out to study ‘intermediate classes’ in 
Indonesia’s ‘intermediate towns’. The project’s name ‘Middle Indonesia’ 
echoes the decision of Clifford Geertz and his colleagues in the MIT 
Indonesia research project, almost 60 years ago, to call the middle-sized 
town in and around which their research was located ‘Mojokuto’, which 
means in Javanese literally ‘middle town’. This in turn was a clear refer-
ence to the well-known studies in the 1920s and 1930s by Robert and Helen 
Lynd and their research team of Muncie, Indiana, a middle-sized town in 
the United States that they called ‘Middletown’. These ‘middle town’ stud-
ies attracted much attention and generated much debate. The second key 
aspect of our research project – ‘intermediate classes’ in these ‘middle 
towns’ – has its roots in a pioneering essay by the Polish economist Michał 
Kalecki (Kalecki 1972b) on intermediate classes and intermediate regimes, 
originally written in the 1960s and based on his observations in the 1950s 
in India, Egypt and particularly Indonesia, and a more recent debate on 
the significance, survival and developmental role of intermediate classes 
in India (Harriss-White 2003).
This short chapter reflects on some of the antecedents and implica-
tions of this focus on the ‘intermediate’. What are the implications of this 
attention to the economic, social and political ‘middle’? What do we in 
fact study when we study intermediate towns? Do we think that we can 
find in them a microcosm of the larger society? Should we be (and have 
we been) studying these towns, or have we rather been studying other 
things in these towns – in other words, is ‘middle Indonesia’ the object, or 
the locus of our study? And what are the implications of a focus on the 
‘intermediate’ social classes in these ‘middle’ towns, rather than their 
elites, their working classes or the destitute? These questions are in fact 
part of a broader debate in the social sciences on the advantages and 
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disadvantages of a focus on the ‘middle’ rather than the upper and lower 
‘extremes’ of societies.
In the social sciences there is a long-standing tension between two tra-
ditions of studying social processes and social change. One sees the ‘soul’ 
of a society or community, and the source of its dynamics, in its interme-
diate, modal or ‘middle’ components, while the other locates these more 
in the extreme ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ economic or social groups or classes 
(wealthy/poor, elite/mass) and especially the dynamics of their relation-
ships with each other. The first is associated with the North American 
sociological tradition, functionalism and neo-populism, while the latter is 
more associated with political economy, class analysis and Marxism.
The next three sections will further explore this broader tension by 
looking at two key areas of debate. First, we will touch briefly on the 
debates between two main traditions in the study of agrarian change, 
originating in continental Europe but also reflected in Indonesian agrar-
ian studies. Then we focus in greater detail on the conceptual divide 
between two landmark studies of ‘middle town’ society in the United 
States, the ‘Middletown’ and ‘Yankee City’ studies. We then turn to 
Indonesia and the ‘Mojokuto’ studies of the early 1950s, returning finally 
to some reflections on our own ‘middle Indonesia’ studies.
Marxists and Neo-Populists
In rural studies the tensions mentioned above are manifested most clearly 
in the debates between the Leninist and Chayanovian traditions of 
research on agrarian change in the Russian and northern European coun-
tryside. These have continued in studies of Asian, African and Latin 
American peasantries in process of ‘modernization’. What was this all 
about? Lenin wrote from exile in Siberia in 1896–1899, using statistical 
data sent from Moscow by his wife. Chayanov was professor of agricul-
tural economics in the more comfortable surroundings of the Timiryazev 
Academy in Moscow, and wrote mainly in the 1920s. Both based their 
work on similar sets of pre-Bolshevik local-government (zemstvo) statis-
tics on farm size and organization. But they produced diametrically 
opposing visions of Russian peasant society.
Lenin recognized the existence of a ‘middle’ group of peasant family 
farms (which he estimated at about 40% of all farms), but focused his 
analysis on the two groups on either side of them. These were the capital-
ist-farmer minority (‘probably less than one-fifth’ of all households, but 
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together representing a large part of the rural economy) and their rela-
tionship with the landless and near-landless (the ‘lower 50%’) who pro-
vided them with wage labour. He saw the dynamic of change in the 
relationship between these two extremes. The ‘cumulation of advantages 
and disadvantages’ resulted in the emergence of these two groups and 
produced the ‘differentiation of the peasantry’. It was these groups, rather 
than the ‘labour farms’ in the middle, which provided the rural home-
market for both the agricultural and the industrial products of emerging 
Russian capitalism. Their relationship was therefore an essential building 
block in his larger argument that capitalism was already developing in 
Russia. In Lenin’s model of class differentiation, the penetration of a com-
modity economy ‘develops the extreme groups at the expense of the mid-
dle peasantry’. This process of ‘depeasantization’ creates ‘new types of 
rural inhabitants’, the well-to-do, labour-hiring farmers at one extreme 
and the landless (or, more often, near-landless) rural proletariat at the 
other:
Numerically, the peasant bourgeoisie constitute a small minority of the 
peasantry, probably not more than one-fifth of the total number of house-
holds.…But as to their weight in the sum-total of peasant farming, in the 
total quantity of means of production belonging to the peasantry, in the 
total amount of produce raised by the peasantry, the peasant bourgeoisie 
are undoubtedly predominant. They are the masters of the contemporary 
countryside.
 The most typical representative [of the rural proletariat]…is the 
allotment-holding farm labourer, day labourer, unskilled labourer, building 
worker or other allotment-holding worker. Insignificant farming on a patch 
of land, with the farm in a state of utter ruin… inability to exist without the 
sale of labour power…and extremely low standard of living – such are 
the distinguishing features of this type. One must assign not less than half of 
the total peasant households…to membership of the rural proletariat. 
(Lenin 1960 [1899]:177–8.)
Chayanov, in contrast, focused on the 80% of all households that were 
‘family farms’, because he was concerned to show that family farming 
could be an efficient and viable part of a ‘modern’ agrarian commodity 
economy. He acknowledged the existence of emerging capitalist farming 
on the ‘wage labour farms’ (which he estimated at around 10% of all 
farms) and also of the emerging landless proletariat, but ignored them for 
his purpose, which was to develop a model of the ‘labour farm’, the peas-
ant family farm:
Simple, everyday observation of life in the countryside shows us 
elements of ‘capitalist exploitation’. We suppose that, on the one hand, 
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proletarianization of the countryside and, on the other, a certain develop-
ment of capitalist production forms undoubtedly take place there…[how-
ever], as we are concerned with the labour farm the themes we have touched 
on, despite their exceptionally intense and topical general economic inter-
est, are quite to one side. (Chayanov 1966 [1925]:256–7.)
In Indonesian studies, from the late colonial period to the present, there 
has been a similar tension between two opposing visions of Indonesian 
rural society. One, dominant among policy makers, academics and urban 
elites, has promoted the image of rural society – especially, but not only, 
in Java – as being made up of egalitarian and homogeneous and classless 
communities of ‘peasants’ or small farmers, practicing some ill-defined 
form of ‘subsistence farming’ and to greater or lesser degree insulated 
from the cash economy. The other underlines the dependence of most 
rural Indonesians on the cash economy, at least from the early twentieth 
century, and the importance of processes of social differentiation, point-
ing to the emergence of agrarian classes, based primarily on access to 
land, including a substantial landless class in many regions (Hüsken and 
White 1989:237–47).
An example of the first approach during the late colonial and early 
independence period is Sukarno’s marhaenisme. It was inspired by 
Sukarno’s chance meeting on a stroll near Cigelereng with Marhaen, the 
Sundanese ‘chicken-flea peasant’ (tani sieur) who owned and operated a 
small farm but did not employ workers and was poor, but not a member of 
the proletariat (Soekarno 1975 [1930]:96–7). Another well-known example 
is Geertz’s influential ideas on ‘agricultural involution’ and ‘shared pov-
erty’ in rural Java, perhaps the only lasting theoretical contribution to 
Indonesian agrarian studies made by a foreign scholar in this period 
(Geertz 1963a). The second approach is reflected in the studies on land 
concentration, tenancy relations and the chronic indebtedness of small 
peasants, tenants and landless workers in West Java by Anwas Adiwilaga 
(1954a, 1954b) and Ten Dam (1966), and the Indonesian Peasant Front’s 
studies of numerous villages in different parts of Indonesia (Slamet-
Velsink 1988). Studies of Indonesia’s ‘green revolution’ and its impact on 
rural societies in the 1970s and 1980s (summarized in B. White 2005) show 
a similar tension between the two approaches.
The ‘Middletown’ Studies
In urban studies we can see a parallel kind of discussion in the debates on 
urban class and classlessness in the first half of the twentieth century, this 
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time originating in small-town studies conducted in the United States; in 
particular, we are concerned with Robert and Helen Lynd’s Middletown 
studies of the 1920s and 1930s in Muncie, Indiana (Lynd and Lynd 1929, 
1937) and, some years after that, Lloyd Warner and Paul Lunt’s ‘Yankee 
City’ studies (Warner and Lunt 1941). As already mentioned, the decision 
of Geertz and his colleagues in the MIT Indonesia project to call their 
research base ‘Mojokuto’ is a nod to the Lynds.
Robert and Helen Lynd had no training in the social sciences when 
they went to Muncie in 1924. In fact, they had been assigned the task of 
studying the ‘spiritual life’ of this small Midwestern town for their employ-
ers, the Institute of Social and Religious Research, funded by the promi-
nent Baptist John D. Rockefeller Jr. (Gilkesen Jr. 1995). Just like Geertz, 
whose task in the Mojokuto team was to study Javanese religion, but who 
ended up writing about all kinds of other topics, the Lynds also deviated 
from their terms of reference. They wrote only marginally on religion, and 
mainly about class cleavages in ‘Middletown’, and indeed, when the focus 
of their work became clear, they almost could not get their first book pub-
lished. This is especially interesting because they had gone to Muncie in 
the sure expectation of finding cultural and social homogeneity, but were 
converted to a class analysis perspective by what they found there.
In fact, the Lynds’ original study was a catalogue of methodological 
omissions in the search for cultural homogeneity. The town itself was cho-
sen because of its ethnically relatively homogeneous population, although 
they knew that ‘such a population is unusual in an American industrial 
city’ (Lynd and Lynd 1929:9). It had ‘a small Negro and foreign-born popu-
lation’; in the 1920s about 6% of Muncie’s population were black, but they 
were purposely excluded from the survey and only rarely appear in the 
book. In their second book the Lynds admitted that the racial line divid-
ing Muncie’s black minority from its majority white population was in fact 
‘the deepest and most blindly followed line of division in the commu-
nity….They are the most marginal population in Middletown’ (Lynd and 
Lynd 1937:463, 465; see also Bahr, Pearson and Elder 2007). Similarly, the 
town’s small Jewish minority appear only three times in 512 pages of the 
two Middletown books, even though one of these references mentions 
casually that the Jews ‘had come to dominate the retail life of the city’ 
(Lynd and Lynd 1929:484) and another that the Ku Klux Klan, coming into 
Middletown ‘like a tornado’ a few years previously, had chosen the town’s 
Catholics, blacks and Jews as its targets (Lynd and Lynd 1929:482–3).
Finally, Muncie’s four richest families – the four Ball brothers, who 
dominated the entire economy and social, cultural and political life of 
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Muncie – were also purposely excluded from the survey. It was only after 
the second study of Muncie in 1935 that the authors included a whole 
chapter on what they called ‘the X family: a pattern of business-class con-
trol’. Some of their informants showed their awareness of the dominance 
of this family in no uncertain terms, as in this man’s comment (in which 
‘X’ refers to the Ball family):
If I–m out of work I go to the X plant; if I need money I go to the X bank, and 
if they don’t like me I don’t get it; my children go to the X college; when I get 
sick I go to the X hospital; I buy a building lot or a house in an X subdivision; 
my wife goes downtown to buy clothes at the X department store; if my dog 
strays away he is put in the X pound; I buy X milk; I drink X beer, vote for X 
political parties, and get help from X charities; my boy goes to the X YMCA 
and my girl to their YWCA; I listen to the word of God in X-subsidised 
churches; if I–m a Mason I go to the X Masonic temple; I read the news from 
the X morning newspaper; and, if I am rich enough, I travel via the X airport. 
(Lynd and Lynd 1937:74.)
Surprisingly, then, the Lynds, although having set out to look for ‘the mid-
dle’ and, as we have seen, omitting from their study significant minorities 
at either extreme of the class divide, emerged from their study to promote 
a strident critique of class stratification in the United States. They argued 
in both the Middletown books and other publications for the next 
30 years that American society was based on unacceptable class divisions.
In their first book they had begun with a simplistic two-class model, 
declaring that the ‘division into working class and business class’ consti-
tuted the ‘outstanding cleavage’ in Muncie (and, by extension, the rest of 
urban industrial America) (Gilkesen Jr. 1995:334). This division was essen-
tially between the 71% of the workforce who ‘address their activities in 
getting their living primarily to things, utilizing material tools in the mak-
ing of things and the performance of services’, and the remaining 29% 
who ‘address their activities predominantly to people in the selling or 
promotion of things, services, and ideas’ (Lynd and Lynd 1929:22–24). This 
simple distinction (basically between ‘producers’ and ‘non-producers’), as 
later critics noted, failed to allow for the existence of either a ‘middle class’ 
(whether defined as professionals or white-collar workers) or an ‘upper 
class’. Instead, the Lynds lumped together salaried employees, the self-
employed, corner grocers and glass manufacturers in the business class 
(Gilkesen Jr. 1995:334).
The Lynds’ first book, Middletown: A study in contemporary American 
culture, became an unexpected best-seller, going through six printings in 
its first year. This was one reason behind their decision to go back to 
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Muncie with a new team in 1935, as Muncie emerged from the Great 
Depression. In their new study, Middletown in transition: A study in cul-
tural conflicts, the Lynds elaborated their class model into what 
they called a ‘nascent class system’ consisting of six classes. This book 
played an important part in giving class analysis more popular currency in 
the United States. Basically, the old ‘business-class’ and ‘working-class’ 
categories were each divided into three discrete strata. These were:
   1. ‘a small, self-conscious upper class’
2.  the business class: ‘established smaller manufacturers, merchants, and 
professional folk’ and better-paid salaried employees
3. ‘small white-collar folk’ (less economically secure)
4. a small ‘aristocracy of local labour’
5. the ‘masses of semiskilled and unskilled workers’, and
6.  irregularly employed ‘poor whites’ recently migrated from Appalachia 
(Lynd and Lynd 1937:458–60).
In 1937, in response to the popularity of the Middletown studies, the 
photographer Margaret Bourke-White was commissioned by Life maga-
zine to produce a picture essay on Muncie entitled ‘Muncie Ind. is the 
great U.S. “Middletown”’.1 To the surprise of many, she followed the Lynds’ 
perspective and produced images that starkly reflected class cleavage:
One showed Muncie’s ‘most exclusive set’ dressed in pink coats riding to 
hounds at William Ball’s farm, while another showed a former Ball steel and 
iron worker who had been forced to go on the dole after exhausting his 
indemnity from an industrial accident in which he lost a leg. Two other pho-
tos contrasted William Ball’s opulent living room with the one-room clap-
board shack in ‘Shedtown’ in which a desperately poor couple from Kentucky 
raised chickens ‘fer eatin’. (Gilkesen Jr. 1995:336.)
Residents of Muncie also read the book and the Life magazine article, and 
did not like either of them. As one said of Bourke-White’s photos: ‘They 
show the upper crust and the lower (soaked) crust, but left out the middle 
filling, which is the most important part of any community’ (cited in 
Gilkesen Jr. 1995:344, note 32).
To some, then, Bourke-White’s photos and the Lynds’ analysis that had 
inspired them seemed to have been flawed by their highlighting of 
Middletown’s extremes of wealth and poverty, to the exclusion of its 
‘middle’.
1 ‘Muncie Ind. is the great U.S. “Middletown”’, Life 2 (May 1937):15–26.
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Lloyd Warner’s ‘Yankee City’
The Middletown studies were more widely read, but had less influence in 
shaping conceptions of urban social structure in the United States than 
W. Lloyd Warner’s research in Newbury, Massachusetts between 1930 and 
1934. Warner’s research, published in the four ‘Yankee City’ volumes 
between 1941 and 1947, put forward a completely different picture.
The Yankee City studies were conducted by Harvard University’s 
Committee of Industrial Psychology. Warner and his team had, like the 
Lynds, looked for an ‘intermediate town’ to meet their requirements, this 
time with the following criteria: a population of less than 20,000; a com-
munity ‘sufficiently autonomous to have a separate life of its own, not a 
mere satellite of the metropolitan area of a large city’, with on the one 
hand a population ‘predominantly old American’ and with an ‘uninter-
rupted tradition back of it’, but on the other hand a number of ‘old ethnic 
groups like the Irish and Jews and newer ones like the Greeks and Italians’; 
and ‘near enough to Cambridge so that the research men could go back 
and forth without difficulty or loss of time’ (Warner and Lunt 1941:38–9). 
‘Old American’ here means not ‘native’ American, but those ‘Yankees’ who 
gave the city its pseudonym: ‘the stock which is usually thought of as the 
core of modern America – the group which normally assimilates the other 
ethnic groups’ (Warner and Lunt 1941: 38–9).
Newburyport was a harbour town at the mouth of a large river. Dating 
from the early seventeenth century, it had a population of 17,000 and 
about one quarter of its labour force worked in the town’s various shoe 
factories. It was also an important silverware manufacturing centre. It 
therefore had, like Middletown, a substantial working class. When sur-
veyed in 1933, 46% of the workforce were ‘semi-skilled’ (mainly factory) 
workers, and 19% were unemployed (Warner and Lunt 1941:77–8).
Warner and his team of ‘fieldmen’ (sometimes as many as fifteen) used 
aerial photography to map the city’s neighbourhoods, conducted hun-
dreds of interviews, and constructed a ‘social personality card’ for almost 
all of Newburyport’s 17,000 inhabitants, excluding only infants (Warner 
and Lunt 1941:70). Out of these materials Warner claimed to have worked 
out empirically the existence of six ‘stratified social classes’ in Newburyport. 
The notion of economic class was abandoned, and class defined rather 
vaguely as ‘orders of people who are believed to be, and are accordingly 
ranked by the members of the community, in socially superior and socially 
inferior positions’ (Warner and Lunt 1941:82). No more detailed definition 
of the concept than this was given in the chapters on concepts and 
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methods. Critics complained about the vagueness of the procedures fol-
lowed to arrive at this stratification, and the criteria for distinguishing the 
‘upper upper’, ‘lower upper’, ‘upper middle’, ‘lower middle’, ‘upper lower’ 
and ‘lower lower’ classes are indeed rather unclear. Later they were sys-
tematized and published as the methods of ‘Evaluated Participation’ and 
the ‘Index of Status Characteristics’ (Gilkesen Jr. 1995:340).
According to Warner this social class system, however unclearly 
defined, determined ‘the allocation of pleasant and unpleasant tasks 
among its members as well as the division of spoils’ (Warner and Lunt 
1941:24). This interpretation represented a shift away from more ‘eco-
nomic’ to more ‘social’ conceptions of class, which ‘deflected interest from 
production, what one did for a living and how much one earned, to social 
interaction and consumption, whom one associated with and how one 
spent one’s money’. This notion of stratification played down the divisive 
connotations of social inequality, viewing it in functionalist terms as 
both an inevitable by-product of a complex division of labour and as 
a source of integration rather than division and conflict (Gilkesen Jr. 
1995:339).
C. Wright Mills, in a devastating critique of the Yankee City project’s 
first volume, argued that Warner had jumbled up the three notions of 
(economic) class, (social) status and power, ‘absorbing these three ana-
lytically separable dimensions into the one sponge word “class”’, also fail-
ing to distinguish ‘class’ and ‘class-awareness’, and relying mainly on 
observations of ‘status-awareness’: ‘It is a double confusion: first, of class 
with status; and second, of class with status-awareness’ (Mills 1942:264–5). 
Most of the empirical chapters, he claimed, contained ‘a maximum of 
flat, tallying busywork with a minimum of sociological imagination…
embarrassingly naked as far as theoretical understanding and explana-
tion are concerned’ (Mills 1942:271). Not surprisingly, Mills came down 
firmly on the side of the Lynds:
Operating with a far less elaborate theory (and no doubt without the 17,000 
cards, the dictaphones, and the airplane used by Warner) the Lynds suc-
ceeded in presenting a far superior picture of the composition and mechan-
ics of a modern community. The Middletown books can’t be dodged. (Mills 
1942:269.)
Warner’s ideas, however, resonated better with the American-educated 
public’s belief that their society was composed of social rather than eco-
nomic classes, and were much more influential than those of the Lynds 




A few years later, Geertz’s writings on Mojokuto (then spelled Modjokuto) 
reflected a model of social grouping much more akin to Lloyd Warner’s 
Yankee City than to the Lynds’ Middletown. Geertz and his colleagues in the 
MIT Indonesia project were originally to do their research together with 
young staff of Yogyakarta’s Gadjah Mada University in the hill town of 
Wonosobo. But for reasons that are still not entirely clear they abandoned 
this idea, left their Indonesian counterparts behind in Yogyakarta and set-
tled on the East Javanese market and sub-district town of Pare as their 
research base. Accounts of this breakdown are divergent. Geertz laid the 
blame for the breakdown on the Indonesian professors, who apparently 
insisted that the American and Indonesian students’ fieldwork be con-
ducted from the comfort of an old Dutch resort hotel; local officials would 
summon people from the surrounding countryside to the hotel to be inter-
viewed in groups, in an ‘extraordinary reincarnation of the pith-helmet pro-
cedures of colonial ethnology’ (Geertz 1995:105). But he also recalls that at 
the time, ‘an armed gang of leftist rebels controlled much of the countryside’ 
around Wonosobo (Geertz 1995:106), which helps to explain the Gadjah 
Mada professors’ reluctance to let their young American guests loose there.
The Middletown studies were certainly one of the influences leading 
Clifford Geertz and his colleagues to call Pare ‘Mojokuto’ (‘middle town’) 
in their publications. It would be interesting to know whose idea this was, 
and precisely when it was agreed upon by the team, but that would require 
some work in the Mojokuto project archives. Geertz in later life suggested 
both that this had not been his idea, and that he did not much like it: 
‘“Mojokuto” means “Middletown”, a conceit I was dubious of then and 
have grown no fonder of since’ (Geertz 2000:14).
Geertz’s work on both urban and rural Indonesia, in the various books 
that emerged from the Mojokuto project in the 1960s, shows a pronounced 
tendency to avoid discussion of major social divides by focusing on the 
middle and on non-class distinctions. There has been extended critique of 
this aspect of his work on rural Java, with just about all the main argu-
ments in Agricultural involution having been proved wrong by subsequent 
empirical research. Geertz’s chronic blindness to class relations and divi-
sions in Javanese society is a good example of what Wertheim in his later 
years called the ‘sociologists’ blind spots’, or the ‘sociology of ignorance’ 
(Wertheim 1984). As Wertheim remarked, Geertz’s vision of rural Javanese 
society mirrored the blindness of colonial and post-colonial elites, whose 
idea of the harmonious and homogeneous village community was 
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derived from, and promoted by, the village elite themselves (Wertheim 
1975:177–214). There is certainly a striking lack of fit between Geertz’s 
accounts of Javanese homogeneous rural and small-town culture and 
the many violent, class-based political conflicts in the region both before 
and after his fieldwork. His general claims in Agricultural involution – a 
book based not on fieldwork but on secondary data – that Javanese soci-
ety consisted not of ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ but only of cukupans and 
kekurangans (‘just enoughs’ and ‘not quite enoughs’; see Geertz 1963a:97), 
certainly jars oddly with the evidence in his own field study of Mojokuto, 
which notes landlord households owning up to 20 hectares of irrigated 
rice fields, about 40 times the average holding (Geertz 1965:21).
There has been less critique of Geertz’s work on urban Mojokuto, the 
place where most of his own field research was concentrated. In the less 
widely read books Peddlers and princes (1963b) and The social history of an 
Indonesian town (1965) one can find many bold statements about the 
formless, confused state of Mojokuto’s social organization, which Geertz 
(1965:121) describes as ‘a social jumble’: [Mojokuto’s social organization is] 
‘a social composite, an only partially organized coincidence of separate 
social structures, the most important of which are the government 
bureaucracy, the market network, and a somewhat revised version of the 
village system’ (Geertz 1965:27).
Geertz does not talk of social classes at all. Instead, he claimed to have 
identified the ‘ten concrete groups which, in seeming disarray, compose 
it’. Geertz aligns these groups along a number of ‘second order distinc-
tions’: ‘Javanist (priyayi, abangan) vs. Islamic (santri)’; ‘politically respon-
sive (insaf) vs. politically unresponsive (masa bodoa [sic])’; ‘modern 
(modèren) vs. traditional (kuna or kolot)’; and ‘elite (pemimpin) vs. mass 
(rakyat)’ (Geertz 1965:129–33). This latter distinction ‘between the movers 
and shakers and the moved and shaken on the sub-district level’ was ‘nei-
ther absolute nor absolutely systematic: but it was quite clear’ (Geertz 
1965:132). Mojokuto’s Chinese business and trading minority (like the Jews 
in the Lynds’ Middletown) are left out of this framework.
None of these social distinctions, of course, are necessarily incompati-
ble with distinctions based on economic class, but Geertz, like Lloyd 
Warner, seems not to have made any attempt to look for these. In all soci-
eties, class distinctions intersect with other axes of distinction and iden-
tity, but this does not mean we can ignore their existence. You don’t find 
classes unless you look for them, asking such basic questions as ‘who 
owns what, who does what, who gets what, what do they do with it, and 
what do they do to each other?’.
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Where concrete information is given on these down-to-earth matters, 
the signs of some clear economic distinctions and relationships are quite 
evident. For example, in the kampung residential pattern ‘the whole block 
is owned by one or two people’, usually living in the stone houses facing 
the street. Behind them are crowded bamboo houses, often owned by their 
occupants but sometimes rented. Only 11% of Mojokuto residents owned 
both house and land, 49% owned their house but rented the land it was 
built on, and 40% owned neither house nor land (Geertz 1965:129–33).
What causes sociological blindness? Here we should look not only to 
the author’s personal politics, but also to the limitations of their analytical 
framework. In general, Geertz had avoided the trend in the 1970s to place 
issues of class, power and history more centrally in anthropology, and had 
stuck to a vision of cultures as systems of locally shared symbols (and 
associated practices). This blinded him to questions of social differentia-
tion, social conflict, and contestations (B. White 2007:1201).
‘Middle Indonesia’
‘The to-ing and fro-ing of the class discourse in Indonesia exemplifies the 
close connection between the social sciences and power’ (Farid 2005:189).
What, then, about our approach to the study of ‘Middle Indonesia’? First, 
it should be clear that we have not been studying ‘Middle Indonesian’ 
towns as microcosms of anything. Here, unusually, I agree with Geertz:
The notion that one can find the essence of national societies, civilizations, 
great religions, or whatever summed up and simplified in so-called ‘typical’ 
small towns and villages, is palpable nonsense. What one finds in small 
towns and villages is (alas) small-town or village life. (Geertz 1973:22–3.)
What we have been doing, actually, is to study certain issues and social 
processes in intermediate towns. Geertz again: ‘The locus of study is not 
the object of study. Anthropologists don’t study villages (tribes, towns, 
neighbourhoods…); they study in villages’ (Geertz 1973:22–3).
The various studies on ‘intermediate classes’ referred to above have 
often been quite unclear and contradictory about what exactly they mean 
by ‘intermediate classes’. Kalecki referred to ‘the lower-middle class and 
rich peasantry’ (Kalecki 1972b:162), distinguishing them from ‘rural and 
urban paupers’ on the one hand and from ‘the upper-middle classes allied 
with foreign capital and the feudal landowners’ (Kalecki 1972b:164–5) on 
the other. But he also equated the intermediate classes with ‘petty bour-
geois’ (Kalecki 1972b:167), as others have done in later debates on India’s 
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intermediate classes. This term bundles together a loose coalition of the 
small-scale capitalist class, agrarian and local agribusiness elites, and local 
state officials, who exercise considerable power at local and regional lev-
els (Harriss-White 2003).
When defined in this way, such classes may be ‘intermediate’ in the 
broader national structure, but when seen from below or at the local level, 
they look more like rural and small-town elites. This raises the question: Are 
we focusing on the upper crust of the middle (town), or on its ‘middle’?
We can of course define intermediate classes in any way we like, 
depending on our interests and what kind of analytical power we hope to 
achieve with our definitions. The important thing, however, is that no 
matter how we define a class, it is impossible to study it in isolation with-
out exploring its relation to other classes. To study a class in isolation, or 
even in terms of its differences with other classes, is a contradiction in 
terms. Class, like capital, is a relationship, not a ‘thing’ (Thompson 1963). 
Classes therefore can only be understood in terms of their relationship 
with other classes: what they do with and to each other.
If we are to avoid the tunnel-vision problems of Warner’s Yankee City 
and Geertz’s Mojokuto, we should not focus exclusively on the modal or 
‘intermediate’ groups to the exclusion of the extremes on either side of 
them. Neither, like the Lynds, should we focus exclusively on the relation-
ships between and among ‘elite’ and ‘mass’, leaving out the middle. Just as 
in the study of rural communities, in urban studies a simplistic (or dog-
matic) adherence to a focus on either the social-economic-political ‘mid-
dle’, or the relationships and conflict between ‘elite’ and ‘mass’ to the 
exclusion of the middle, are likely to produce ‘blind spots’ resulting in a 
distorted representation of urban societies and their dynamics.
The ‘intermediate class’ debate is actually about the future shape of 
rural and urban societies. In many parts of rural Indonesia we need 
increasingly to ask ‘Who is going to own the countryside?’ as corporate 
capital (domestic or foreign) gains access to large tracts of land for com-
mercial cultivation of food or fuel, dispossessing peasant cultivators and 
leaving them the choice of a life as wage worker or impoverished contract 
farmer, or leaving for the city. In urban Indonesia we need to ask ‘Who is 
going to own the city?’ as informal economy yields to malls, supermarkets, 
global brands, franchise food chains, et cetera. Intermediate classes may 
be highly resilient, but the question that Kalecki raised more than forty 
years ago, that the possible outcome might be ‘the final submission of the 
lower middle class to the interests of big business’ (Kalecki 1972b:163), is 
still a valid question for today.
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Fig. 2. TERNATE:  A fishmonger at the central market and bus terminal poses 
with her stock. She’s fashionably outfitted against the midday sun with a broad 
hat and smears left by a thin rice–flour–and–turmeric paste applied earlier to 
protect her skin; alas, her fish boast no similar protection from the heat.
June 2010: photo by S. Chris Brown
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WORKING CLASS REVISITED:  
CLASS RELATIONS IN INDONESIAN PROVINCIAL TOWNS
Nicolaas Warouw
Class analysis in Indonesia has reached an impasse, from which it can be 
released by opening our eyes to urban anthropology. Class analysis should 
be made more concrete by situating it in the geography of urban commu-
nity. The typically Indonesian kampung has been described as an ‘urban 
society of the common people’ (Dick 1985:75), distinguished by ‘social har-
mony and co-operation’ (Guinness 1986:184; also J. Sullivan 1992). Most 
members of the industrial working class live in such a kampung. In almost 
every aspect of their life, including their work, they have to craft relation-
ships with members of other urban classes who live around them. I argue 
that the working-class sense of injustice emerges not only from industrial 
practices, but also from the urban vulnerabilities that they share with 
other urban classes whose life chances are limited. It is generated by the 
social heterogeneity of the locality and by the workers’ identification with 
their communities. These form an imminent energy within the working 
class. When members of other classes also experience dispossession and 
marginalization, a working-class consciousness in semi-urban industrial 
centres might arise.
Democratization since the late 1990s has brought unprecedented polit-
ical participation to local agents in the peripheries. Residents of distressed 
kampung communities have engaged in political struggle to gain access to 
basic state services. In the process they often contested the authority of 
existing cultural leaders who had long benefited from the intermediary 
roles they played in patronage relations.
This chapter examines working-class communities in two industrial 
towns, both on the coast. Cilegon is located in western Java with a popula-
tion in 2008 of 346,059, and Pekalongan in central Java with a population 
in 2005 of 267,574. Manufacturing is the context for working-class local 
politics. Residents blame local notables and low-level state officials, whom 
they call ‘elites’, for poor implementation of urban policy. After the politi-
cal reform following the downfall of Suharto in 1998, elites have benefited 
most from decentralization. The spread of power and resources to provin-
cial towns has empowered local elites. This centralization of power in the 
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hands of local elites is making the access to welfare schemes more diffi-
cult. This has prompted some industrial-labour activists to look for sup-
port among marginalized urban groups to claim welfare rights. Labour 
activists campaign on environmental and employment issues that affect 
the whole community. While many scholars of regional autonomy remain 
focused on elites (for instance, Webster, Stokke and Tornquist 2009:225–
6), this chapter suggests that urban-neighbourhood democracy is a prom-
ising (if still underdeveloped) form of popular engagement. Democracy 
at this level is dynamizing both local class formation and culture-based 
social configurations.
Beginning with the heterogeneous class structure of local communities 
in these two urban industrial centres, the chapter then describes how 
some industrial workers adopted unusually active roles on behalf of their 
deprived local community. Their engagement in community-based social 
struggles amounted to an expression of class.
Geography
Most Indonesian cities with an industrial working class did not emerge 
from an industrial economy. There are exceptions, such as the nickel- 
mining town of Soroako in Sulawesi (Robison 1986), or the copper- and 
gold-mining towns of Tembagapura and Timika in Papua (Aditjondro 
1982; Widjojo 1997), but manufacturing mostly grew up on the outskirts 
of towns in agrarian settings, aiming to benefit from the abundant supply 
of labour in the countryside (Mather 1983; Ratna Saptari 1995; Weix 1990). 
Low industrial wages were considered acceptable by people still part of 
a family economy (Wolf 1992). Cultural values fostering labour docility 
remained strong. This made rural areas ideal settings for manufacturing. 
State officials also had reasons to move industries away from metropoli-
tan centres towards neighbouring rural towns. The big cities were over-
populated, already flooded with investment, and moreover threatened by 
political instability due to labour unrest. This explains the relocation of 
factories from Jakarta, west to Tangerang and east to Bekasi, during 
Suharto’s New Order (Giebels 1983; Hadiz 1997; Stolte 1995). Already dur-
ing the Sukarno era, the state-led industrialization of the rural town of 
Cilegon was motivated by the need to contain local ‘disobedience’ towards 
the central government and to break down ‘political parochialism’ (Hikam 
1995; Amri Marzali 1976).
Thus industrial centres with semi-urban characteristics were rapidly 
established in the midst of agrarian communities. Existing social relations 
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embodied in local neighbourhoods often remained surprisingly intact. 
The industrial working class was born in this hybrid environment. Much 
of the scholarly literature on labour in Indonesia is misdirected for over-
looking this geographical setting. Those studies that have described a 
working class estranged from other urban classes, and indeed from the 
dominant classes in general, have missed this local-community context. 
We can think of descriptions of industrial workers as ‘prisoners’ (Harris 
1995) of the country’s economic development, who find release in their 
defiance of unfair work practices and the political repression of labour. 
This is made possible through workers’ solidarity, occasionally in alliance 
with progressive urban middle class elements such as students, lawyers, 
academics and NGO activists (for instance, Ford 2009; Hadiz 1997; 
Kammen 1997; La Botz 2001). The energy that the working class obtain 
from their local community disappears from such accounts. Having an 
eye for working-class engagement with other marginalized classes is also 
part of Herring and Agarwala’s (2006) agenda for ‘restoring agency to 
class’ analysis in India.
The literature on labour in Indonesia has overwhelmingly concerned 
itself with labour conditions on the shopfloor; class consciousness 
emerges from control and resistance at the point of production. However, 
rather than focus exclusively on the world of work, we would gain more by 
expanding our view. Ratna Saptari (2003:135–6) did do this when she ana-
lysed the impact of the piece-work system by examining the impover-
ished urban enclave where workers live. She also explained the lack of 
industrial strife and the acceptance of strong workplace hierarchy by 
referring to the patriarchal values prevailing in the residential neighbour-
hood. Class is a life condition shaped by local residential relations as 
much as by working conditions. This view is in line with Eric Hobsbawm’s 
(1984) ‘worlds of labour’ extending to the domain of values, ideologies and 
everyday existence in the ‘natural habitation’ of the workers.
The Social Structure in Local Community
Most of Pekalongan’s medium-sized manufacturing establishments, and 
all of Cilegon’s industrial estates, are on the margins of town. The local 
communities that host the factories and house the workers are socially 
heterogeneous. While downtown residential areas house people engaged 
in modern services, trade and public office, the communities on the 
periphery are shared by people from more varied walks of life. They 
include farmers, fishers and other non-modern sectors whose numbers 
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1 Informants generally admitted that the locals’ lack of relevant skills and education 
may explain the company’s preferences for migrants. But Hikam (1995:348) concluded that 
managers adhered to a stereotyped idea that migrants were ‘more docile and less demand-
ing’ than locals. Locals felt cheated out of land compensation by the establishment of new 
industries during the 1970s (see also Amri Marzali 1976:34–6). Moreover, Cilegon was the 
site of a peasant rebellion in 1888 and a communist uprising backed by Islamic religious 
leaders in 1926, both against Dutch colonial rule. Social revolution against local bureau-
crats between 1945 and 1949 strengthened the rebellious stereotype attached to the locals 
(see also Kartodirdjo 1966 and M. Williams 1982).
continue to decline but who never manage to make the transition to mod-
ern and formal sectors. Small traders, food stall proprietors and other 
informal service workers help further broaden the neighbourhood social 
configuration.
Industrial workers made up 21.59% of all workers in Cilegon in 2008 
and 21.83% in Pekalongan in 2005. Of these, the permanent workers were 
the most secure, just below managers and supervisors. Most are educated 
and skilled, and hold responsible positions in administration and produc-
tion. They enjoy the full protection of labour rights stipulated in work 
agreements, their salaries are well above the government-set minimum 
wage and, in addition, they get a variety of allowances and bonuses. In 
Cilegon, these position are believed mostly to be filled by ‘migrants’ from 
elsewhere in Java and from the nearby island of Sumatra. Though there 
are no official statistics on the ethnic composition of industrial workers, 
Muhammad Hikam (1995:385) reported that only a ‘handful’ of local peo-
ple occupied such positions. Workers interviewed for this research con-
firmed that ethnic tensions between locals and migrants in the workplace 
are common.1 The migrant workers mostly rent rooms in barrack-like 
housing owned by locals. This type of accommodation rather separates 
the migrants from the everyday life of the local community, to which, by 
contrast, the local workers are constantly exposed. In Pekalongan such 
barrack-like housing does not exist, and all workers share a house with 
local owners or acquire an individual house. They identify with the local 
community and engage in its problems, and this makes them want to stay 
on. In both towns, despite describing themselves as ‘mere operators’, the 
permanent workers with local identification managed to complete their 
education, whether high school, vocational school, non-degree or an 
undergraduate qualification in relevant disciplines. This enables them to 
handle complex machinery and hazardous chemicals in the factories of 
Cilegon as production operators, liquid waste controllers, or laboratory 
analysts. One of my Pekalongan informants had been to a vocational 
school in textile technology to learn specialized spinning techniques. 
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2 The skilled migrant workers in Cilegon described by Rudnyckyj (2008), by contrast, 
lived in secluded neighbourhoods provided by their employer. This focus prevented them 
from being curious about the local community.
3 Contracted workers receive only a daily or monthly salary to cover living costs. 
Moreover, they are only eligible for medical treatment from health clinics, whose service is 
claimed by informants to be below standard. However, a serious work accident may allow 
them to access medical treatment from a hospital.
4 Contracting arrangements are, in fact, typical of batik small and home industries 
throughout Pekalongan (Chotim 1994). The decline of local entrepreneurs due to the 
repeal of the state’s protection policy over raw materials in 1970, as Robison (1986) and 
He was head-hunted by a large textile company even before finishing the 
course. His employer asks him frequently to travel inter-city to examine 
raw materials. These established workers enjoy good, secure salaries and 
are respected within their local communities for this.2
Unlike the permanent workers, contract workers are linked to 
industry only by a third-party company in an outsourcing arrangement. 
Liberalization has made this increasingly important. Official labour fig-
ures do not include this type of labour, but PT Krakatau Steel, the coun-
try’s largest steel manufacturer and based in Cilegon, had nearly 4,000 
contracted workers supplied by four employment contractors in 2010. 
This number is set to go up when production expands under a new joint 
venture with one of South Korea’s largest steel producers. Outsourcing 
contracts are likely to be signed with nine contractors. Outsourced work-
ers perform regular jobs, ranging from non-production tasks (e.g. office 
boy, cleaner, gardener) to production work on the shopfloor. They are 
therefore at the bottom of the workplace hierarchy – not because of their 
job descriptions, but as a consequence of the unprotected nature of their 
labour. They fall outside any labour law by which the employer or the 
state could be held responsible. In one Cilegon industrial neighbourhood 
I examined, an official village-level youth organization called Karang 
Taruna recruited factory workers from the local community, but gave 
them no formal contract. There is a case where a company made a deal 
with a unit within the state administration office at the village level. Most 
of the industrial workers identifying as local were in this category. They 
have no access to the normal mechanism of promotion, nor to decent 
workplace treatment such as safety gear, a uniform and meals, nor the 
bonuses, allowances, pension fund or even the minimum wages regular 
workers enjoy.3 The neighbourhood in the north-west of Pekalongan that 
I studied, meanwhile, had no outsourced labourers (although outsourcing 
is important in the textile industries in Pekalongan’s centre and south).4 
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Muhaimin (1991) point out, led to the closure of batik enterprises in some parts of 
Pekalongan. The introduction of printing technology in batik making, enabling the cost of 
production to fall, but leaving the capital only in the hands of a small number of big entre-
preneurs, including the Indo-Chinese, exacerbated the situation whereby smaller actors, 
unable to contest in the competition, ceased their operation. Today, the clusters of batik 
industries are concentrated in the central part down to the southern area of Pekalongan. 
I am indebted to Amalinda Savirani for her insights on Pekalongan’s batik entrepreneurs 
and the geographical spread of the industry.
5 In some cases, the term ‘contractor’ may seem too ‘industrialized’, given that the role 
is often filled by local organizations, such as the Karang Taruna (youth group) affiliated to 
the village administration. When such an organization recruits for an industrial company, 
the workers have even less protection than those recruited by a bona fide outsourcing 
company.
Most workers were migrants from neighbouring towns looking for cheap 
housing. The north coast, with its fisheries, is vulnerable to tidal flooding.
Urban neighbourhoods also house other types of labourers who con-
tribute indirectly to the manufacturing activity. Contractors5 often hire 
unskilled locals on a casual basis to paint or repair factory buildings or to 
overhaul machinery. For locals to get work like this they must have good 
relations with one of the local personalities connected to the recruiting 
agency or organization. Manufacturers frequently offer casual recruit-
ment concessions to such local figures as part of their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). This personalizes the relation between society and 
capital, something to which we will return.
When not being hired, such casual labourers are doing ‘favours’ for 
people in the neighbourhood – helping one neighbour find a truck to 
transport construction material, fixing the roof for another neighbour. All 
this in exchange for petty cash, known as a komisi (commission) and 
ostensibly to pay for cigarettes, motorbike petrol or a mobile phone 
voucher. Some young people make illegality an option. Locals in Cilegon 
use the slang word nyekrap (possibly from the English ‘scrap’) to refer to 
thieving scrap metal from the industries, for sale in the local black market. 
They have also been known to target steel poles and telephone cables 
passing through their own neighbourhoods, arguing these were being 
used more by industry and government than by the locals.
Of course manufacturing is not the only job provider in the commu-
nity. In one Cilegon neighbourhood I saw home workers producing mlinjo 
crackers (a traditional snack made from mlinjo nuts) for local small entre-
preneurs called juragan emping. Most were housewives and young 
women, contracted to work in their own homes at piece-rates. The entre-
preneur would come in the late afternoon to collect the crisps, pay and 
leave fresh raw mlinjo for the following day’s production. He employed 
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6 For the definition of ‘informal sector’, see Portes, Castells and Benton 1989 and 
Agarwala 2006:420–2.
around two hundred workers. In a coastal neighbourhood of Pekalongan 
workers in small-to-medium-scale fisheries-related industries were mak-
ing block ice, processing canned or salted fish and building wooden boats. 
Local entrepreneurs supplied the local fishing economy and a town-wide 
market. In both towns these home industries were largely informal; their 
compliance with government fiscal and labour regulations was limited.6 
Businesses are registered, have permissions from the municipal authority 
and can receive local bank loans, but they pay below-minimum wages 
and provide insufficient labour protection. Workers in such an economy 
are best categorized as informal. The category extends to the already-
mentioned contract workers and casual labour in large industries.
Both towns have a considerable number of small-scale fishers in coastal 
neighbourhoods. Particularly in Pekalongan, they enter into a profit- 
sharing arrangement with owners of large and more powerful boats, 
allowing them to sail to deep water for bigger catches. The downside is 
that they thereby lose their connection with the local fish-processing 
industries, which refuse to buy from profit-sharing fishers because they 
ask a higher price. As a result, these fishers can only sell their catch at the 
municipal auction centre, where extortion is rife. Declining profits have 
forced some of them to shift to land fishery (ponds and rivers) where they 
can sell to the more profitable local fisheries-related industries. The 
Cilegon fishing economy is even smaller. There fishermen have no con-
nection with local entrepreneurs. Their small boats with weak engines 
yield small catches in shallow water. A more powerful engine requires a 
special licence from the government fisheries authority. Locals believe 
chemical run-off has caused coastal fish stocks to decline. They have lim-
ited room to manoeuvre among the huge industrial ships and tankers and 
the commercial ferries running to Sumatra. Moreover, industrial plants 
block most road access to the coast, making it difficult for fishermen to 
transport their catch to market. As a result, price-fixing middlemen who 
connect fishers with the market have become increasingly crucial to their 
survival.
Cilegon’s small farmers also need the middlemen, whom they call ‘big 
boss’. Half of the town’s surface area is covered by hilly forest and agricul-
tural landscapes. When the municipal authority relocated the local mar-
kets away from the farming neighbourhood to downtown, these farmers 
found it hard, financially and psychologically, to sell their products at the 
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7 During the political turmoil in 1998, the locals ransacked the surrounding factories 
and looted metal bars, pipes, iron fences or other large objects considered to have eco-
nomic value. This was caused by social and economic disparity in Cilegon, where the 
locals felt that they were not the direct beneficiaries of the town’s industrialization. The 
CSR programme grew out of that period.
8 The mayor, by law, was not allowed to run as he was already in his second term. The 
mayor’s preferred candidate, who was in fact his son, won the election.
new, more distant market. The farmers also experience declining produc-
tion. They blame air pollution and contaminated water on Cilegeon’s 
industries.
Moving up the social ladder, there are ‘elite’ classes within the local 
community who do have a more direct relationship with formal business, 
such as the industrial companies, and with the lower state bureaucracy at 
the municipal administration. Among them are the crisps-making entre-
preneurs and labour-contracting agencies in Cilegon, and the large boat-
owners in Pekalongan. Cilegon’s heavy industries also grant community 
concessions to recycle industrial solid waste as a gesture of corporate 
social responsibility.7 But only ‘strong men’ (orang kuat) have the finance 
and connections to benefit from the recycling business. This marks the 
rise of entrepreneurs who deploy their local identity and claim to repre-
sent the locals to gain contracts from the surrounding large industries. 
They provide services ranging from labour supply, overhaul and repair 
works to waste recycling and office supplies.
Such entrepreneurs come not only from the private sector but also 
from local officialdom. One recycling concession was offered to a senior 
village official in Cilegon. Corporate contracts become slush funds for 
local power struggles. A 2004 law on local government stipulates that 
lower officials can only be appointed by the mayor or district head. In 
practice this means the village apparatus has become part of the political 
machine of the incumbent local head of government. During the mayoral 
election in Cilegon in early 2010, residents deplored the inclination of vil-
lage officials to direct people to vote for the incumbent’s preferred candi-
date.8 In a bid to build political allegiances, municipal-level officials and 
politicians have pushed through regulations directing industries to chan-
nel contracts and CSR schemes to ‘local’ interests. Local entrepreneurs 
interested in concessions from surrounding large companies conse-
quently need to demonstrate adherence to political elites and municipal 
officials. Success depends on their ability to build connections between 
the neighbourhood and the municipality. This web of entrepreneurs 
and officials appears to be typical to Cilegon. The small entrepreneurs on 
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9 During colonial times, the jawara was a leader and single fighter who protected the 
interests of local people or ‘local tentants’ in a bonded community in their resistance 
against the Dutch or ‘private estate owners’ (Shahab 2001:1–3; see also Abeyasekere 
1987:67). My past study in Tangerang reveals the connection of jawara to manufacturing 
industries that use them to control labour activism in the neighbourhood (Warouw 2006).
Pekalongan’s coast have no such web and are thus less dependent on 
state officials.
Other important figures in the social structure of the urban neighbour-
hood are those with social and cultural authority. In both towns there are 
Islamic religious leaders known as kyai, and in Cilegon there is the ‘tradi-
tional’ role known as jawara, or martial hero. Cilegon lies in Muslim-
majority Banten, where the kyai have always combined religious authority 
with a degree of political power. Even today they have to negotiate 
between community expectations and their own need for power, as I will 
show below. Jawara is an informal leader and a traditional title in 
Bantenese society conferred upon a person considered to have the capac-
ity (often related to martial arts) to protect the community from disrup-
tive external forces.9 A tendency to put their own interests above those of 
the community led Oji Armuji (2004:93) to identify their modus operandi 
with the words ‘anarchism’ and ‘pragmatism’. Their capacity to mobilize 
pressure using threats and violence has made jawara targets for recruit-
ment by powerful forces in Cilegon who need to control popular criticism 
(Armuji 2004:94; Hikam 1995). Some jawara today are functionaries of the 
incumbent mayor’s political party. Others have become entrepreneurs 
who pressure large companies for business concessions ‘on behalf of the 
community’.
Such threats and violence can also be observed in Pekalongan, but 
there they are less connected with the bureaucracy. The decline of the 
fishing economy caused by extortion in the municipal markets, men-
tioned briefly earlier, is connected with the so-called ‘land people’ (orang 
darat). The term lumps together a range of intermediate actors spread out 
all along the way, from the point the fishermen dock their boat after 
returning from the sea, to the fish auction centre. They include temporar-
ily unemployed local sailors and fish trolley porters. Petty gangsters and 
fixers claim to be responsible for ‘security’ in the area and for the ‘smooth 
operation’ of the fishing activity. Fishermen complain that their catches 
have been reduced to half by the time they arrive at the auction centre. 
This chain of extortion got so bad that it discouraged large boat-owners, 
with whom the fishermen had entered into a profit-sharing deal, from 
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dispatching their fleets. Fishing profits declined until owners were only 
able to recover basic expenses.
The Intermediate Classes and their Adversaries
Barbara Harriss-White (2003:241) deploys the term ‘intermediate classes’ 
to describe ‘a loose coalition of the small-scale capitalist class, agrarian 
and local agribusiness elites, and local state officials’ typically found in 
Indian country towns. The coalition aims to gain access to ‘state resources’ 
and ‘concessions by influencing policy in its implementation’. Gerry van 
Klinken (2009:888), speaking of Indonesia, characterizes these classes by 
their ‘non-market mechanisms such as patriarchy, ethnic and religious 
solidarity, and the threat of violence’. All these techniques have the poten-
tial to undermine the authority of the state by converting government 
policies and subsidies for their own benefit. In fact, he continues, their 
‘mobilizing skills’ have been used by the state to reinforce the presence of 
the state and to endorse the government’s policies in exchange for reward-
ing concessions.
The term ‘intermediate classes’ applies well to the local elites we have 
described above. In Cilegon, the capacity of the intermediate classes to 
control the economy at the neighbourhood level is evident in different 
forms. These intermediary classes have the capacity to arrange the supply 
of labour to companies, and furthermore they benefit from their privil-
iged access to state institutions. The money they earn supports their dom-
inance within the community. 
The term ‘intermediate classes’ in the first place covers local state offi-
cials, who are typical intermediaries extending the administrative author-
ity of the state to the population. But at the same time their access to the 
local community allows them to arrange employment opportunities at 
newly established companies. These officials have leverage with higher 
municipal authorities to make regulations directing corporate contracts 
to these companies. It is this capacity to craft beneficial regulations that 
forces local entrepreneurs to maintain personal connections with them; 
this includes financial sponsorship for electoral campaigns. Thus the rent-
seeking partnership of entrepreneurs, government officials and the cor-
porate CRS managers rests on non-market mechanisms, particularly the 
skills to maintain social relations that enable the manipulation of state 
regulation.
In the second place the term intermediate classes is appropriate for 
certain religious and traditional leaders in these two towns. The use of 
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10 In Cilegon they also run lucrative informal ‘protection’ services for industries, stores, 
the seaport, bus terminals and traditional markets (Armuji 2004:93).
cultural and traditional symbols to secure resources from the state and 
the companies is apparent in their capacity for threats and violence. Kyai 
who lead Islamic organizations enjoy access to state funding for religious 
activities and prayer facilities open to the whole community. Community 
figures such as jawara get funding from local officials essentially to curb 
community discontent. Such figures are vital to secure votes for the town’s 
higher elites. Those considered jawara can ask the politicians at election 
time for anything they wanted, and they can also ask freely from the com-
panies, in exchange for ‘protection’.10 Success enhances their authority in 
the community – they have cultural capital and the skills to pull resources 
from the state and from industry.
Despite their evident success, these actors who profit from ‘non-market 
mechanisms’ are often in conflict with other small local capitalists – those 
who do live by their market skills, who are less dependent on state agen-
cies and large companies. In Pekalongan, the boat-owning entrepreneurs 
were annoyed with them for extorting the fishing economy nearly to 
death by their threats and violence. The extortion was particularly visible 
given, as described by some local informants, that these actors had con-
nections with officials in the village administration who benefit from such 
practice. The result was the virtual extinction of coastal fisheries in 
Pekalongan. The Cilegon crisps-making entrepreneurs similarly could not 
decline when jawara asked for ‘protection’ money. Local officials made 
things worse by refusing to help unless offered more money. This type of 
conflict led some local entrepreneurs to enter into collaboration with less-
privileged social forces in the urban community. It is to this collaboration 
that we now turn, since it brings the workers back into view.
Cilegon
During Cilegon’s 2010 local elections, a number of crisps-making entrepre-
neurs allied with their home workers to support a rival to the mayor’s pre-
ferred candidate, whose nickname was Mumu. They hoped a new mayor 
independent of the current one would lower barriers to their business cre-
ated by jawara and local officials. In short, they hoped for a democratic 
escape from the political machine of the town’s dominant intermediate 
class elites. They particularly directed their challenge at local-neighbour-
hood agents loyal to the incumbent mayor. Here their efforts converged 
with a separate electoral effort initiated by some industrial workers 
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11 Most of the young, unemployed locals remained engaged in their small world of 
Cilegon, despite the easy transport possibilities to Jakarta or Sumatra. One of my unem-
ployed informants had never even travelled outside of Banten province. One worker told 
me he believed marginalized young men in his neighbourhood engaged in thieving and 
thuggery because they had never travelled.
resident in the same neighbhourhood. The workers had their own com-
plaints against the ruling intermediate classes, namely that the latter were 
seizing state welfare schemes and social programmes for themselves and 
their cronies that were intended for the whole community.
These workers, employed full-time in the town’s heavy industries, had 
begun holding informal gatherings after their day in the factories. In the 
beginning, these meetings were aimed at responding to moves made by 
the incumbent mayor’s political party in the run-up to the 2009 parlia-
mentary election. They brought together unemployed young people and 
industrial contract workers. The talk was about the problems with the 
local ‘elites’ – referring locally to politicians, officials and jawara – about 
unemployment, and the gap between locals and migrants. One of the 
workers, Affan, told me at the time that the forum had no intention to 
form an organization and only wanted to encourage young people not to 
become aggressive every time they encountered problems. He wanted the 
forum to transform ‘local boys’ (anak kampung), who displayed the aggres-
sive behaviour regarded as typical of the Bantenese, into citizens with 
broader insights into the way they could respond to industrialization and 
modernization in their town.11
When I attended one of these meetings it struck me as interesting how 
clearly these underprivileged residents saw all the ‘elite’ (intermediate 
class) social forces – the rent-seeking entrepreneurs, the kyai, the jawara 
and the local officials – as obstacles to their own access to the state. They 
realized that the opportunities for employment, for access to welfare 
schemes such as health insurance and subsidized rice, and for participa-
tion in CSR programmes, were only available to those prepared to become 
clients to those that I have here called the intermediate classes, or some-
times ‘elit’ (elites), as my informants put it to me. Despite low educational 
achievement and locality-bound insights, these young unemployed peo-
ple refused to be contained by the local elites whose lives were so con-
spicuously distinct from the rest of the population. They were angry about 
having been stigmatized by the elites as ‘sinners’ (murtad) and ‘rubbish’ 
(sampah) for their acts of petty crime. They realized the resources in 
elite hands were being devoted merely to personal ambition and to buy 
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12 The preferred candidate of the mayor (it was his son) still won, but only with 45.6% 
of the vote, much less than before. The residents felt anything below 50% was a major 
blow. The closest contender, a local entrepreneur popular amongst neighbourhood resi-
dents, managed to reap 36.13%.
13 News items on www.Liputan6.com, 16 December 2009.
loyalties. Others expressed disappointment with them for failing to set up 
a labour training centre in the neighbourhood to improve the chances of 
the unemployed. Contract labourers wanted better employment condi-
tions in surrounding manufacturing establishments. A permanent posi-
tion is regarded as ideal employment by residents in the urban industrial 
neighbourhood, not only because of the better conditions, but because it 
would release them from the patronage (kekuasaan) of the intermediate 
classes. All this amounted to criticism of the incumbent mayor for failing 
to prioritize secure industrial employment in the neighbourhood. Instead, 
he had been busy extending his patronage throughout the town.
Eventually these informal gatherings turned to spontaneous political 
action. During the 2009 general legislative elections, the residents split 
their votes to undermine Golkar, the party of the incumbent mayor. 
Golkar had been the dominant party since long before the 1998 reformasi, 
and even in 2009 the party had offered them money in exchange for their 
vote; but 2009 marked the end of the party’s supremacy in the neighbour-
hood. This local experiment in bringing together an alternative coalition 
to challenge the incumbent mayor and his intermediate classes was 
repeated during the mayoral election of 2010. As the local workers put it, 
they wanted ‘to humiliate’ (mempermalukan) the circles close to the 
incumbent mayor for failing to provide for those on the margins.12
In another initiative in the same neighbourhood, a group of residents 
protested against environmental contamination by certain industries. 
They were upset that members of the local assembly neither visited the 
area immediately following a particularly significant leak of gases from 
the production process into the air, leaving local residents with respira-
tory problems, nausea and dizziness, nor even made a statement regard-
ing the incident.13 The group was initiated by workers from the same 
chemical factory that caused the leak. It accused local officials of making 
a backdoor agreement with the company. A worker from the group, Dedi, 
said that local ‘elites’ with vested interests in the industries were always 
the biggest obstacle to solving pollution problems. This made them unin-
terested in mediating between residents and the company over contami-
nation. The group did not want to challenge the companies and the state 
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but simply wanted greater access to resources made available by the 
industries and the government, and thus form a bridge between the locals 
and the companies. Their position as workers in those units that were 
directly related to production ensured they had sufficient knowledge of 
the manufacturing process to be able to identify which hazardous sub-
stances were being used. Dedi maintained that it was not about getting rid 
of the industries, but about taking care (menjaga) of industrial assets in a 
residential neighbourhood. Accommodating residents’ discontent would 
minimize conflict, he felt.
Pekalongan
The issues in the Pekalongan neighbourhood (Cangkring) that I studied 
were different, but the basic problem of state services being hijacked by 
intermediate classes was the same. At issue here was the absence of pub-
lic facilities due to bad urban planning. The other problem was the lack of 
clean water, as the neighbourhood lay beyond the boundaries of the 
municipal water supply. Shallow local wells contained high levels of dis-
solved chemicals and suspended solids typical of the town’s coastal areas. 
Bypassing reluctant village officials, community representatives went to 
the municipal government to request a deep well. Although the area tech-
nically fell outside municipal infrastructure planning, the government 
accepted the proposal. The municipal authority also granted the commu-
nity permission to distribute the water from the government-facilitated 
communal well and to charge households for the electricity used by the 
pump. In short, their first encounter with public officials immediately 
produced a real sign of recognition. One of the central figures in this 
Pekalongan initiative was Turah, who worked full-time in a textile factory. 
He had learned about water and electricity management from his com-
pany. He later successfully asked the municipal government to improve 
the pump, to install a water tank and, even, to build a small office so the 
water administration would no longer be run from a residential house.
Efforts to bring ‘life’ into the recently settled community extended to 
the conversion of abandoned land into a fish pond and a nursery for 
medicinal and cooking plants to accommodate fishermen losing their 
income as a result of the declining fishing economy. A few hectares of this 
unused land were actually borrowed from Turah’s own company. The 
company went further and offered the community a loan to develop fish-
breeding ponds. These efforts also enabled the low-income residents of 
another nearby neighbourhood and its surrounding communities to 
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14 Certain individuals within the municipal government were credited in the national 
media for the success of these poverty alleviation and slum environment management 
programmes (Gatra, 13 February 2008; Radar Pekalongan, 11 June 2010). However, the 
reports made almost no reference to the role played by community figures like Turah.
improve their economy and make better use of the environment. In addi-
tion, residents brought a sense of normalcy into the community that pre-
viously had no legal entitlement by simply naming their street, in order to 
enable outsiders to identify them as a community and to find an address. 
They saw street-naming as an inaugural effort for social recognition. (Even 
so, some even more ‘local’ figures initially pulled out the street signs until 
their ‘permission’ had been sought).
The municipal government is proud of having brought social and envi-
ronmental development to a previously non-recognized and disadvan-
taged community. It regards the work in Cangkring, including the 
collaboration between the residents and industrial firms, as a model for 
its programme in poverty alleviation and environmental management of 
slum areas.14 It invited Turah and some of his colleagues to share his expe-
riences in deep-well drilling and water management with other neigh-
bourhoods around Pekalongan. Turah now has easy access to government 
officials including the mayor, to lawmakers and corporate agencies. They 
recognize his role as mediator connecting impoverished urban residents 
with the authorities.
Morever, Turah brought the fishermen to the mayor in the government 
offices to explain their problems. The mayor responded by ordering the 
fisheries authority to strictly oversee the harbour and the fish auction cen-
tre to protect the fishermen. This helped revive the fisheries economy in 
northern Pekalongan. The government also facilitated the construction of 
houses for fishermen along the coast. The mayor was chairman of the 
local Golkar branch. Turah then decided to join Golkar and campaign for 
him at the next local election. He said he was impressed that the mayor 
had kept his promise of rehabilitating the health, education and housing 
conditions of the poor in his neighbourhood. His neighbours did not 
blame him for joining the New Order party Golkar – they appreciated 
what he had done for them. Turah said that being close to the mayor had 
been the only way to bring people’s aspirations to the correct authorities.
Initiatives by local residents in Cilegon and Pekalongan reveal the limi-
tations of intermediate-class patronage as democratization deepens at 
the local level. Residents wanted direct contact – patrons were obstacles 
who distanced them from the state and the companies, and who seized 
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rents that should have gone to the marginalized. Contrary to those schol-
ars who argue that democratization is strengthening the role of predatory 
intermediate classes, my close observation in these two places (which 
may indeed not be representative of all of Indonesia) shows that some-
times democratization is weakening their power. Regular free and fair 
local elections are allowing residents to act on their frustration with the 
neighbourhood-based ‘elites’ whose intimidation and flattery have long 
blocked their own access to state and corporate services. As they built 
their own direct links with the town’s major economic and political forces, 
they built loose, semi-institutionalized alternative alliances to defend 
their own interests.
Working Class and Changing Class Relations
These neighbourhood experiences in Cilegon and Pekalongan expose two 
somewhat contradictory class dynamics in the semi-urban communities 
of industrializing provincial towns. One is a long-standing pattern of what 
might be called domination by predatory intermediate classes. The other 
is a counter-movement from below. The first pattern arose as local eco-
nomic actors became incorporated into a modern industrial economy. 
The industries’ need for informal contract labour privileged local entre-
preneurs – neighbourhood notables and public officials – who deployed 
‘non-market’ mechanisms to recruit workers on exploitative terms. These 
outsourcing agencies made good profits for themselves. Their bargaining 
position with the big companies rested on ‘traditional’ claims to represent 
the community, which in reality involved the capacity to pose threats.
Moreover, political decentralization actually strengthened the position 
of these local operators, who were seen as patrons by their own communi-
ties. Lacking a populist agenda to rally sympathy from the masses com-
pelled the local government to work through intermediaries such as 
religious leaders and other influential big men. Where industry is less 
intrusive, such as in Pekalongan, the failure of the municipal government 
to reach people in urban peripheries leaves space for similar operators. 
Using threats, intimidation and local sentiment, they wheedle fishermen 
and new settlers out of their money while making themselves indispens-
able to local officials. In both towns, neighbourhood-based ‘elites’ use 
their access to bureuacratic and corporate resources mainly for their own 
purposes.
These arrangements clearly come at a cost to underprivileged urban 
classes, who, as underemployed subcontracted labourers, are left almost 
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entirely without protection. The dissatisfaction among the unemployed 
in particular results in aggressive behaviour and criminality. Fishermen 
attribute their deteriorating subsistence to industrialization as well as to 
extortionate practices by intermediate-class local elites. All struggle to 
access local-government welfare services that could relieve their distress.
This chapter has examined a counter-movement from below in the two 
neighbourhoods studied. Democratization and decentralization have 
opened up a little-noticed new arena for workers, one that is located in 
their semi-urban kampung residential neighbourhoods. Here the old 
agrarian patron–client relations are in decline, while the harsh divide 
between labour and capital is somewhat softened. Dissatisfaction with 
the local figures and small capitalists who used to provide protection and 
certainty – people this chapter has identified as ‘intermediate classes’ – is 
growing. Meanwhile, full-time industrial workers, who would normally 
rely on traditional relations to defend them from harsh industrial exploi-
tation (Elmhirst 2003; Wolf 1992), are now likely to be in a relation with 
less tension with their industrial employers. In my neighbourhoods they 
even became intermediaries for the industries’ CSR programmes towards 
the local community. Some have found themselves becoming trusted 
intermediaries for channelling state welfare schemes in neighbourhoods 
previously beyond the state’s reach. These developments have placed 
these mediating full-time workers into a loose alliance with lower urban 
classes, including the informal working class. This new alliance is quite 
unlike that observed between industrial working classes and intellectuals 
belonging to the urban middle classes during the 1990s (Ford 2009; Hadiz 
1997; Kammen 1997; La Botz 2001).
Semi-urban poor neighbourhoods face a myriad of difficulties. Workers 
who live there become engaged in social activism. Their embeddedness in 
the everyday struggle of their own communities has shifted their arena of 
engagement away from the point of production towards their kampung. 
These permanent workers have a commitment to the industries, which 
have given them secure jobs and prestige. They realize that industrial 
decline would affect the livelihood of the entire town. Their attachment 
both to their local society and to the state and capital allows them to 
bridge the two, bypassing the authority of the old intermediate classes.
These initiatives have seen citizens re-engage with the state rather than 
building a different logic of power separate from the state and the compa-
nies. The activism parallels Indian experiments with community politics, 
which are also redefining the relationship between society and the state. 
Partha Chatterjee (2004) argues that alternate, somewhat informal, asso-
ciations at the neighbourhood level ensure members’ social well-being 
<UN><UN>
66 nicolaas warouw
even when surrounded by urban hardship. The associations facilitate ‘the 
duties of good citizenship’ (Chatterjee 2004:60). This is, in the Indian con-
text, what Chatterjee, following Michel Foucault (1991), calls ‘governmen-
tality’. It is the capacity of communities not recognized as part of civil 
society to ‘claim the benefits of various governmental programs […] [by] 
bending or stretching [the] [governmental machinery and] rules because 
existing procedures have historically worked to exclude or marginalize 
them’.
Closing Remarks
Post-Suharto local politics have empowered local actors by means of fre-
quent local elections combined with the effective decentralization of gov-
ernment policy and resources allocation. Democracy has been deepened 
as civil society has grown (Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Faucher 2006; 
Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto 2009; Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 
2007b). Also in Indonesian provincial towns, democracy has created more 
room to manoeuvre for independent social sectors such as entrepreneurs, 
NGOs activists and concerned intellectuals. They are particularly keen to 
take their distance from ‘elite patronage’ (Van Klinken 2009:157). This 
chapter has explored how the dominance of the intermediate classes in 
the provincial towns, such as traditional leaders, small capitalists and local 
state officials, is being contested by the urban underclasses demanding 
state welfare services and corporate compensation to protect them from 
the consequences of their largely informal employment. As these under-
privileged workers become incorporated into the market economy 
through industrialization, and as democracy makes the state more present 
to them, some are able to throw off their role of traditional clients to the 
town’s intermediate classes at the local-neighbourhood level. These are 
classes with differential access to political procedures and institutional 
practices as compared to the powerful neighbourhood-based elites at 
many different levels. Their different forms of capital, defined in social and 
cultural terms, has enabled them to create political space in their respec-
tive localities to defy established elites. Their experiences of exclusion 
lead to initiatives that become a rallying point for citizenship claims even 
in distant areas of the country. These factors altogether allow the indus-
trial working class to secure the position as new intermediary for local 
residents.
Engagement in these mediating functions does not necessarily lead to 
social mobility of industrial workers. In spite of their different life chances 
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by comparison with the underemployed informal-sector workers, given 
their higher status in the workplace, industrial workers remain part of 
their own community and are involved in the same everyday struggles as 
all its other residents. The local neighbourhood with its social predica-
ments, therefore, can form the basis for a new working-class identity and 
solidarity. The lesser degree of tension in industrial relations, wherever a 
level of wages and working conditions considered to be just and suffi-
cient by workers discussed here are in place, also marks the shift of the 
arena of working-class struggle from the shopfloor to the residential 
neighbourhood.
The sense of justice does not melt as workers leave the shopfloor. Some 
may object that my observations imply that full-time workers will simply 
become the new predatory intermediate classes in these towns. Further 
research is required to prove or disprove this point. As it is, I agree with 
the conclusions of Diane Davis (1999), who observed similar transforma-
tions in Latin America. Rather than exacerbating the ‘state and civil 
society divide’ or creating ‘dichotomization’, she wrote, an ongoing trans-
formation is bringing representations ‘of this inaccessible state down to a 
more attainable and manageable level’ and thus place citizens back in a 
‘social contract’ with the state.
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Fig 3: KUPANG:  Girl absorbed in a cell phone game while older kids play street 
soccer in downtown kupang. Cell phones, with radios, games, music, cameras, 
and web access, are the new babysitters all over Indonesia.
June 2010: photo by  S. Chris Brown
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1 Located in the central court city of Yogyakarta, Central Java, Indonesia, this kampung 
neighbourhood has been the site of my ethnographic fieldwork since the early 1990s. Mas 
Hadi was the oldest son of the kampung family that had served as my most important 
source of social support, both as personal support and as valued cultural interpreters. 
I gratefully acknowledge the support from KITLV’s Middle Indonesia project, and from the 
Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore.
CLASS MOBIL: CIRCULATION OF CHILDREN IN THE MAKING OF 
MIDDLE INDONESIA
Jan Newberry
Mas Hadi had bought a car. This was the biggest news in the kampung neigh-
bourhood when I visited in 2006.1 The new car, or mobil, was actually a used 
minivan. The listing of its many flaws and its description as bad, or jelek, did 
not mask his family’s glee in having it. The mobil was in fact a great boon to 
this family, living a stone’s throw from the Yogyakarta kraton, the palace of 
the sultan. Although better off than some of the downtown kampung, this 
neighbourhood was likewise home to densely packed houses of the urban 
lower classes (Robison 1996). Site of innumerable small, home-based enter-
prises along with low-level civil servants, clerks and teachers, this kampung 
neighbourhood was more often described by locals as the home of many of 
the faithful servants of the sultan, the abdi dalem. It also served as residence 
for scrappy lower-class entrepreneurs, crooks and schemers typical of urban 
kampung. For all of them, the arrival of a mobil marked the attainment of a 
new level of consumption and the possibility of middle-class mobility. Yet, 
the car also marked a kind of family resource whose use demonstrated pat-
terns of kampung kinship, even as it showed a widening class gap within the 
family. Although Mas Hadi had moved to a new housing development with 
his young family, he left the mobil in the kampung at his mother’s house 
where it was used by his large extended family. Every day he brought his 
young son to this house, centre of a dense network of kin, so that Ari would 
attend the same neighbourhood school Mas Hadi himself had attended and 
so experience an upbringing much like his own.
Kampung are urban enclaves understood to be home to lower-class 
Javanese who are rough and unrefined (kasar in Indonesian). In contrast 
to wealthier, more refined street-side residents, they are described as 
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2 Javanese is the local language. Unless otherwise noted, interviews were conducted in 
the national language.
3 The CIA’s World Factbook (2012) puts Indonesian urbanization at 44% of the popula-
tion. The World Bank (2012) describes Java as 67% urbanized, with a total of 78 million 
people living in cities, and predicts 61% urbanization for the country as a whole in 2025. 
This same document notes that 32% of the poor were in urban areas in 1999, the highest 
ratio in developing East Asia (to which Indonesia belongs in this report).
4 The analysis of culture in the Marxian mode (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Roseberry 
1989; Thompson 1967; Willis 1977) has fallen out of favour in anthropology, although it 
remains strong in cultural studies. Recent work on the anthropology of the state touches 
on these issues from a different angle (Steinmetz 1999; Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001).
‘little people’ (wong cilik in Javanese2) (Guinness 1991). The kampung class 
has typically not been described as part of the Indonesian middle.3 Yet by 
considering the middle from the perspective of these lower-class urban-
ites, sources of class differentiation and definition can be seen from 
another perspective, one that counters normative descriptions of the 
middle class as part of modernization even as it resituates culture under-
stood in relation to production in the manner of Bourdieu (1984), and ear-
lier of Raymond Williams (1961, 1977).4 The kampung class has been 
generally neglected in treatments of class in Indonesia (but see Guinness 
1986, 1991, 2009; J. Sullivan 1980, 1986, 1992; N. Sullivan 1983, 1994). More to 
the point here, the role of family practices and child-rearing as markers of 
class and sources of its reproduction have not been placed at the centre of 
any consideration of class.
The kampung class is defined in large measure by being an urban form, 
and in the following it is approached through the lens of urban family and 
kinship. Class mobility, then, refers to the spatial mobility afforded by the 
mobil, but also to changing class position. This chapter identifies both the 
constraints on kampung mobility and its structural twin, forced mobility. 
The socialization of kampung children, and the circulation of children to 
improve family circumstances, becomes a window on forms of classed 
embodiment.
See the Middle from the Kampung Class
Attention to the kampung class interrupts the conversation on the middle 
class in Indonesia. Hildred Geertz (1963:35), whose work forms a significant 
part of the following account, described the urban environment in mid-
century Indonesia as producing a ‘metropolitan superculture’ of urban 
elites. More recent attention to the middle class in Indonesia has focused 
on its patterns of consumption (Shiraishi 2004) and the divergence in the 
<UN> <UN>
 class mobil 71
Indonesian middle class from standard descriptions of a middle class in 
the fashion of the European bourgeoisie (Heryanto 2003; see also Crouch 
1986). Its self-conscious fashioning as a class and its democratic potential 
have been assessed (Dick 1985; Crouch 1994). While political science may 
have ‘annexed’ the definitions of the middle at one point (Van Leeuwen 
2011), a cultural-studies approach that considers consumption, style and 
aesthetics seems to have gained a foothold as well. What remains little 
attended to is the practical consciousness of embodied culture as an ele-
ment of class, and the key role of kinship and family in its reproduction.
This chapter adopts a different tack for understanding middle 
Indonesia by describing it from the perspective of the kampung class 
in Central Java. This class-from-below approach helps define the edges 
of the emerging middle (cf. Heryanto 2003). At the same time its ethno-
graphic grounding in Central Java demonstrates the ongoing repro-
duction of particular forms of Javanese flexibility that illustrate the 
struc turation of shared cultural disposition (Giddens 1984). The work 
presented here suggests that one of the untold stories of Indonesia is the 
role of the kampung class in conferring stability in its long-term-growth 
trajectory. It serves as a bulwark against extremist political violence 
(see also Van Klinken 2009b).
Approaching the middle through the kampung class also demonstrates 
that production in the constitution of this class-in-the-making must not 
be forgotten. In contrast to work by Beatty (2002), who notes a fundamen-
tal Javanese relativism that is not contingent upon structural conditions 
of economy and politics, this work suggests that the kampung class 
is made in large measure through its role in the Indonesian economy. 
That is, the kampung class is constituted in part through class mobility 
and constraint that derives from its structural position as much as agen-
tive patterns of consumption. Yet, this production cannot be divorced 
from a habitus of shared lifestyle, a self-conscious culture of community 
and embodied forms of distinction (Bourdieu 1984). The work presented 
here suggests that the kampung class is profoundly shaped through its 
economic role in the Indonesian economy, but also by forms of practical 
consciousness that extend and reproduce this class position and produce 
a remarkably durable structure of feeling (R. Williams 1961, 1977).
In the following, as one means to map the topology of the middle in 
Indonesia, the twin pulls of knowing one’s place and seeking to transcend 
it are located at three points: the production of kampung consciousness, 
the socialization of kampung children and the circulation of children 
through adoptive relationships (anak angkat).
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The Production of Kampung Consciousness
In the 1990s, the emergence of a self-conscious middle class-for-itself 
that took a particularly ‘intellectual’ approach to democratization was 
matched with the rapid growth of new industrial capacity as well as gated 
suburban housing settlements in Jakarta’s peri-urban periphery (Van 
Leeuwen 2011; Kusno 2000). Van Leeuwen traces the history of scholarship 
on Indonesia’s middle class to Hildred Geertz’s (1961) early identification 
of an urban middle class. The connection to Geertz is doubly significant 
here given her work on child socialization attended to below. The 
kampung class is generally overlooked as a political force, but instead is 
taken to represent backwardness (Kusno 2000) and the site for interven-
tion to alleviate social problems. Yet, forms of kampung production and 
the related forms of embodied class consciousness may provide impor-
tant stabilizing effects as the kampung class serves as counterweight 
to rapid change, even as its reproduction serves to anchor people 
in place.
Indonesia appears to be weathering the global financial downturn in 
better shape than one might have expected given the tumultuous effects 
of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. The stability of the economy 
can be related to several factors. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
cracked down on unrest and opened the country to increased foreign 
direct investment. On the other hand, it might be argued that the success 
of the economy requires less explanation than the lack of its success in 
the post-Independence era, given Indonesia’s rich natural resources. 
Crony capitalism (Robison and Hadiz 2004) and high levels of corruption 
are typically identified as root causes, while incoherent management due 
to regional autonomy played a role as well (Schulte Nordholt and Van 
Klinken 2007b). One element in Indonesia’s economic stability that has 
received less attention comprises the very small, home-based industries 
in kampung neighbourhoods. As Hadiz (2002) notes, Indonesia’s competi-
tive advantage has long relied on its labour surplus economy. Southeast 
Asia generally has been a source of cheap, often female, labour on global 
assembly lines (Wolf 1992; Hill 1996) and has exported female domestic 
labour throughout Asia and the Middle East. But the largely female work-
force in micro-industries has received less attention.
In an argument developed elsewhere (Newberry 2006, 2007), kampung 
neighbourhoods are described as the site of the reproduction of a large 
reserve army of labour, in part through social welfare programmes 
that harness the voluntary labour of women. State administration of 
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communities under the New Order had the effect of mobilizing women as 
unpaid social welfare labour. It simultaneously positioned them in the 
home as wives and mothers who also supported husbands and children 
who were half-employed, occasionally employed, employed in low-skill 
labour or simply unemployed. Programmes such as the national house-
wives association (Pembinaan Kesejahateraan Keluarga, PKK), which are 
underwritten by local forms of administration below the civil service, 
combine with the ideal of a supportive home community to support the 
reproduction of very cheap labour.
This aspect of the state-ordered gendered division of labour is evident 
in the provision of small amounts of credit and grants along with educa-
tion on small industries (usaha kerajinan kecil). Kellett et al. (2001) have 
used the term ‘micro-scale home-based enterprises’ (HBE) to describe 
these industries that blur and reconfigure the ‘spatial and conceptual 
boundaries between work and home, between production and reproduc-
tion’ in order to generate income and sustain themselves. The Indonesian 
Central Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) has defined micro-
enterprises (called cottage industries) as those with 1–4 workers; small 
enterprises as those with 5–19; medium enterprises as those with 20–99; 
and large enterprises as those with over 100 workers (Berry, Rodriguez and 
Sandee 2001). Kampung are the site for the full range of these enterprises, 
including even some large ones. In the 1996 census, micro-enterprises 
dominated in number of workers, as they did in the past. Micro-enterprises 
represented 75.4% of workers in manufacturing in 1975 (3,900,000 work-
ers); 49.3% in 1986 (2,714,000 workers); and 39.9% in 1996 (4,076,000; 
Berry, Rodriguez and Sandee 2001:365). Yet, as Berry, Rodriguez and 
Sandee (2001:365) note, ‘in 1996, 40% of all workers were found in units of 
under 5 workers’. Brata (2007) demonstrates the continuing importance 
of small enterprises by citing 2006 statistics that 91% of employment in 
Indonesia is in small enterprises. The non-governmental sphere has also 
played a role in encouraging the development of these small-scale indus-
tries as part of a global model aimed at grassroots development, along the 
lines, for example, of micro-credit programmes.
The identification of the kampung as a class formation, then, is derived 
in part from this involution in economic activities through the prolifera-
tion of small industries within them. It is central to the provision of one of 
Indonesia’s key comparative advantages: cheap labour. And whether this 
labour materializes as factory-wage-earning labour, or quickly absorbed 
and dismissed manual labour, or overseas domestic labour, or local small 
industries labour, the advantage of cheap reproduction is clear (Guinness 
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2009; Meillassoux 1981). The key thing here is that the labour produced in 
kampung is cheap because it is precarious and informal.
Global regimes of flexible accumulation and late capitalism are cited as 
the cause of increased labour precarity (Arnold 2008; Harvey 1990; Ong 
1999). This informalization of labour is a continuous process of under-
mining labour stability and the prospect of secure, well-remunerated 
work and benefits. Such an analysis reflects a nostalgia for the Fordist 
compromise that ruled the developed north Atlantic during the mid-
twentieth century. Yet, no such nostalgia is possible in Java, where labour 
has long been informal and where, to the contrary, it might be argued that 
kampung forms of precarious, informal labour have long served to stabi-
lize, manage and reproduce labour. That is to say, the kampung economy, 
rather ironically, provides stability as it underwrites the precarity, or flex-
ibility, of labour in Indonesia.
A young girl in the extended family described here moved between 
households in a relationship that looks much like the anak angkat rela-
tionships detailed later. I had known her since she was a child. In my most 
recent fieldtrip, I learned that she was working in a factory in Bekasi, an 
industrial area on the outskirts of Jakarta. Meanwhile a variety of liveli-
hood activities were occurring in the house where she was born and 
raised. They included cooking candy to be sold, name card printing, piece-
work labour, haircutting, a small snack and drink stall, numbers games, as 
well as the provision of spiritual help to win at them. What then is remark-
able, is not that a young woman had gone to Jakarta to work in a factory, 
but rather the myriad, legal and illegal, informal jobs of those who stayed 
put. They were surviving at the edge of the formal economy as always-
available labour for whatever industry developed in the neighbourhood. 
No one expected this young woman to last at her factory job for very long, 
and it was understood that she could return home to be supported, as all 
the rest of her siblings were, by the make-work kampung labour of their 
mother and her relatives.
As significant as the precarity of labour for the analysis proposed here 
is the reproduction of a particular kampung consciousness. Indeed, it is 
here that the role of the kampung class in defining the middle is made 
apparent. An ideal of mutual self-help, or gotong royong, and community 
values of mutual obligation and support are key parts of kampung iden-
tity (Bowen 1986; see also Guinness 2009; Warouw 2006). Ultimately, this 
rhetoric of community self-help validates the reproduction of those who 
are under- and unemployed, even as it legitimizes women’s gendered 
labour in support of their families and communities. These lower-class 
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enclaves are bounded in more than one way: by the architecture of streets 
and walls; by forms of community organization, such as the neighbour-
hood civil security patrol (ronda); by administrative management by 
municipal authorities; but also by modes of dress, interaction and social 
relationships. In some contrast to Hildred Geertz’s observation (1963) of 
formlessness in the early 1960s, kampung neighbourhoods are organized, 
formally and informally, at a variety of levels. Thus, the sense of a bounded 
community has multiple, reinforcing sources. Perhaps the most telling is 
the use of kampung as a marker of a particular kind of class identity, one 
that is both cause and consequence of these boundaries.
To say that one is a ‘kampung’ person is to suggest a lower-class socio-
economic position, whether used by insider or outsider. Yet, when people 
inside these densely packed neighbourhoods use this term, it connotes 
familiarity and comfort with a particular style of life, one predicated on 
close observation of particular repertoires of behaviour. Kampung people 
are taken to be involved in one another’s lives, whether as guardian of 
neighbourhood moral dictates or as collaborator in local schemes, for 
good or ill. Attendance at kampung life rite events and other community 
ritual events is expected. Sending money rather than providing commu-
nal labour at such events elaborates this set of behaviours. That is, to send 
money is to suggest a higher socio-economic standing, and while often 
understood as not sufficiently kampung, the people who can send enve-
lopes of money also represent what is desired by many in the neighbour-
hood. This ambivalence between desire and suspicion of the wealthy 
is persistent in the kampung, serving again to mark incipient class 
boundaries.
The highly nuanced and subtle distinctions formed around the idea of 
kampung are evidence of the complexities of class, even as they illustrate 
how the positive affirmation of community membership by some can 
quickly become denigration by others. To call someone wong kampung 
(kampung person, Javanese) has a positive valence as insider, one of us, 
someone who understands what the kampung represents in a kind of 
resistance to normative middle-class respectability and pretensions. Yet 
to say wong kampung-an (person who acts like they are from the kam-
pung), that is to say, a person with a kampung mentality, is to shift this 
discourse to the pejorative and the speaker to an outsider. A further con-
trast makes this clearer. Javanese colleagues noted that to be told: ‘aja 
desani’ (‘don’t act like you are from the countryside’, Javanese) carries the 
meaning of not acting too humble, too self-effacing, as a rural peasant 
might in the company of those with higher standing. The contrast between 
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rural and urban as embodying different values is clear when we contrast 
this humility with the effect of being told: ‘jangan kampungan’ (Indonesian 
for ‘don’t act like a kampung person’). Here the connotation is of being 
rough, unrefined, not well-bred – kasar. Poverty and lower-class standing 
is implied in both examples, but the contrast between humble and vulgar 
is a key one. The use of these phrases, whether by kampung insider or 
outsider, effectively celebrates – as well as denigrates the countryside, 
while the urban poor are unambiguously described in negative terms.
In other words, kampung is a form of class consciousness, one that cuts 
two ways. While the word is used to register lower-class identity, kampung 
neighbours use it as a lash against those who fail to conform to kampung 
life, and against those whose class position is higher and therefore 
unmoored from the realities of kampung life. As such, kampung forms of 
distinction serve to mark the edges of the middle through conduct that 
simultaneously confirms class consciousness and registers a desire for the 
middle class. In many ways, kampung consciousness is fundamentally 
split: always looking forward to a modernizing urbanism while simultane-
ously gazing with nostalgia at a rural, village past.
Yet, the urban character of kampung is crucial here, even as these urban 
enclaves often blur the lines between rural traditional values and urban 
cosmopolitan ones. The New Order made good use of the village rhetoric 
to organize and govern these urban communities. As a consequence, the 
absorptive capacities of the kampung are not understood by kampung 
dwellers as a response to global demand for flexible labour, but instead as 
evidence of the still strong, rural Javanese values of sharing and mutual 
support. As I have described elsewhere (Newberry 2006, 2007; and see 
Breman 1980, 1988), the origins of the village imaginary are less important 
here than their continued reproduction through everyday social practices 
and their durability as New Order forms of governmentality. While it is 
true that rural Java also serves as a reserve of flexible and surplus labour, it 
is the urban kampung in its proximity to urban middle-class lives that 
lights up the divide between the lower class and the middle.
Kampung serve, then, not only as meaningful containers for particular 
types of economic activities, including those from which the state and the 
Indonesian economy derive great benefit, but also as a container for the 
domestic reproduction of particular forms of classed experience. Patterns 
of social engagement and particular repertoires of ritual and everyday 
experience reinforce membership even as they draw lines between inside 
and outside. This boundary-making is materialized in spatial practices 
that give material form to the kampung class. That is, kampung are not 
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only social formations but spatial ones as well. In some measure, kam-
pung work as whole social universes whose boundaries are re-inscribed 
on a daily basis through shared forms of belief, practice and life.
In the following, the inculcation of some of the values associated with 
the kampung class through child-rearing will be considered to demon-
strate the embodiment of kampung consciousness and how it relates to 
social mobility.
Diffuse and Enduring Forms of Respectful Embodiment
The year the mobil arrived, much of family life seemed oriented around 
admiring it. The improvement of the kampung house had included the 
addition of a deep, tiled front porch, a much-favoured aspect of kampung 
houses because it allows for catching cool breezes in the afternoon and 
monitoring the comings and goings of neighbours down the street. On 
one of my visits, Mas Hadi’s family was at the house with their young son, 
Ari. I had brought a present for him, as I did for the other children of the 
family. Because he was so young, about four years old, he was extremely 
shy in front of me. Rather than leave the mobil, which was parked next to 
the porch and where he often sat in the driver’s seat to watch the world 
through the windshield, Ari looked at me with fear and trepidation. 
Despite his deep desire for the toy I had bought, he was unable to come 
and greet me to receive it. That is, he refused to salam, which meant 
approaching me to respectfully take my hand and bring the back of it to 
his forehead. One constant refrain when around children is the command 
to salam when arriving and leaving respected older people. Young chil-
dren frequently refuse if shy around the adult, and the repeated, often 
frantic-sounding urging to salam, salam, indicates that attaining this 
respectful form of embodiment is quite important.
Javanese comportment in the kampung still emphasizes refinement, 
and the desire to be alus, or refined, is one that has often been noted for 
the Javanese. Alus is typically opposed to kasar, or not refined and coarse, 
as kampung dwellers are often described. This idea of refinement has 
been supported by a complex nexus of values. For example, modes of 
bodily refinement have been understood as deriving from a Javanese 
court culture that emphasizes unruffled elegance and grace both in body 
posture and in the use of the Javanese language. Javanese has several lev-
els that register relative social hierarchy so that speakers must make deci-
sions about relative status in order to use the correct level in conversation 
<UN><UN>
78 jan newberry
5 Thanks to Chris Brown for prompting attention to this issue. Indeed, status is 
like kampung membership, a matter of looking up and down at once (see Keeler 1987 on 
relative status). And it is important to note that the kampung described here had a close 
relationship with the Yogykarta kraton and a history of serving as the residential quarter 
for abdi dalem, those servants of the sultan whose comportment must perforce be alus but 
who were (and are) quite poor.
(Keeler 1984, 1987; Errington 1984). The higher the register, the more dis-
tant one is situated from the bump and tussle of social interaction and 
daily life. The sultan’s demeanour is taken to be the epitome of refinement 
that emphasizes immobility, grace and inner reserve, although it is also 
the case that the higher one’s status the less likely the need to conform to 
correct status.5 That is, the sultan may act as he pleases, while his under-
lings do not have this freedom of movement.
Even so, some have suggested that the intricacies of learning the 
Javanese language and the aesthetics of Javanese power serve to distance 
ordinary men from their families. Their children learn to speak Javanese 
by using the higher registers for their fathers, implying less emotional 
closeness. And male potency is concentrated through denial of the mate-
rial world by avoidance of mundane activities, such as dealing with 
money. Indeed, taking direct action is a sign of a lack of power and control 
(Ferzacca 2001). In effect, men are immobilized (Keeler 1987). Note here 
especially the opposition of male refinement with the gendered ideology 
of women as unable to attain the kind of aesthetic denial, inner resolve, 
and remove that are associated with male power. Nancy Smith-Hefner 
(1988) has noted the tendency for women to hypercorrect when using the 
Javanese language; that is, they tend to move up in register inappropri-
ately. In fact, their mobility is a liability. Likewise, while their movement 
through markets as buyers and sellers demonstrates their instrumental 
efficacy, it is not an ideologically legitimate form of power (Brenner 1998; 
Peletz 1996; see also Keeler 1984; Smith-Hefner 1988). So the emphasis on 
refined bodily comportment serves to mark gendered and classed forms 
of embodiment, but perhaps in surprising ways.
The admonition to not ‘act like a kampung person’ was mentioned ear-
lier. Attention to child socialization practices shows the key importance 
of modes of comportment and embodiment as a sign of being a good and 
moral person. Whatever the case with the royals, it is the upper middle 
class that is disregarding these forms, often dismissing them as evidence 
of a feudal past. Yet, in the kampung, these forms of bodily distinction are 
fully embraced and reproduced, as is evident in child socialization prac-
tices. The values of these forms of bodily comportment in the kampung 
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6 While isin and wedi are Javanese words, sungkan is an Indonesian word. In Yogya, 
rikuh or pekewuh would be used for sungkan. People use sungkan in East Java where 
Hildred Geertz conducted her research. This may account, in part, for the difference of 
opinion with Koentjaraningrat. My thanks to Nita Kariani Purwanti for pointing this out.
serve as particular markers of class. To attain them and use them is desired 
by kampung inhabitants, perhaps to counter the view of outsiders. These 
forms are important to those who would improve their class position, 
whereas those whose class standing is assured can ignore them.
So young Ari and the other grandchildren were schooled in particular 
forms of ‘registered’ bodily behaviour, that is bodily performances that 
registered status, just as the levels of the Javanese language are based on 
recognizing status differences. These moments of educating Ari on the 
porch revealed other aspects of child-rearing. Ari was the youngest grand-
child. Consequently, all eyes were trained on him. His refusal to leave the 
car resulted in a torrent of language directed at him, from mother and 
father, but also from uncles and aunts, and a variety of cousins. Indeed, for 
some time the energy of this large group of relatives was directed pre-
dominantly at convincing this young boy to leave the car and come greet 
me. This ongoing harangue was remarkable in several ways. First, this con-
tinual bantering, threatening and harassing were part of the normal mode 
of teasing the young to get them to comply. No physical action was taken, 
and instead a veritable sea of words surrounded him, urging him to think 
about the consequences, to consider his actions, to see that this was the 
wrong choice. He listened silently, and looked with longing at the toy and 
with terror at me, as the words continued.
The admiration of both the car and the child also serve as markers 
of class. Not only did the mobil make the family able to move around 
more freely, the approach to socializing the young Javanese child sug-
gested a concern with middle-class markers of status. H. Geertz (1961; cf. 
Koentjaraningrat 1985) considered three values or principles as key parts 
of the socialization of children: wedi, isin and sungkan. The terms can be 
glossed as fear (wedi), shame (isin) and knowing one’s status relative to 
another – a kind of humility (sungkan).6
In Hildred Geertz’s analysis these values reflect the growing sophistica-
tion of the child’s knowledge of social distinction. Experience in the kam-
pung suggests a slightly different focus, but ultimately the same result: a 
finely tuned sense of position in social space, one that is as relevant to the 
kampung class as to the priyayi class (Errington 1984). Descriptions of 
people in the national language as kurang malu (not embarrassed enough) 
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7 My thanks to Nita Kariani Purwanti and Gerry van Klinken for their notes on usage.
or nggak tahu malu (doesn’t understand what it is to be embarrassed) 
were used for people who did not know their place. Translated into 
Indonesian for my benefit, I was instructed in some of these values as well. 
For example, a young neighbourhood boy who frequently played at my 
house was from a very humble background. His father was unknown, and 
his mother was alleged to be a prostitute. Because he was young and full 
of fun, he was often in my house, intrigued by the foreigner. It was after 
one of these occasions that my next-door neighbour told me that his 
behaviour was not sesuai, not fitting. I didn’t fully understand at the time 
that what she meant was that he was not acting appropriately for his 
social station, which is to say, he was trying to move beyond the status he 
was meant to have. In other words, his mobility was restricted.
The development of a precise sense of social geographic sense is pro-
duced through another value that I saw in practice in kampung child 
socialization, one that is vitally important to understanding kampung 
class and its embodiment, and that is the value of learning to ngalah. As 
Keeler notes, the word ‘is based on the root kalah (“to be defeated”), but 
the initial nasalization gives the word an active and intentional cast, so 
that it expresses the decision on the part of a stronger or more righteous 
party to yield voluntarily to another. To be able to ngalah is an ability 
much praised in Java’ (Keeler 1987:62).7 In practice, this value means that 
older children must learn to concede defeat to the younger; they must 
learn to recognize the greater vulnerability of younger children and learn 
to deny what they want themselves in favour of giving to younger family 
members. As one friend described it, to concede defeat, or ngalah, can 
actually mean to win in the sense of winning over one’s desire and attain-
ing maturity. The value of knowing defeat amplifies and reinforces the 
value of knowing one’s social place and not to move beyond it.
Despite the shrinking family and delayed marriage, long-standing 
Javanese kinship, family and child socialization practices remain quite 
relevant in the kampung in my experience. Children are raised in house-
holds shot through with a network of kin from parents to grandparents to 
cousins, uncles and aunts. They are the centre of daily discourse and inter-
action, which subtly encourages them to know their place and to be aware 
of their social standing. As young Ari gazed at me from the safety and 
height of his perch in the front seat of the new mobil, he stood for many 
things: enduring patterns of kinship ties and socialization practices, but 
also the promise of a new mobility and a new class standing. In the next 
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section, long-standing practices of child sharing and fosterage and their 
relevance in the kampung illustrate another form of mobility.
The Circulation of Children
The term anak angkat – literally lifted child – is often glossed as adoption. 
The term actually covers various forms of child circulation (cf. Leinaweaver 
2008): from child sharing, to child borrowing, to fosterage. Formal adop-
tion is said to be prohibited by Islamic law (Fachruddin 1985; Harahap 
1993), although adoptions were reported to me under the name anak 
pupon (H. Geertz 1961 translated this as adopted child) to mean a formal 
legal adoption with the severing of ties to the biological family. In this sec-
tion, these forms of circulation of children are considered in terms of 
class and the forms of labour flexibility noted above, illustrating again the 
play between mobility and fixity in social status.
Beatty (2002) makes an argument for Javanese foundational flexibility 
as a kind of cultural disposition, one that is evident in the practice of mov-
ing children between households. As he notes for a community in East 
Java, flexibility in patterns of adoption share much with patterns of 
divorce and religious conversion. They all derive, he suggests, from a com-
mon cultural scheme that emphasizes the ability to change places and 
perspectives. Indeed, there are a variety of practices in Java that serve to 
make children mobile and these practices appear to be long-standing. 
Boomgaard (1989, 2003) considers historical practices that include child 
sharing (following Henley 2003), adoption and slavery to be contingent on 
household labour needs. He notes a distinction between anak pupon and 
anak angkat made in late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Java. 
An anak pupon was adopted at an early age and subsequently regarded as 
a ‘normal’ child by the adopting parents. This child would receive a share 
of inheritance and could succeed the adoptive father as a shareholder in 
the communal rice field. In contrast, an anak angkat was a child brought 
into the household at a later age that might then work as a servant or 
farmhand. This child would not inherit. Boomgaard notes some ambigu-
ity in the distinction between resident servants and farmhands and chil-
dren adopted at a later stage. Over the period 1500–1900 ‘slavery shaded 
imperceptibly into adoption’, particularly in parts of Sumatra (2003:208). 
The ambiguity in both cases derives from the blurry line that divides rela-
tions driven by affect from those driven by economic need. Schröder-
Butterfill (2004) notes a similar dynamic in her contemporary case studies 
of child circulation to help with senior care in East Java. Those interviewed 
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8 Interviews for this research were conducted by Nita Kariani Purwanti between July 
and October 2006. Interviews were transcribed by Ms Kariani Purwanti along with a brief 
synopsis of the life story. The translation of these materials was done by the author. The 
author extends her heartfelt thanks to Ms Kariani Purwanti, a valued research colleague.
for the present research also indicated that moving children between 
households produces a significant tension between love and attention 
(kasih sayang dan perhatian) and help with paying for school fees and 
other needs.
In Hildred Geertz’s 1961 description, the circulation of children was less 
clearly about the socio-economic effects than the effects on the household 
by having a child in the house: to produce a birth, to provide an opportu-
nity for parenting practice, to deal with loneliness. Yet, the term anak ang-
kat commonly used in contemporary Java is clearly about class mobility, 
and the notion of lifting a child with its implication of obligation shading 
into economic advantage and redistribution are central to practices of 
child circulation in Java. In a series of interviews conducted in 2006 regard-
ing the experience of being an anak angkat, it was clear that changes in 
biological families (due to marriage, divorce or death) were a key reason 
for the movement of children.8 This movement was almost always towards 
a family that was more economically fortunate. Yet, one aspect of the 
mobility of children that was repeated in the interviews was movement 
back to the natal home. In other words, patterns of child movement sug-
gest the circulation of children as markers of possibility, economic and 
emotional, as well as some of the obstacles to their circulation.
In one case from the interviews, three girls were circulated due to 
changes in their family of origin. As in all the cases here, this family was 
a lower-class urban one. These children had quite divergent experiences. 
It is the contrast between the eldest and the youngest that concerns us 
here. Their father, a military man, was married four times. Their biological 
mother was the first, and five children were produced in this marriage. 
The second wife was fat and very mean (ibu gemuk yang sangat galak), 
according to the oldest girl. The third wife was a Chinese woman who 
had two children of her own and who was not acknowledged (tidak diakui) 
by her family because of the marriage. Finally, the fourth wife produced 
a son.
The three girls were then ‘lifted’ by a friend of their father, another com-
mon way for children to move beyond family. The eldest child never felt 
accepted and sought to leave this new house as soon as she could. The 
youngest, who had no memory of the move, was a much-loved and 
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    9 ‘Dulu kalau memanggil ayah asli “Oom Raji”, dulu ayah asli kalau berbicara denganku 
malah bahasa Jawa halus.’
10 ‘Setelah ibu angkat meninggal dunia dan ayah angkat menikah lagi semua harta ayah 
angkat dikuasai oleh ibu tiri yang jahat dan serakah, saya tidak diberi bagian.’
pampered child in the adopting family. The relationship between the two 
fathers is telling as to the classed dimensions of anak angkat relations. 
Both were military men, but the biological father was a lower-status junior 
officer in a patron–client relationship with the adoptive father. In Java, 
these hierarchical relationships are described in familial terms. The 
poorer, lower-status man is child to his senior officer (anak buah/ or, liter-
ally, fruit child). Many poor people in my acquaintance hope to become 
the anak buah of a powerful man, and thus derive the benefits (often eco-
nomic) in exchange for loyalty (often political). The difference in status 
was evident when the younger daughter described her relationship with 
her biological father before she knew that she had been moved: ‘At first 
I called my “real” father Uncle Raji, and he would talk to me in high 
Javanese.’9 Her biological father’s use of a honorific level of Javanese to 
speak to her would be unimaginable if not for her movement as a lifted 
child (see Beatty 2002). In this case the spoiled child, who was moved 
without, at first, knowing, was treated as a person of higher status than 
her own biological father. The ‘lifting’ represented by child movement is 
quite evident. And yet the story does not end there.
After the death of the adopting father, his fourth wife secured his prop-
erty for her own child. The grown adoptive daughter went on to say: ‘After 
my adoptive mother died and my adoptive father married again, all his 
wealth was dominated by [my] step mother, who was evil and greedy, I 
wasn’t given a portion’ [from the inheritance of the adopting family].10 
This outcome was described as the result of the lack of formal documen-
tation of the transfer, a fact that reiterates the informal character of much 
of this child circulation. In this case, the youngest daughter returned to 
her natal home where she was granted inheritance by her ‘uncle,’ her bio-
logical father. Ultimately, both girls received inheritance from their bio-
logical father despite the fact that he was of a lower socio-economic 
status. The sisters now share a house given to them. The reversal of for-
tune represented by this case is quite remarkable.
The movement of children because of economic need was described 
again and again in interviews. When there were changes – a death, a 
remarriage – in the family, often children were moved as a result. In many 
of these cases, the movement was of a child back to an original home 
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because of changing fortunes in the adopting family, that is, these move-
ments were indeed circulation. What seems to be a persistent element in 
the circulation of children is the attempt to tap the resources available 
and/or implied in patron–client relations. That is, as suggested above, 
although lifted children are understood to benefit from their movement, 
in many ways it is their role as nodes in the networks of kinship and 
patronage that explain the prevalence of these patterns. Their circulation 
produces and reinforces pathways of exchange. The complicated nature 
of economic gain as against emotional relation was repeatedly mentioned 
in interviews. The continued mobility of children, moving as need be to 
avoid fate and to take advantage of resources, suggests that Beatty’s notion 
of an embrace of different perspectives through socialization of children 
is true, yet to shear it of attention to class differentiation, as he suggests 
(2002), is a mistake.
Like the desire of the kampung class to move easily and freely beyond 
the confines of their lower-class urban neighbourhoods, the circulation of 
children is about a variety of forms of desire for the free movement 
through social space. But it is also about a clear attempt to move up the 
class hierarchy, as we saw in the case of the mobil. Yet, in many ways, this 
mobility does not represent a jump across a broad divide between haves 
and have-nots, but rather a kind of lateral, tactical move to open up and 
make use of rather small differences in social standing. Like the new 
mobility of the kampung class in terms of transportation and communi-
cation, attempts to move beyond are circumscribed by limits and obsta-
cles that relate to embodied forms of distinction that derive in part from 
economic class and the structure of feeling that shapes it in urban kam-
pung neighbourhoods.
Class Mobility and the Fixity  of the Kampung Class
Flexibility, in the disposition of labour and in social status evident in 
patterns of child socialization and circulation, might be said to support 
and extend Beatty’s proposal of a fundamental Javanese flexibility. But 
the cultural disposition proposed here is produced as a form of practical 
consciousness; one born of the structuring power of the reproduction of 
precarious and abundant labour to the great advantage of the Indonesian 
state and economy. This is no argument for the role of culture as a sui 
generis phenomenon, but rather an argument about the deep imbrication 
of culture and class. Referencing Raymond Williams’s long revolution in 
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11 Thanks to Fridus Steijlen for these notes on changes to public transportation.
the structure of feeling, not to mention its relationship to state power 
(Corrigan and Sayer 1985), this approach to mobility appreciates not only 
its local valence, but also its powerful shaping by a global political econ-
omy and a national state.
Although the kampung class may desire a middle-class mobility and 
may circulate children as mobile tokens of economic opportunity and of 
pathways of exchange and obligation to achieve a kind of upward mobil-
ity, there is much that fixes this class in place, despite their efforts to move 
beyond. First, the flexibility of labour that serves the comparative advan-
tage of Indonesia depends on the fixed labour of kampung women as 
national heroes of reproduction and domestic engineering, even after the 
end of the New Order. Their fixity through state-sponsored domesticity 
relies on a tightly circumscribed sphere of mobility, the kampung com-
munity, even as the unemployed and under-employed labour of others in 
the kampung is made absolutely mobile and flexible. These programmes, 
as well as the precarity of economic life for this class, are linked as well to 
the house-based micro-enterprise industries of the informal sector that 
sponge excess of labour in surplus-labour economies.
Yet, there is a real irony here in the forms of kampung flexibility and 
mobility in labour, in child sharing, in community welfare work: they are 
founded on the stable reproduction of the lower class. And this stability, 
this fixed location in the social space of Indonesia, is strangely reiterated, 
not only in forms of child socialization, but also in the circulation of chil-
dren to take advantage of economic difference and in their ultimate 
return to where they began. As young Ari sits in the front seat of the fam-
ily’s new mobil, he seems the very epitome of the promise to move up to 
the middle. After all, his father and mother have moved to one of the new 
housing developments in the suburbs, and their new car allows for forms 
of urban mobility that were once denied them. At the same time, some 
forms of public transportation available to the urban poor are being 
undercut by recent changes, including the end of subsidies on petrol for 
motorbikes and the proliferation of cell phones and texting.11 Yet, in truth, 
the mobility of the kampung class has long been limited. This is evident in 
the social value placed on knowing one’s place. The socialization of kam-
pung children illustrates the continuing importance of family, including 
aunts, uncles, cousins and grandparents as well as parents, fifty years after 
Hildred Geertz’s work. It also shows the continuing role of child-rearing 
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that emphasizes the importance of respect, of embodied social subjectiv-
ity and forms of distinction, and of the importance of conceding defeat, 
mengalah, and knowing one’s place. While forms of respectful embodi-
ment might easily be denigrated as the feudal remains of Yogyakarta’s 
colonial nostalgia for aristocratic privilege, the modes of child-rearing in 
the kampung derive more proximately from cultural practices that regis-
ter a desire for middle-class status, even as they index forms of embodied 
distinction defined in the ongoing reproduction of these lower-class 
enclaves.
The circulation of children in urban kampung illustrates how local 
forms of embodiment serve to mediate class, and class-striving, in every-





Fig. 5. PONTIANAK:  A young woman working in an electronics shop is eager to 
pose for the camera. Too late, she is chagrined to realize that her mop will under-
mine the sophisticated air she hoped to project. 
June 2010: photo by  S. Chris Brown
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1 ‘Tengok Kak, baru jak gubernur ngumumkan kepala dinas propinsi, semue eselon 
dua.’ Second echelon is the appropriate civil-service rank for new heads of provincial 
offices.
2 ‘Hah, Dayak agek! Sebab gubernur Dayak, semue posisi penting diambik same die 
(Dayak). Nantek pegawai propinsi pasti Dayak gak semue.’
3 Berkat, ‘Gubernur: tidak ada balas dendam,’ 15 January 2008.
ETHNICITY AND YOUNG PEOPLE’S WORK ASPIRATIONS  
IN PONTIANAK
Wenty Marina Minza
One morning one of my research assistants in Pontianak showed me the 
morning paper. ‘Look’, she said in an anxious voice, pointing to the head-
line, ‘the governor has just announced the heads of the provincial offices…
all the second echelon people’.1 I was puzzled; why was this so important? 
She patiently explained it to me. First, several posts in the list were consid-
ered lucrative. All civil servants receive money on top of their salary. It is 
usually known as ‘side money’ (uang sampingan), and departments that 
pay a lot are called ‘wet’ (basah). The offices for the regional civil-service 
bureau, public works, education and health are ‘wet’. Side money can 
exceed the salary. Second, these appointments were ethnic. Resting her 
finger on the name of the new head of the West Kalimantan Regional Civil 
Service Bureau (Badan Kepegawaian Daerah Kalimantan Barat, responsi-
ble for recruitment), she added: ‘See, it’s a Dayak! Now that the governor is 
a Dayak, all of the important posts are held by the Dayak.…Soon all the 
provincial civil servants will be Dayak.’2 Of course that was just an assump-
tion and perhaps a bit of an exaggeration, but the feeling that this ethnic 
map of the bureaucracy would affect my assistant’s future turned out to 
be shared by many other young people in this town. The commotion led 
the governor to state in the local press that he had tried to balance the 
composition of his cabinet and that ethnicity did not matter in the recruit-
ment process.3 My Malay assistant did not believe it. To her it was obvious 
that more Dayak had been appointed than before.
My assistant, Lia, was a 24-year-old young Malay woman. That day she 
was wearing skinny jeans and a floral printed blouse. I noticed she had 
swapped her plain black-framed glasses for matching red ones. Attention 
to style is typical of young women in Pontianak. Lia had graduated in law 
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from the local state university two years earlier, but had not managed to 
find ‘decent’ work. Her idea of decent work was to be a civil servant, a 
pegawai negeri sipil, or PNS. She had been applying desperately ever since 
she graduated – seven times to various regional and national offices, all 
without success. Where I come from in Java, a PNS job is not as major an 
aspiration among young people. I was surprised by her fixation on getting 
a PNS job. It made me wonder how typical Lia’s obsession was among edu-
cated young people in Pontianak.
Pontianak is the provincial capital of West Kalimantan, located on one 
of the ‘outer islands’ of Indonesia. It has grown remarkably in recent years. 
In between the two-storey shop-houses known as ruko (short for rumah 
toko) and the spacious coffee shops (warung kopi) there are now enter-
tainment facilities such as internet cafés, karaoke bars and billiard rooms. 
The trained eye – all Indonesians have them – will soon notice the Chinese 
faces on Pontianak’s streets. Wherever you turn, you will see ethnic 
Chinese – walking along the streets, working in the ruko, selling as street 
vendors or simply relaxing at coffee shops. But this public scene contrasts 
with what I see in state offices, schools or health facilities. Ethnic Chinese 
are almost nowhere in sight. That is when I realized that space in Pontianak 
is ethnically segregated.
I was then introduced to a 25-year-old Chinese woman, Carla, a part-
time clerk at a small Chinese-owned transportation company who was 
still trying to obtain her university diploma. When I met her at the office 
she was wearing a simple tight skirt, complemented by a white shirt. She 
told me that when hanging out in cafés or at the mall, she dresses in short 
pants and tank tops, with high heels – exactly what my Malay informants 
call the ‘Chinese style’ (model cine). When she finishes her study she 
dreams of moving up in a big, private company. With the money she earns, 
she hopes to travel the world, to Europe and Japan.
None of the Chinese I spoke with shared Lia’s PNS aspiration. Like 
Lia, they wanted financial independence, but they also wanted self- 
development. Eny (19), a Chinese woman from Sekadau in the interior 
currently working with a company on a one-year contract, wanted even-
tually to have her own electronics store in Pontianak. She had no inten-
tion of applying for a PNS job. She feared that, if she was accepted, the 
government might send her back out to her hometown:
When I finish university, there is no way I will go back to my hometown. We 
are human…we want to develop ourselves all the time, we are looking for 
new experiences. I am not that interested in working as a PNS.…Especially if 
<UN> <UN>
 ethnicity and young people’s work aspirations in pontianak 113
I were assigned to a rural area, I would not be able to develop myself.…We 
have to fit in if we are placed in a rural area.
Many other Chinese youths that I interviewed similarly stressed the 
importance of matching their future job with their educational back-
ground. Sometimes this might have been a cover for fear of failure, because 
they also assumed their chances of being accepted into the bureaucracy 
were minimal. Vanka (22), a Chinese woman who had come to Pontianak 
from a small village, told me: ‘I heard that if you want to apply for a PNS, 
only natives (putera daerah) will be considered. Non-indigenous people 
(non-pribumi) like the Chinese will definitely be refused.’
The contrast between Chinese and non-Chinese youths’ work aspira-
tions became clear in a small survey I conducted (see Table 1, further dis-
cussed below).
My observations on what shapes youth work aspirations differ sharply 
from those of others. Arnett (2004) describes young people in the United 
States as eager to explore their work options before deciding. Exploring is 
Table 1. Work aspiration by ethnicity.
First choice Total 
PNS Business Worker in 
private 
company
Ethnicity Malay 140 10 3 153
91.5% 6.5% 2.0% 100.0%
Dayak 34 8 2 44
77.3% 18.2% 4.5% 100.0%
Madurese 19 1 0 20
95.0% 5.0% .0% 100.0%
Javanese 39 1 0 40
97.5% 2.5% .0% 100.0%
Others 21 3 3 27
77.8% 11.1% 11.1% 100.0%
Chinese 2 30 13 45
4.4% 66.7% 28.9% 100.0%
Total 255 53 21 329
77.5% 16.1% 6.4% 100.0%
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part of constructing their personal identity. Pontianak youth, by contrast, 
all seem to know what job they want without having to explore options. 
Educated non-Chinese are sure they want to enter the bureaucracy; most 
Chinese want to start their own business or at least work in a dynamic, 
challenging private company. Unlike Arnett’s industrial-city western 
youth, educated youth in this provincial town in a developing country are 
not free to follow their own inclinations. Not individual capacity but vari-
ous structural factors shape their work opportunities. As I tried to unravel 
what these factors might be, I faced three puzzles.
The first puzzle is this fixation on finding perhaps the most boring job 
in town. I could not get over my amazement at the number of non- 
Chinese youth in Pontianak – Malay, Dayak and Madurese – who wanted 
nothing more than to ‘be a PNS’. Where was their need for self-actualiza-
tion? Most PNS with whom I spoke did not find their job very interesting, 
and the image is that PNS actually do very little work.4 When I came to 
one of the local offices at ten o’clock in the morning, the woman taking 
care of my administrative necessities chatted amiably about her ‘busy’ 
schedule outside the office. When she was finished with me, she walked 
towards her desk and said with a smile of satisfaction that it was time 
for games on the office computer. Soon she would leave to pick up her 
daughter from school. This is what Pontianak’s educated indigenous 
young people aspire to – a job in the bureaucracy, any job at all, regardless 
of their educational background. Even those of my informants who said 
they wished to become a teacher emphasized it had to be as PNS. If they 
had to choose between becoming a teacher in a private institution and 
becoming a PNS in the bureaucracy, they would choose the latter.
A second and related puzzle arose from Lia’s anxious exclamation, ‘See, 
it’s a Dayak!’ Entering the bureaucracy was apparently not a matter of 
acquiring the right qualifications, but of being born into the right ethnic 
group. In the minds of these young people, ‘getting in’ was a competition 
that ran along the lines of ethnic patronage. This bureaucracy was a long 
way from the advanced, dispassionate organization that Weber (1968:956–
1005) depicted. What kind of organization was it for Pontianak? To under-
stand this would be to understand the source of the anxiety young Malay 
and Dayak graduate job seekers felt.
The third puzzle arises from the completely different aspirations, in the 
same town, among ethnic Chinese educated youth. They do not share the 
anxiety of ethnic competition in fulfilling their aspirations. Why is that so, 
4 Berkat, ‘Makan gaji butak,’ 10 January 2009.
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5 Pam Nilan, at the conference ‘Growing up in Indonesia: Experience and Diversity in 
Youth Transitions,’ Conference, Canberra, Australia (29 to 31-10-2009).
6 Berkat, ‘6710 Pelamar rebutkan 383 lowongan,’ 20 December 2008.
and what does this tell us about the socialization process in an ethnically 
divided provincial town?
This chapter explores the process of growing up through the domain of 
work in an Indonesian provincial town. It focuses on university-educated 
youth in the provincial city of Pontianak. It begins by asking how non-
Chinese youth justify their PNS aspirations, and aims to understand how 
limited chances, unfair competition and ethnic prejudice shape their 
dreams and anxieties in their quest for upward mobility. It finds that fam-
ily is particularly important to them. Work aspirations are less about iden-
tity construction than about securing a livelihood that enables young 
people to fulfil family obligations.
To help solve the three puzzles, I will first describe how Pontianak’s 
labour market has historically been shaped by ethnic relations.
Ethnic Work-Domains
An Australian colleague who heard me present a paper at a conference 
could hardly believe that provincial youth still found the bureaucracy so 
fascinating. ‘It seems such a 1980s dream’, she said. 5 But it is true. A young 
Malay man on campus, when I explained early in my research that 
I wanted to know what kind of job young graduates in Pontianak were 
after, replied: ‘Mbak, you don’t need a year of research to answer that ques-
tion! Everybody here knows that they all want to be a PNS.’ The fierce 
competition to enter the civil service did not dampen his ambition. 
During the 2008 PNS recruitment in the new district of Kubu Raya, just 
outside Pontianak, for example, 8,083 applied for just 383 positions.6 If in 
the big cities industries and the private sector increasingly provide young 
people with opportunities for decent, secure and fulfilling work, in a pro-
vincial town such as Pontianak educated non-Chinese have much less 
choice. Industry is limited, and the Chinese dominate private business. 
A ‘decent’ office job (kerja kantoran) for them comes only from the state.
Pontianak, with a population of just over half a million in 2008 
(Pontianak Statistics Bureau 2008), is located at the mouth of three rivers: 
the Kapuas, the Small Kapuas and the Landak. Its strategic location made 
trade the basis of its growth. The rivers remain an important transporta-
tion route to and from the interior. The province of West Kalimantan lies 
<UN><UN>
116 wenty marina minza
7 Berkat, ‘Pekerja Kayu Kembali Demo ke Kantor Bupati,’ 6 December 2008.
8 Tribun Pontianak, ‘Perusahaan Batam buka di Pontianak,’ 18 October 2008.
in Borneo. Its four million inhabitants (Badan Pusat Statistik 2011) reside 
mostly near the coast. Agriculture, trade and the service sector make up 
most of the domestic product. The province is known for its fruit and 
expanding palm oil plantations. Rice production is limited when com-
pared with Java (West Kalimantan Statistics Bureau 2010). In the past, log-
ging drove the province’s economy, but crackdowns on illegal logging 
bankrupted many major logging companies, increasing already high 
unemployment in the province.7
In Pontianak, most people work in the trade and the service sectors 
(the latter includes government); industry is not prominent. Numerous 
government offices extend from the west to the southern part of the city. 
The mayor’s offices stand on the Kapuas river bank. The provincial gov-
ernment’s offices are in the south, near the state university Tanjungpura 
and the Mega Mall. The new mall has become one of Pontianak’s most 
visited entertainment centres. Pontianak’s poor mostly live in the north, 
across the Kapuas River – mostly poor Chinese and Madurese working 
their market gardens. Several local, Chinese-owned rubber-drying sheds 
line the northern bank of the Kapuas, but they employ few workers. Some 
new national-level agribusiness companies have started hiring low-skilled 
female workers through job fairs facilitated by the local government.8 The 
educated young dominate the town’s statistics for the un- and underem-
ployed (Pontianak Statistics Bureau 2008).
Ethnicity has always been important in West Kalimantan’s social land-
scape (Prasojo 2011:52). The province’s slogan is ‘Harmonis dalam etnis’ 
(harmony in ethnic diversity). Four groups dominate provincial ethnic 
dynamics: the Malay (42%), Dayak (32%), Chinese (12%) and Madurese 
(5%). Other migrant groups include the Javanese, Bugis, Padang, Batak 
and Sundanese (Ridwan Rosdiawan, Hudi and Shaleh 2007:22). Trans-
migration programmes in the 1980s ensured there are more Javanese here 
than Madurese, yet they are considered to integrate better than the 
Madurese and are not prominent in ethnic tensions (Alqadrie 1990:62; 
Ridwan Rosdiawan, Hudi and Shaleh 2007:23). In Pontianak, Chinese at 
about one third make up the largest group. They are followed by Malay 
(a quarter), and then the Bugis, Javanese, Madurese and others. Whereas 
Dayak are the majority in the province’s interior, only a small number of 
Dayak live in Pontianak (Ridwan Rosdiawan, Hudi and Shaleh 2007:26). 
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Apart from the Chinese, the other groups are predominantly Muslim, so 
that Islam is Pontianak’s majority religion.9
Ethnic and familial networks shape employment patterns to an impor-
tant degree in West Kalimantan (Van Klinken 2003:22–3). Malays domi-
nate the civil service, but many Malays are also involved in farming and 
petty trade; Dayak are farmers, petty traders and also teachers; and 
Madurese work in informal sectors such as transport (pedicabs, small fer-
ries, taxis) and petty trade (fruit, vegetables and street-side food). The 
Chinese are the dominant players in retail and wholesale trade and in ser-
vices, often employing non-Chinese as workers. In urban Pontianak, many 
Malays also work in petty trade and small restaurants (warung makan). 
Only a few Dayak occupy middle-level civil service positions (Achwan 
et al. 2005).
Riwanto Tirtosudarmo (2002:4) writes that West Kalimantan’s is a ‘his-
tory of migration, or in other words, a history of interaction between 
migrants and the local people (or those who had arrived earlier) in this 
area’. The Dayak and Malay are considered the ‘original’ ethnic groups, 
while the Chinese and Madurese are migrants. Arab immigrants in the 
1700s established what would be known as ‘Malay’ sultanates, located on 
the coastal areas (Pemerintah Kota Pontianak 2009). The Kadariah sultan-
ate in Pontianak was one of the more prominent ones. Dayak who 
embraced Islam were considered Malay; indeed, Muslims from other eth-
nic groups are also often considered Malay, with the exception of the 
Madurese. Some Dayak later moved to the interior (Adri 2007).
The Dutch arrived seven years after the establishment of the Kadariah 
Sultanate (Pemerintah Kota Pontianak 2009).The Christian mission pen-
etrated the interior in the late nineteenth century, and most Dayak con-
verted in the twentieth. Unlike the Dayak Muslims, Dayak Christians 
maintained their ethnic identity. They constructed an ethno-religious 
identity that paralleled Dayak culture with Christianity (Ridwan 
Rosdiawan, Hudi and Shaleh 2007:22–3). The Malay sultanates cooperated 
with the Dutch and provided access to resources (including land), but the 
sultans also got military protection from rivals (Van Goor 1986). The 
Dutch–Malay partnership gave Malays prestige. The Dutch used them to 
colonize the area through indirect rule (Siahaan 1974:32). The partnership 
further marginalized the Dayak, who had already been positioned as ulun, 
or slaves of the sultans (Tangkilisan 2005).
9 Sejarah Melayu: Kesultanan Kadariah. http://history.melayuonline.com/?a=bU5WL 
29QTS9VenVwRnRCb20%3D= (accessed 25 February 2008).
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The Chinese first came to the northern part of West Kalimantan early 
in the nineteenth century as farmers (Heidhuis 2003:27; Siahaan 1974:20). 
The discovery of gold encouraged more to come. To protect their eco-
nomic interests, the Chinese established their own mutual-aid organiza-
tions, called kongsi, which facilitated the accumulation of capital and the 
reproduction of Chinese cultural practices. These strategic steps later 
facilitated Chinese domination in trade, though some remain farmers 
today (Siahaan 1974:23–5). Most Chinese are Buddhist or Confucian.
The Madurese, from the island of Madura off East Java, first came to 
West Kalimantan as low-skilled workers for the Malays, beginning in the 
early twentieth century (Hendro Suroyo Sudagung 2001:93). The flow 
increased in the 1920s and 1930s as the Dutch built new roads and towns 
(De Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:258). The Madurese are Muslims, but 
retain a separate identity from the Malays.
Ethnic stereotypes are rife. Malays are said to be Islamic, educated, 
urbanized and of higher social status than the Dayak, who are Christian 
and rural. Chinese are said to be exclusive and wealthy, while the 
Madurese are seen as poor, uneducated, violent and strongly attached 
to religious leaders from Madura. In reality not all Chinese are rich 
(Sikwan and Triastuti 2004). In recent years many Dayak Muslims are 
refusing the Malay identity and calling themselves Muslim Dayak 
(Alqadrie 2002:6).
These ethno-religious identities are intensely politicized and have led 
to a series of bloody ethnic conflicts. The conflicts of 1997, 1999 and 2001 
pitted Dayak and Malay versus Madurese and occurred around the 
moment of decentralization (Davidson 2008; Wawa 2000; Prasojo 2011:51). 
All my informants’ anxieties, and their hopes of upward social mobility in 
an era of changing ethnic relations, can be traced back to these episodes.
The ethnicized employment market in this provincial town leaves 
few options for educated non-Chinese young people besides the PNS 
job. How do the young people themselves justify their choice of work 
aspiration based on these perceived opportunities? I conducted 106 in-
depth interviews with university-educated youth, as well as a small survey 
among university students (N=369) to answer that question. Some of my 
in-depth interview respondents were drawn from the survey. The students 
were randomly chosen. I went to four universities and distributed the 
questionnaire in some of the classes. All students in the selected classes 
filled out the questionnaire. The research team made sure that the stu-
dents answered all the questions, to minimize missing or ambiguous 
answers. The survey population proportions are: Malay 44%, Dayak 14%, 
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10 Tanjungpura is the main state university in the province. STAIN (Sekolah Tinggi 
Agama Islam Negeri) is a state higher-education institution that places Islamic teachings 
in its core curriculum. STKIP (Sekolah Tinggi Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan) is a private 
higher-education institution, focusing on training future teachers, while STMIK (Sekolah 
Tinggi Management dan Informasi Komputer) is a private higher-education institution 
mainly teaching management and computer science.
11 Berkat, ‘Jangan nak berutang’, 24 February 2009.
Madurese 7%, Chinese 15%, Javanese 14% and others (including Bugis, 
Batak and Minang) 8%. Of the respondents, 55% were male. The four uni-
versities were: Tanjungpura University, STAIN, STKIP and STMIK Widya 
Dharma.10 In Pontianak, even the universities are ethnically stereotyped. 
I chose mine for that reason: Tanjungpura University is associated with 
Malays, STAIN with Madurese, STKIP with Dayak and STMIK with 
Chinese.
Puzzle 1: Why Become a PNS?
Many non-Chinese youths of lower-middle-class backgrounds consider 
PNS a form of upward mobility. The bureaucracy is accessible to them, 
promises a stable income and status, and allows them to fulfil family obli-
gations. The stability outweighs the size of the salary, which is often not 
very high. Low PNS salaries are a stock item in local media. One story in 
Berkat starts with two PNS at a warung kopi. Asked how he is doing, one 
says: ‘You ask how I am doing? It’s like you’ve just known me. Everyday we 
go to this warung kopi and you still ask how I’m doing? This is how life has 
always been for us PNS. I only have money on the first day of every month. 
Even that won’t last long, cut to pay back loans…’. The other replies, ‘You 
and I share the same fate. My salary is also always cut. It gives me a 
headache…even if there is a rise, it won’t solve our problems as a lower-
echelon PNS’.11
In reality, however, ‘side money’ can exceed their salary. This includes 
gifts, often of dubious legality, from personal or corporate clients for sup-
port with government projects. The steady income also creates access to 
credit schemes, for example, to buy a motorcycle. Lian (27), a Malay young 
man, told me: ‘You know how important a motorcycle is to get to places 
here. That is why people are competing to enter the PNS.’ A mortgage on a 
house is also very popular; in fact, it is so popular that housing 
was excluded from a city regulation of March 2009 banning PNS credit 
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12 Berkat, ‘Larang pegawai pinjaman uang: potongan gaji di atas 40 persen,’ 31 March 
2009.
applications requiring instalments of more than 40% of the monthly 
salary!12
The pension, while small, guarantees lifetime security in a country that 
is for most people not a welfare state. And it goes on giving – the pension 
of a deceased PNS goes to the surviving spouse. Tina (24), a Dayak young 
woman, is the daughter of a deceased police officer. She told me:
During good or bad times we still have money. If you’re a businessman, you 
get millions of rupiah, but you don’t know the future…if you’re a PNS, even 
when you’re retired, you have money for your children to eat. Even though 
my father has passed away, I still enjoy the benefits from his pension. I want 
that for my children, I want to become a PNS.
A pension is also a buffer against stigmatization in old age. A Madurese 
young woman, Wati (28), told me it would protect her from the shame of 
having to go into one of the free retirement homes subsidized by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs: ‘If I cannot get a job in the civil service, then 
who will take care of me when I can no longer work? I would probably live 
in a retirement home (panti jompo). People would pity me. I don’t want 
that.’
The stability, opportunity (side money and credit schemes) and secu-
rity of the PNS job contrasts with the low, unstable income and uncertain 
future for those in the lower class in Pontianak working in the informal 
sector, such as small shops. Formal-sector alternatives for non-Chinese 
youth are usually low-end service jobs such as sales promotion or check-
out girl at the mall, or waitress in a global restaurant chain. These jobs 
may bring a stable income, but the pay is low and the contracts uncertain. 
All this gives the PNS status, as Aas, a 26-year-old Malay young man, told 
me: ‘The motivation to join the PNS is to acquire a good social position 
(kedudukan sosial).’
Many non-Chinese aspirant PNS emphasized the importance of soci-
etal recognition, especially within their own ethnic group. Wearing a PNS 
uniform is the public symbol of success. This was mentioned by Wawan 
(30), an unemployed Malay young man who graduated from the Faculty 
of Forestry in 2008.
I would say the bottom line is this…I prefer a job as a PNS. If I am a PNS, in 
the eyes of society, I will have status. If I am not a PNS, then I have less sta-
tus, unless I am really successful at what I do. My family will also have status, 
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13 Berkat, ‘Pemkot tertibkan pegawai “titipan”,’ 27 March 2009.
because here, if one is successful, the family is also successful in society. And 
people notice that when one wears the uniform.
The uniform as status symbol is carefully guarded, as evidenced by a 
media debate on whether temporary civil servants (honor) should be per-
mitted to wear it.13 The mayor recently decided the answer was ‘no’. When 
I showed Nia (24), a Malay young woman, the mayor’s new policy of limit-
ing the uniform to permanent PNS, she agreed that honor were threaten-
ing to deflate its value:
I often meet my friend, riding her motorcycle, when I am on my way home. 
I have always thought it was all right. She is a temporary worker (honor), but 
she wears the brown uniform. Yes, really she wears a uniform. Maybe the 
policy is still new. That is why she is in the uniform, even though she is actu-
ally not allowed to wear the uniform yet.
We were having lunch at a small canteen in front of a government office. 
I asked her what was so important about the uniform. She replied: ‘Look 
around, see those PNS in that corner? Many of the PNS come here to eat. 
We feel, I don’t know (gimana gitu – indicating reluctance) when we see 
them. They are so confident, and proud in their uniform. They know 
everyone knows they are a PNS.’ The uniform is a symbol of power. As 
access to it is further restricted, its value only rises.
Unlike the uniform, the free use of state motorcycles, cars and houses is 
only available to PNS of a certain position. Dino (21), a Malay man, told me 
this was the reason why he wanted one day to become head of a local office:
I want to be a kepala dinas (head of office). They have access to office cars, 
sometimes houses (rumah dinas). Everyone will know one’s position if they 
stay in a rumah dinas. I think that is achievable. If a person obtains a bach-
elor’s degree, he will be at level III (golongan III). It is easier to climb up the 
career ladder from there.
Whether through credit or as a state facility, a ‘proper’ house is the ulti-
mate goal. Pontianak’s peaty soil is unsuitable for anything but timber 
houses on stilts, but a proper house has brick walls and a tile floor, as in 
Java. The added expense of deep foundations is part of the prestige. A car 
comes a close second. Lanny (24), a Dayak young woman, says:
For us, success is…success is about achievement, like from the material 
domain…a house, having a car, or a new car. People will judge us, people are 
considered a success if they can obtain a house and a car. Usually it is those 
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in the civil service who are able to afford a house and a car. I don’t know 
what kind of effort is put in to obtain the money to buy those goods, I don’t 
know. But that is how people see success, from large observable material 
wealth. With a car, you can also show your success in public more than with 
a house.
A more intimate form of symbolic power is the opportunity to fulfil 
social obligations to the family. This is often viewed as the key to achiev-
ing  ‘adult’ status. A regular income allows the dutiful child to assume 
the responsibility of assisting their parents. In the West, responsibility 
is often thought of as referring to oneself (Arnett 1998). But in Pontianak, 
as in district towns in India (Seiter 2009), youths do not see responsibil-
ity  as limited to oneself. Adulthood is achieved when one is able to 
extend responsibility towards others – especially to parents and the 
wider family.
Financial responsibility can also enhance their bargaining power in the 
family. Hendar (22), a Malay man, explains:
I need a job to earn money, to help the family and for myself…but more 
importantly for my family, that is more important….That is why I want a 
PNS job. Recognition from my parents, my older brother – but especially 
from parents – is important…I have more say in decision making in the fam-
ily if I can support the family each month.
Most of the youths I interviewed are from lower-middle-class families. 
Their parents are usually teachers, low-ranking bureaucrats or owners of 
small businesses. A minority are from lower-class families whose parents 
work as farmers, plantation workers or workers in small businesses. These 
youths usually will not inherit a house. Credit schemes for housing allow 
them to become independent adults. The non-Chinese young people 
I met in Pontianak took an amazingly long-term view of their family 
responsibilities. Only when they have their PNS status and can see that 
their future family is safe will they feel confident enough to ‘move on’ and 
think about marriage. Owning a house, after marriage, is the start of a new 
mode of relating to parents. Agus (24), a young Malay man, explained:
If married people still live with their parents it does not mean that they are 
less of an adult than those who live independently.…Maybe they need a 
temporary place (numpang dulu), because people start a new life from 
zero….But a PNS can have a house through credit. They don’t have to wait 
too long to save money for a house. The PNS can become independent 
sooner.
A house facilitates independent decision-making and lessens the parents’ 
burden. Mimi (25), a young Dayak woman, said:
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If we are away from our parents, we become an adult faster. Because when 
we are with our parents, every time it is ‘emak-emak (mom, mom), pak, pak 
(dad, dad), mak, I can’t do this, I can’t do that.’ When we’re alone, like when 
we have our own place, we have to try to solve our own problems.
Clearly class origins tell us a lot more than merely not inheriting a house. 
They tell us something about values, such as the commitment to family. It 
also shapes attitudes towards the future, including the anxiety about 
secure incomes and perhaps, too, the lack of imagination about a world 
beyond their own family circle. These values come from their parents. 
Borjas (1992) used the term ‘ethnic capital’ to show the importance of 
parental inputs and ethnic environment in youth chances for upward 
mobility. Work aspirations are formed through values that run through 
the family in certain ethnic subcultures. And of course the opportunities 
are structured ethnically. Non-Chinese parents are especially likely to ide-
alize the PNS job if they themselves experienced insecurity. Bu El is a 
50-year-old Malay mother of four. Her eldest daughter has just graduated 
from university and is looking for work. She has two other children still at 
university. She says: ‘I imagine my children when they have finished uni-
versity. If she is a PNS, it is a full success (sukses penuh).’ Her father had a 
job as a low-skilled worker with a private company with decent pay. But 
when she was in junior high, he was fired and the family’s finances col-
lapsed. The fall from prosperity to poverty was traumatizing. She says: 
‘That is why I expect my children to become a PNS.’
Even though a pension does not directly involve parents’ self interest, 
it is very much part of the parental plan for their children. I met a 65-year-
old Malay man, Pak Alip, a retired PNS teacher with three grown 
children – all PNS. When Pak Alip heard that during my fieldwork I was 
teaching at a private university in Pontianak, he asked, ‘Then you are not 
a PNS? Then you don’t get a pension, right?’ I agreed, and asked him why 
pension was so important to him. He replied, ‘I have two daughters in the 
PNS, and my son is also in the PNS. I am a lucky man, I know that my 
grandchildren will be secure. That is why pension is important.’
The uniform of one member in the family is a sign that the whole fam-
ily has ‘connections’. Arjan, a 30 year-old Madurese man, said:
If we wear a uniform, the whole family will be proud. Other people will 
know that someone in the family is a PNS…they know that we can perhaps 
help in this and that, like giving information and stuff. Just as I was offered 
to enter the PNS by another PNS. People know that a PNS can do all that.
Even a low-ranking PNS has the power to negotiate placement in the 
PNS recruitment process, provided they have a good relationship with a 
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14 Berkat, ‘Penipuan calo CPNS’, 17 November 2008.
higher-ranked bureaucrat. People who offer this service are known as calo 
(middle man). During my fieldwork, the newly formed district of Kubu 
Raya started a PNS recruitment process. The number of calo produced a 
storm of bribery allegations. First, there was the wife of a district parlia-
mentarian and her sister. They recruited a go-between who then searched 
for interested applicants. The go-between set up the connection, for 
which the two sisters would give him a small amount of money (Rp 
100,000–200,000). After that, this go-between would carry the applicants’ 
much higher fees to the two sisters. The amount depended on the salary a 
successful applicant could expect to earn. A high-school graduate pays at 
least Rp 40 million (US$ 4,000) to enter the police force. ‘The go-between 
admitted to the police that he had given a total of Rp 750 million to the 
two sisters’.14 The police got busy, more calo were arrested, and that par-
ticular recruitment process was annulled in its entirety. Since then people 
have become more cautious, but no one believes these practices have dis-
appeared. Bu Idah is a PNS, teaching elementary school. Her husband 
wants to save up a special fund for when their son finishes university. 
Through her friends she has acquired a map of middle men they can 
approach.
The downside to this system of connections is that it excludes many 
who might otherwise be well qualified to enter the public service. Dea 
(25), a Dayak woman whose father is a teacher, says hesitatingly:
I didn’t think of the PNS as my work aspiration, well not that much. But 
I wouldn’t refuse if I were accepted, I would be happy. My parents say that 
they can seek help from my father’s friend. But his friend’s position is not 
strong. The position will probably go to someone else with a stronger 
connection.
Bernadus, a young Dayak man whose parents are farmers, wrote ‘starting 
my own business’ as his first work aspiration choice in my questionnaire. 
But when I interviewed him, he told me he actually wanted to enter the 
police force, but had not been accepted. He did not tell me how good his 
school results were, but he himself blamed a lack of connections, a result 
of his parents’ occupation:
Most of my friends get into the police force using money. I hate that, I hate 
those kinds of policemen….But I really, really want to be a policeman… 
when I applied after high school, I did not use any connections (orang 
dalam). Connections…who? I don’t have any. Even if I had one, I would need 
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to prepare a lot of money, mbak. 40 million, 50 million, 60 million rupiah. Do 
you think I am capable of providing that kind of money?
This also shows that an even higher percentage of young people, espe-
cially those from the lower class, may aspire to the PNS job than stated in 
the result of my small survey.
Puzzle 2: Why the Fear? Ethnic Bosses and the Bureaucracy
The handover of various powers from the central to the local government 
has triggered many local power struggles. In some areas local ethnicity has 
become an important condition for attaining certain powerful positions, 
in order to counter a perceived history of Javanese domination. The Malay 
and the Dayak in West Kalimantan are considered ‘sons of the soil’ (putera 
daerah) with special rights. But putera daerah are not united. Pemekaran, 
the establishment of new districts by sub-dividing old districts, is an 
opportunity to ‘officially’ claim ethnic territories. The power struggle is 
mainly about civil-service positions. Combined with a strong patronage 
system and the manipulation of rules by ethnic elites, the competition 
has significantly strengthened primordial ties.15 As West Kalimantan con-
tinues to urbanize by migration from the countryside, despite a weak 
labour market, non-Chinese young people find themselves in a highly eth-
nicized competition for bureaucratic jobs. During a graduation ceremony 
at the Widya Dharma University, I sat next to a proud Dayak mother. She 
told me that the current governor, Cornelis, a Dayak, had made Dayak 
needs his priority. New roads into the interior had made it easier for young 
Dayak to come to the city for their education. She felt Cornelis was revers-
ing the historic marginalization of the interior that had been the Dayak 
fate since colonial times (Peluso and Harwell 2001:84; Peluso 2009:50; 
Davidson, 2003:9; Eilenberg and Wadley 2009:61–2; Van Klinken 2008:37; 
Bamba 2004:70). Oren (23), a Dayak young man studying in a university in 
Pontianak, told me:
The governor is now Dayak, the head of district in the interior happens to be 
Dayak, so there is a kind of policy to recruit Dayak people with potential, 
those who found it difficult to get into the civil service in the past now easily 
get in…. There still needs to be more effort to bring them in. Even if they are 
a bit unfit, efforts should be made to get them certain positions that fit their 
capabilities….Why not? Why is it like that nowadays? Because before it was 
very difficult.
15 Berkat, ‘Penerimaan CPNS jangan sampai ada titipan’, 18 December 2008.
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Dayak optimism about seizing access to bureaucratic jobs through peme-
karan is producing anxiety among Malays like Lia. Some hope against 
hope that the bureaucracy is not a finite resource. Artha (25), a young 
Malay man, says: ‘There is no change (in how Malays think of their chances 
of getting into the PNS). It is still like before, even though we know that 
there is more Dayak power.’ This might be true at city or district level, but 
unfortunately jobs at the provincial level are a zero-sum game. Madurese 
share the growing Malay pessimism about their chances of getting into 
the PNS. For them, though, the issue is even more discouraging. Their gen-
eral lack of education has left them with insufficient social networks in 
the bureaucracy. Even having a Madurese as deputy mayor of Pontianak 
will be of little help. Aziz (24), a Madurese young man, says: ‘There are 
only around five Madurese who have a master’s degree, and now a deputy 
mayor. But I am not sure he will be able to help that much. Not because he 
doesn’t want to – the Madurese are just not strong enough.’ Aziz’s pessi-
mism about his chances did not prevent him from believing that a PNS 
job is the only ticket to upward mobility. His statement reflects Pontianak’s 
common discourse on ethnic jobism in the local bureaucracy, as expressed 
by Lia in the opening quote. The more elites of a particular ethnic group 
hold important positions, the stronger they are in providing access to peo-
ple of their own ethnic circle to jobs in the bureaucracy.
To make things more complicated for educated young Malay men 
expecting to follow in the bureaucratic footsteps of their fathers, more 
and more women are now entering the PNS workforce. My small survey 
indicates there is no gender difference in work aspirations among non-
Chinese young people in Pontianak. Both men and women aspire to 
becoming a PNS. A local newspaper carried a Malay op-ed about this as 
follows:
It cannot be denied that being a civil servant is one of the most desired jobs. 
Society thinks that a person is not successful before he/she becomes a civil 
servant. Unemployment is associated with men….Many jobs men are enti-
tled to have been taken away by women, because intellectually, women are 
better performers. In terms of honesty, neatness and conformity, women 
outperform men….It would be logical and just to have an 80:20 proportion 
in the recruitment of civil servant jobs (80 for men, 20 for women).16
The Malay young man who wrote this piece recognized women’s superior-
ity in work performance (not without some stereotypes), yet his call for 
16 Pontianak Post, ‘PNS laki-laki lebih prioritas’, 10 January 2008.
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affirmative action on behalf of men illustrates how highly Malay young 
men value the PNS job. In 2007, 60% of PNS positions in the Pontianak 
Government office were held by women (Pontianak Statistics Bureau 
2008). This contradicts non-Chinese society’s expectation that men are 
the breadwinner in the family, and also underlines once more the scarcity 
of breadwinning opportunities through the state. While some Malay 
young men feel threatened by this form of women’s emancipation, young 
women, not surprisingly, see it as an opportunity to increase their bar-
gaining position vis-à-vis men. This includes increased autonomy in 
choosing their future spouse, as seen in the case below.
Tiwi (24) is a Malay young woman who just graduated from a university 
in Java. She had a boyfriend whom she had been seeing for five years. Her 
boyfriend was still struggling to finish his undergraduate thesis. This 
would not have become a problem were it not for the fact that Tiwi was 
accepted as a PNS in up-country Sintang in January 2009. Then everything 
changed. ‘Why do I feel sick (ill-feel) of my boyfriend?’ Tiwi asked me rhe-
torically one day when she visited my ‘office’. The appointment forced her 
to rethink her relationship with her boyfriend. She felt she now had a 
good and stable job, while her boyfriend was going nowhere (ndak kemane 
mane). Later on, she did break up with her boyfriend, and formed a new 
relationship with another young man.
The aspirations of the non-Chinese educated young people in 
Pontianak might be representative of a lower-middle class that dominates 
the bureaucratic politics of the city. Many of the youth in the small survey 
(30%, all non-Chinese) have at least one PNS parent, mostly lower- 
echelon bureaucrats or teachers. This fits the lower-middle- class picture 
of the Indonesian provincial town also described by Evers and Gerke 
(1994). Unlike the middle-class youth in developing countries described 
by Arnett in his further writing (2005:28–9), who enjoy a long transition to 
adulthood accompanied by identity exploration, these lower-middle-
class Pontianak youth do not explore their options. They are more like the 
youth in China described by Nelson and Chen (2007:87–8), who also have 
very limited opportunities to explore work options, due to a lack of educa-
tional opportunities and a declining labour market.
Puzzle 3: Chinese are Different: Socialization into an Ethnic Subculture
The dynamics of ethnicity, gender and class that structure young people’s 
work aspirations come to them through their families. Both non-Chinese 
and Chinese youth told me that pleasing their parents was important 
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when making their choices. The non-Chinese youths seemed to be 
less autonomous than the Chinese in this regard. When friction occurs 
between parents’ wishes and children’s plans, Chinese youth express 
more freedom to take their own path. For instance, Hutomo (25) is a 
Chinese young man from the northern district of Singkawang who is now 
a PNS. He was the only Chinese PNS I met during my research. His parents 
were not pleased with his decision to enter the PNS, but they gave him 
enough freedom to make his own decision and face its consequences.
My parents wanted me to have my own business. But it is impossible for 
parents to force their wishes upon their children. I will take any job offer 
that comes. My parents told me whatever I choose, just go along with it. 
Actually, it is based on self-awareness that I chose this path, and I will face 
the consequences. Since I was little, my parents told us things like that. Like 
if we want to open a business, if we become bankrupt, that that is our own 
responsibility. My parents really emphasized that.
Hutomo admitted that being a PNS had not been his dream. It was just 
one of several work options. Before entering the PNS, Hutomo worked in 
a private company for four years. However, he did not earn enough money 
to save. So he quit, and started applying for other work. Out of all the work 
applications he sent, this one passed. He was not overwhelmed with his 
acceptance in the PNS, but he was thankful that his current income of Rp 
1,400,000 was enough to save some money. Being a Chinese PNS was also 
something he was proud of, because he made it there on his own. He com-
pared the experience favourably to his previous acceptance in private 
companies, where he had to rely on his Chinese networks.
On the other hand, most non-Chinese youth tend to submit to their 
parents’ expectations. Those that do not, seem to feel guilty. Kaka (34) is a 
Malay young man working as an NGO activist, involved in community 
development. He felt he was living his dream, because he had always 
wanted to work with the local community. But he still feels guilty for not 
fulfilling his parents’ expectations of joining the PNS.
When I started university, I was the only one in the family to go to university 
and escape life in the harbour. My father said that I had to become a PNS. 
There was conflict between us. Even though I like my NGO work, until now 
I still regret that I did not enter the PNS. I really regret not following what my 
deceased father expected of me. I was unable to make him happy.
This shows that work aspirations are not always related to self-fulfilment 
in the Arnett sense of developing one’s personal identity. Self-fulfilment 
for these lower-middle-class non-Chinese youth is about forming work 
aspirations that are in line with their parents’ wishes.
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17 Berkat, ‘SBY ajak Tionghwa gunakan hak politik’, 2 February 2009.
Siahaan (1974:41–3) shows that the ethnic Chinese population in West 
Kalimantan increased markedly over the 65 years between 1905 and 1970. 
Until the 1970s, most Chinese in West Kalimantan formally remained for-
eign citizens. The New Order’s anti-Chinese discrimination resulted in 
costly naturalization processes that poor Chinese could not afford. This 
forced them to find ways to survive outside the state’s domain. Recently, 
the reform era has opened more space for the Chinese to fully practise 
their citizenship, including suffrage,17 and improved access to state ter-
tiary-education institutions, while still retaining their religious beliefs. 
There is also more space for the Chinese to reach political positions and 
become state elites. For instance, the deputy governor of West Kalimantan 
is an ethnic Chinese. All these changes affect young Chinese people’s 
beliefs in the opportunity to enter the bureaucracy. However, parental 
expectations and memories of New Order anti-Chinese discrimination 
are strong. One common justification for preferring to work outside the 
state domain is the ‘self-generating pension scheme’ in the private sector. 
Trade produces higher savings than the paltry PNS pension schemes. 
Many Chinese own a ruko in the centre of the city, along Gadjah Mada and 
Tanjungpura streets, selling foodstuffs, electronics or Chinese herbal 
medicine. Chinese traders also sell essential foodstuffs, fruit and tradi-
tional cakes in traditional markets. The Chinese dominate the foodstuffs 
trade. Effective distribution chains and a strong capital base allows the 
Chinese to sell at lower prices. They also dominate service sectors such as 
hotels, restaurants and travel agencies. Small businesses usually hire 
Chinese helpers, while larger ones recruit both Chinese and non-Chinese 
workers. Dylna (19), a young Chinese woman, explained:
Chinese parents are proud of trade. Very few will wish for their children to 
become a PNS. PNS retire at 55, but in trade, no matter how old you are, you 
can always run your business. PNS salaries are also too low. If you are a PNS 
you only get a salary of 1 million rupiah. It is better to trade, because when 
we are old, we never know what illness we will have. And with only 1 million, 
what will we eat?
Unlike the non-Chinese youth who do not prioritize matching educa-
tional background and work when applying for the PNS, Ipin (20), a 
Chinese young man who is currently studying information technology at 
university, states that a match between educational background and work 
is a must if he were to apply for a PNS job.
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If there is an opening for a PNS position that is in accordance with my major, 
I will then apply to become a PNS. But my intention of becoming a PNS is 
only 20%. The rest (80%), I want to have my own business or work in a pri-
vate company, but only if I can have a high position.
Conclusion
Developmental psychologists have proposed that identity exploration 
in work is an essential stage towards constructing a healthy identity 
(Manning 2002; Arnett 2004). However, this offers a limited explanation 
for understanding young people’s work aspirations in a Third World pro-
vincial town setting. This chapter highlights the experience of educated 
young people’s transition to work in a provincial town in a developing 
country. Work aspirations in the process of education-to-work transitions 
are framed by structural opportunities rather than by individual choice.
The influential role of external structure in young people’s work aspira-
tions is not a monopoly of young people in provincial towns. In many 
rural and bigger cities of developing countries, class and ethnicity are 
often equally influential in shaping young people’s work opportunities 
and aspirations (Seiter 2009:58; Arnett 2005:28; Jeffrey, Jeffery and Jeffery 
2008). However, in provincial towns such as Pontianak, the influence of 
ethnicity among the lower-middle-class youth seems to be strong in shap-
ing their work aspirations. Class is (among others) indicated by the occu-
pation of the youngsters’ parents. Most parents of the non-Chinese youth 
in my sample are teachers and lower-level civil servants, who see their 
chances of social mobility exclusively through accessing the civil service. 
In constructing their work aspirations, they prioritize how work will help 
them meet family obligations rather than individual ambitions.
There are historical and political reasons for the popular view that 
social mobility is only possible through the state. Ethnic mobilization, 
combined with systems of bribery and connections, have created new 
opportunities for non-Chinese youth in various categories to enter the 
bureaucracy. At the same, this system of ethnic patronage has created 
new obstacles for those without access to these resources. The resulting 
competition has created anxieties for educated young people, because 
alternative work domains, such as industry, are very limited. Feminization 
of the work force in the state domain creates further anxieties among 
young men.
On the other hand, the Chinese middle-class youth are similar to 
Arnett’s emerging adults, who grow up through individual exploration 
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and who focus on self-development. Mostly confined to the trade sector, 
values of initiative and self-deployment are much more prevalent among 
these youth. In general they are also from wealthier families, thus having 
more options in their life. The almost completely separate socialization of 
youth within the same town of Pontianak, down to different clothing 
styles and language, is one of the significant discoveries of this chapter.
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Fig. 6 TERNATE:  Dock bosses spend much of the day (and night) at the central 
pier playing dominos for money, petty sums per point which can nevertheless 
add up to a tidy amount. Even though gambling is illegal, local police frequently 
join in the action. Meanwhile, more junior members of the dock gang are allo-
cated actual loading and unloading of boats, from which the bosses reserve a cut.
June 2010: photo by  S. Chris Brown
<UN> <UN>
© Amalinda Savirani, 2014.
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-NonDerivative 3.0 Unported (CC-BY-NC-ND 3.0) License.
RESISTING REFORMS:  




After the fall of President Suharto and the concomitant economic crisis in 
1998, international agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank pres-
sured Indonesia to reform its economy. The control of nepotistic networks 
over important sectors of the economy had created a form of ‘crony 
capitalism’ (Yoshihara 1988) that, it was argued, was hampering 
Indonesia’s  competitiveness. Alongside various democratic reforms, 
Indonesia adopted measures intended to free its economy from the influ-
ence of cliques of businessmen and politicians. This chapter discusses the 
impact of these reforms. Focusing on the construction sector in a middle-
sized town in Central Java named Pekalongan, it highlights the various 
ways in which local elites in such towns use their social networks to 
undermine attempts to make the allotment of construction projects more 
transparent and impersonal.
Indonesia’s economy has since long been characterized by an intense 
cooperation between politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen, as 
‘insider’ firms were granted privileged access to markets and state con-
tracts in exchange for kickbacks and electoral support. The New Order 
state was termed patrimonial (Crouch 1979) as political and military elites 
could reap large benefits by creating business monopolies for their cro-
nies and limiting the competition from ‘outsider’ firms (Cheung 2005; 
Beeson 2001). Patron–client relations developed between business entre-
preneurs and administrators. Entrepreneurs won business opportunities 
by performing favours and drumming up electoral support for political 
leaders. This system not only limited incentives for Indonesian firms to be 
competitive, but also fuelled social inequalities. The ‘Suharto franchise’ 
basically amounted to officials using ‘the coercive power of government 
to impose this “private taxation” on the general public’ and to redistribute 
the revenue to a small elite (McLeod 2011:52).
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Indonesia’s monetary crisis and the fall of Suharto provided a strong 
impetus to end this kolusi between business and politics. Using a dis-
course centred on ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’ and ‘good governance’, 
international agencies swooped in to propose measures that were 
intended to strengthen the capacity of state institutions to implement 
policies and allocate resources in a more impersonal, rule-bound manner. 
Government institutions were directed to use open tender processes to 
award governmental contracts, and the system of certifications was 
beefed up to monitor the quality and trustworthiness of firms applying for 
these contracts. A few years after these reforms were implemented, it 
became apparent that ‘predatory elites’ had been very successful in cir-
cumventing such measures to maintain their lucrative access to state 
resources. Observers began to criticize the technocratic nature of the 
‘neo-institutionalist’ reforms, arguing that adoption of various regulatory 
measures did little to address the weaknesses of state institutions and 
might have even played into the hands of elites who possessed the capac-
ity to manipulate the implementation of state regulations (Hadiz and 
Robison 2005; Hadiz 2010; Beeson 2001).
This chapter offers a local, up-close evaluation of the impact of these 
economic reforms by highlighting both the resulting changes and some 
continuities in the way the construction sector operates in one provincial 
town. Through ethnographic fieldwork on the functioning of local con-
struction companies in Pekalongan, on the north coast of Central Java, it 
shows that while local construction firms have lost some of their hold 
over the process of awarding contracts, the practice of developing strong 
ties between politicians and contractors has not disappeared. On the con-
trary, as local firms now face stiffer competition from outside contractors, 
they have tightened their links with politicians to find ways to keep these 
competitors out. These practices, this chapter argues, can be particularly 
successful in middle-sized towns. In a place like Pekalongan the interper-
sonal networks are sufficiently tight-knit to develop effective control over 
the tendering process.
Procurement Regimes
The construction sector in Indonesia has long been highly politicized. The 
awarding of governmental contracts for building roads or schools proved 
also to be an effective way to provide jobs to supporters. Provisions were 
put in place to prioritize small and local firms, and contractors began to 
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1 Apart from the enactments of the bill (Law 18/ 1999), there are at least six implement-
ing regulations, namely Government Regulations 28/2000 on the role of the construction 
society in the construction sector; 80/2003 on guidelines for the construction sector 
(amended as 4/2010, and re-amended as 92/2010); and 29/2000 on information required for 
the procurement activities (amended as 59/2010).
develop close ties with the ruling Golkar party to maximize their chances 
of securing new contracts. In line with the corporatist setting of the New 
Order, the Indonesian builders association Gapensi only had member 
firms who were willing to prove their loyalty to Golkar (MacIntyre 1991).
As part of the reform agenda adopted after 1998, this interaction 
between contractors and state officials came under scrutiny. By making 
the awarding of contracts more transparent and rule-bound, government 
projects might be made more efficient and less costly – particularly if the 
common practice of paying a kickback for receiving a contract could be 
curtailed (World Bank 2001). In 1999 the first bill on procurement activi-
ties was adopted, to be followed by several others.1 These laws tightened 
rules for classifying and certifying the firms that were permitted to com-
pete in a government tender process. Construction firms were classified 
on the basis of their turnover, equipment and personnel, thus limiting the 
number of firms that could compete for the bigger projects. The certifica-
tion process was not only intended to limit the capacity of politicians and 
bureaucrats to manipulate the process on behalf of their client-firms, but 
also aimed to improve the quality of the work. Companies that performed 
badly could lose their certification. A board for the development of the 
construction sector was set up to oversee the certification. With a national 
office and many regional branches, the Institute for the Development of 
the Construction Industry (Lembaga Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi, 
LPJK) was entrusted with the task of accrediting construction firms. 
However, particularly many smaller firms felt the LPKJ was biased against 
them. In 2010 they convinced the politicians to curtail LPKJ’s responsibili-
ties. After that the association of construction companies was permitted 
to certify their own member firms.
A second innovation was that the tender process for awarding a govern-
ment contract became more open. All tenders (apart from those on the 
smallest budgets) had to be announced publicly and be open for applica-
tions from companies based anywhere in Indonesia. Since the presiden-
tial instruction of 2007, an electronic system for announcing and applying 
to tenders has been set up. The e-procurement system is by now widely 
used and has, according to Indonesia’s anti-corruption body KPK, led to a 
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2 See ‘Mencegah korupsi melalui e-procurement’, KPK Jakarta 2007, http://www.kpk 
.go.id/uploads/rnd/mencegah_korupsi_melalui_eprocurement.pdf (last accessed October 
2012).
3 Examples are the water and sanitation procurement programme (PAMSIMAS) and 
the ‘Water Supply and Sanitation for Low Income Communities’ projects coordinated by 
the Ministry of Health. See LP3ES 2007.
significantly more effective use of state budgets.2 Nonetheless, the 
e-procurement system was still on trial during my fieldwork in Pekalongan. 
To make the tender process even more transparent, some government 
agencies started to invite citizens to participate in the evaluation of the 
bids.3 One result has been, for example, that the central government allo-
cation for education within the Special Funding Allocation (Dana Alokasi 
Khusus, DAK) is now often disbursed through school committees, as I will 
discuss in more detail below.
Resisting Reform in Pekalongan
Pekalongan is a medium-sized town of 300,000 inhabitants in Central 
Java. Most derive their livelihood from trading activities, while many jobs 
are also related to the public sector. The private sector consists mostly of 
textile-related industries such as batik, sarong and garments, ranging in 
scale from home industries to sizeable manufacturing plants. The city 
used to process fish and produce jasmine tea on a small scale, but both 
have declined in recent years. After dipping into the red during the Asian 
crisis of the late 1990s, economic growth in the city of Pekalongan once 
more reached a healthy 5% p.a. in 2010. There are at present 95 construc-
tion enterprises in Pekalongan, up from 42 in 1998. Most are very small, 
lacking permanent offices or equipment let alone permanent personnel. 
The assets of most of these companies do not amount to more than a few 
million rupiah (a few hundred US dollars). Their most prized assets are 
their political contacts and their experience. When company directors 
have to report their assets on official tender forms, they regularly mention 
their private homes as company assets, in order to qualify for bigger proj-
ects. Most of the construction activities commissioned by Pekalongan’s 
local government involve relatively small projects such as local roads, 
bridges, irrigation channels and ditches. For the bigger projects 
Pekalongan’s companies lack the equipment and capacity. A Jakarta firm 
was hired to build the local hospital.
More than half of the contractors in Pekalongan today used to work for 
one of the two big construction firms operating here in the 1980s, CV 
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Bersatu and Ikamuda Enterprise. The directors of these two firms, respec-
tively Wabi Baisya and Kamaludin Bachir, developed a proximity to Golkar 
and the military establishment. This enabled them to monopolize the 
town’s construction activities. Having worked together in these two firms, 
the current leaders of Pekalongan’s construction sector form a relatively 
tight-knit network.
The reformasi period shook up the construction sector in Pekalongan. 
As Golkar lost its grip on power, new construction firms could gain access 
to projects by cultivating contacts with the political parties who emerged 
after the fall of Golkar. Pekalongan’s construction companies can be 
divided into two groups. On the one hand there are the ‘senior’ enterprises 
set up before the fall of Suharto, who are generally still close to politicians 
and bureaucrats from Golkar. The second, ‘junior’, group are those firms set 
up after the fall of Suharto, who benefited from Golkar’s weakened grip on 
power by aligning themselves with new political parties. As the number of 
firms increased, competition for contracts became more fierce. The build-
er’s association associated with Golkar lost much of its influence as new 
associations – mostly associated with new political parties – have come up.
This increased competition has not, however, necessarily made the 
competition for government contracts more transparent. In the following 
section I will assess the impact of the reforms on the process of allotting 
government contracts. I will identify three ways through which bureacrats, 
politicians and construction firms sometimes succeed in circumventing 
the new regulations on procurement activities to defend their own inter-
ests. Firstly, in the context of increased political competition, politicians 
can ill afford to award government contracts without demanding financial 
and electoral support in return. As a result, clientelistic practices have 
hardly subsided. Secondly, as politicians and bureaucrats are sensitive to 
arguments that local firms should benefit from local-government budgets, 
they turn a blind eye to the ongoing intimidation the locals practise against 
outsider firms to discourage them from participating in tender processes. 
Thirdly, weaknesses of local civil society defeat policy efforts to increase 
citizen participation, as a lack of knowledge enables local contractors to 
manipulate the proceedings. I will discuss these observations in turn.
Clientelistic Practices
Projects are awarded through the involvement of three types of local 
actors: members of parliament, builders associations and administrators. 
Once the district government budget has been agreed between the 
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Pekalongan local parliament and local-government officers (dinas), the 
branch chair persons of the various builders associations are summoned 
and they are informed about upcoming tenders in Pekalongan in the com-
ing year. However, this meeting is only the official start of an open bidding 
process for these tenders. Informal agreements have usually already been 
made long before between administrators and politicians on the one 
hand, and contractors on the other. These agreements generally involve a 
clientelistic exchange, as builders promise to contribute to election cam-
paigns in exchange for help to secure a government contract. For example, 
one of my informants, Syukri (40), is a contractor belonging to the second, 
‘younger’, group. In 2008 he financed the campaign for the 2009 legislative 
election of a candidate from the Golkar party named Sayid. He expected 
that once Sayid was elected, he would help get him some government 
projects. The newer contractors mainly focused on developing such ties 
with politicians, while the ‘senior’ builders made use of their connections 
to administrators. The latter do not necessarily offer administrators elec-
toral support, although some of them do cultivate these contacts for 
launching a political career. Rather, they offer lucrative kickbacks and, 
occasionally, support to secure a promotion. In this way, politicians often 
back a different contractor than the administrators. Project allotments 
take the form of negotiations between them, with the mayor as the final 
‘referee’.
These actors do not have unlimited freedom to hand the contract to 
their preferred contractors. They still need to work within the existing 
procurement rules, which for example do not allow them to award a con-
tract to a more costly bidder. All tenders are published in the newspapers, 
and the bids have to be evaluated on the basis of more or less open crite-
ria. Yet it is at this point that administrators and politicians can manipu-
late proceedings in favour of their preferred company. For each tender 
process, specifications (‘spek’ is the commonly used term in Pekalongan) 
are formulated to detail what the bidding company needs to deliver. By 
including very particular specifications, the competition can be narrowed 
considerably. For example, when the local government needed new com-
puters, those involved in the tender process specified that they desired 
only one particular computer brand – of which ‘their man’ was the only 
distributor in Central Java. In this way the inclusion of very specific 
requirements in the ‘spek’ enables politicians and administrators to favour 
‘their’ companies. In this way the new procurement rules do curtail the 
freedom of local elites – as they have to be much more transparent in 
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awarding contracts – but enough loopholes remain to give them at least 
some grip over the tendering process.
After the fall of the New Order, both the number of contractors and of 
political parties have multiplied. Clientelistic networks organized around 
a few powerful patrons within the Golkar party have atrophied, while 
multiple smaller cliques have sprung up that now compete to develop 
access to state resources. Indonesia’s democratization process has given 
politicians more influence in the process of awarding government con-
tracts. Election results have therefore become of vital importance to the 
construction sector. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, Golkar lost con-
siderable influence and, consequently, its associated builder association 
Gapensi lost its grip on the process of allotting contracts. New competing 
associations emerged to profit from this situation. Nevertheless, in 2005 a 
Golkar candidate managed, with the support of local Gapensi members, 
to become Pekalongan’s mayor. That meant a major membership boost 
for Gapensi, which was once again the place to be. As they had by far the 
largest membership (more than 70% of all Pekalongan’s contruction firms 
were Gapensi members) they claimed the right to distribute most projects 
among their own members.
Such observations suggest that old clientelistic practices die hard in 
Pekalongan. Despite the implementation of reforms that aimed to make 
procedures more impersonal and rule-bound, the nurturing of clientelis-
tic ties between builders, politicians and administrators is still common 
practice. One reason for the persistence of this practice is that they 
strengthen ties that are essential to protect local firms against increased 
competition from outside firms. I will discuss this further below.
Pekalongan Money for Pekalongan People
The reforms in the tendering process have in principle opened the bid-
ding process for government contracts to companies from any part of 
Indonesia. The Pekalongan construction sector was ill-prepared to face 
this competition. In the first years after 2006, when the open tender sys-
tem started, more than half the projects were awarded to companies from 
outside of Pekalongan.4 This led to protests from the local construction 
firms, and their arguments were well received by local politicians. As the 
4 Interview with the head of the tender committee, ‘Mr A’.
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head of Pekalongan’s parliament, Salahudin (37), said, ‘uang orang 
Pekalongan harus untuk orang Pekalongan’, or, ‘Pekalongan money should 
be for Pekalongan people’. Local elites became convinced that the strict 
implementation of an open tendering process would imply a loss of liveli-
hood for those working in construction.
A solution was devised to prevent this. An informal kesepakatan, or 
understanding, developed between bureaucrats, politicians and builders. 
The tender process would proceed in a normal fashion, but ways would be 
sought to discourage outsiders from applying. As usual, the tender would 
be announced in the newspapers, and after submission of the proposals 
the tender committee would verify the proposals before reaching its final 
decision. Part of the process was a ‘screening’ of participating firms on 
their suitability. It was at this stage that subtle and not-so-subtle tech-
niques were applied to pressure outside firms to withdraw their bid. Local 
firms would hire local preman (strong men) to approach representatives 
from outside firms and, if needed, intimidate them and so prevent them 
from submitting or pursuing their bid. As one builder said to me, his 
‘friends’ were ready with a knife if the outside participants were reluctant 
to withdraw. ‘But it hardly ever resulted in real violence’, he added, imply-
ing that intimidation usually had the desired effect. This practice is so well 
known that during my fieldwork everyone I met, from the head of 
Pekalongan parliament, through departmental heads of offices, the ten-
der committee, heads of associations and the contractors themselves, 
all discussed it openly, sometimes even without my asking about it. Yet 
my informants were aware that this practice contravened national regula-
tion. An executive of the builders association Gapensi told me he did 
not want ‘Jakarta people’ to find out, as ‘it would have a serious impact if 
they did’.
Ironically, in this respect the reforms in the construction sector seem to 
have had an adverse affect. Measures that were intended to break clien-
telistic ties and to open the bidding process have drawn local contractors, 
politicians and administrators together into tighter collusive bonds. They 
recognized their shared interest in keeping outsiders out and in prevent-
ing punitive measures from ‘Jakarta’.
The Capture of School Committees
Part of the reform of the procurement process was the involvement 
of civil society in the awarding of government contracts. However, an 
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5 www.mandikdasmen.depdiknas.go.id/docs/dok_14.pdf (accessed 26 June 2010).
6 Earlier school committees were called POMG (Persatuan Orang Tua Murid dan Guru) 
or Teachers and Parents Group. Before that, the name was BP3 (Badan Pembantu 
Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan).
7 Personal communication on 1 September 2009 with Dr TNE, who was a World Bank 
consultant involved in drafting the new policies on school committees in Indonesia, and 
who wishes to remain anonymous.
examination of the actual functioning of one of these civil-society organi-
zations reveals how and why such organizations cannot always live up to 
the expectation of being a watchdog against corruption and nepotism. 
School committees have been set up all over Indonesia over the last ten 
years to assist local schools with such activities as devising new curricula 
and setting up and maintaining facilities. Before the committees, the 
school principal had been in charge of these activities, but now the prin-
cipal merely acts as a member of the committee, together with parents 
and prominent social leaders.5 There have been school committees 
before,6 but the committees proposed in Law 2003 on the education sys-
tem increased the role and responsibilities of parents. The school com-
mittees became particularly important after 2006. In that year the Special 
Funding Allocation scheme (DAK), a key financing instrument in regional 
autonomy, began funding construction projects in the education sector. 
The Ministry of Education decreed that only the school committee could 
propose construction activities at school. The committees suddenly 
became very important in the process of acquiring and spending money 
for school facilities. The World Bank had advised this role for school com-
mittees7 because it believed that if parents as stakeholders are involved in 
proposing and supervising projects, they will have strong incentives to 
award contracts to reliable and efficient contractors.
In practice this supervisory role is undermined both by a lack of capac-
ity and by the persistence of clientelistic practices. Neny (38) is principal 
of one of the 132 private elementary schools in Pekalongen. At first she did 
not pay much attention to the composition of the school committee. She 
told me that when the head of the education office in Pekalongan ordered 
her to submit the names of members of her school committee, she had no 
idea whom to contact. She randomly asked some people she knew, such 
as her neighbours, close friends and family members. At first she cared 
little about the background of the members of the committee and saw it 
as a mere bureaucratic requirement: ‘I was busy taking care of my stu-
dents and other affairs at my school.’ But gradually she realized it was 
important to have people with political contacts and lobbying skills on 
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the committee. In order to acquire state funds for school facilities, the 
school has to send proposals to the Department of Education within the 
district government. This department does not have the final say in 
the evaluation of these proposals, but issues a recommendation to the 
regional parliament, which takes the final decision. It is at this stage that 
the school needs to have relations with the constructors and their politi-
cal contacts to ensure that its proposal is successful.
School committees without strong political connections stand less 
chance of state funding. When Neny heard that her school could submit 
proposals to renovate her school, she began to regret that she did not have 
someone with a construction background on her committee. She asked a 
friend of her brother, who was a local contractor, to join the committee. ‘It 
was such a good opportunity for my school to renovate the building. As a 
private school, it is so hard to mobilize funds for these expenses. I could 
not let this opportunity pass by just because our school committee had no 
one with a technical background in construction’. She needed someone 
with contacts in parliament and the Education Department – precisely 
the contacts that contractors cultivate professionally. At the same time, 
however, committees that rely on local contractors to secure state budgets 
lose their capacity to critically supervise the process of awarding a con-
tract. Once the budget is approved, the contract will go to the contractor 
who helped to secure the budget.
Baiqi is a 40-year-old constructor. He can help us understand how the 
supervisory role of the school committee is undermined in practice. He 
has been active since a young age in the youth organization Garda Bangsa, 
which belongs to the large Islamic association Nadhlatul Ulama (NU). NU 
has numerous schools. Baiqi’s membership of Garda Bangsa has yielded 
abundant contacts with principals of NU schools. Many have asked him to 
join their school committees. As ordinary members did not know how to 
prepare a DAK funding proposal, Baiqi was often asked to use his exper-
tise in dealing with government to do so. Each one of his first four propos-
als was successful. Other schools began to seek him out as well. At present 
he sits on the committees of no less than 12 schools, which enables him to 
secure the construction projects from all these schools. Lack of knowl-
edge among ordinary committee members makes them dependent on 
those who do know; and the need is not simply for technical knowledge. 
As proposals are not awarded in a straightforward, rule-bound manner, 
the committees need someone with good political contacts. These depen-
dencies force school committees to go along with the clientelistic prac-
tices that they were supposed to prevent.
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Conclusion: The Construction Sector after Reformasi
This chapter has discussed the challenges of making the process of award-
ing government contracts more transparent and less corruption-prone. 
After the fall of Suharto, various measures were adopted to end the long-
standing collusion between contractors and state officials. Ethnographic 
fieldwork on the construction sector in one provincial town has revealed 
that the local impacts of these reforms have at times been contrary to 
their intention. In some respects the reforms did have the desired effects. 
The procurement process was wrestled from the control of a few powerful 
patrons. In the early years of the reforms, the construction sector seemed 
to have become more open as many contracts were awarded to contrac-
tors from outside of Pekalongan, suggesting that local connections were 
not all-important in the process of awarding government contracts. But 
this chapter has shown that local clientelistic networks proved to have 
considerable resilience. They regained their capacity to undermine the 
reform measures.
The social networks in a medium-sized town such as Pekalongan are 
relatively tightly knit compared to larger cities. These have enabled local 
contractors, administrators and politicians to devise ways of regaining 
control over the procurement process. I discussed three interrelated strat-
egies. Firstly, I highlighted that the reforms failed to curb prevailing clien-
telistic practices. In their quest for campaign budgets and electoral 
support, local politicians could ill afford to award government contracts 
without forcing contractors to return the favour. So, while the appearance 
of an open bidding process was maintained, contractors made deals with 
politicians and administrators to increase their chances of winning a con-
tract. These clientelistic deals were facilitated by the fact that all the local 
actors had a shared interest in preventing state budgets from going to out-
side actors. The second strategy I discussed was the intimidation of out-
side contractors to enhance the opportunities for local contractors. With 
the knowledge of local administrators, local preman are hired to discour-
age outsiders from submitting or pursuing their bid. Thirdly, I discussed 
why policy provisions to involve civil society could not change these prac-
tices. As members of school committees needed people with skills and 
political contacts to gain access to state budgets, they have become 
dependent on the very actors – contractors and politicians – whose 
actions they were supposed to supervise.
Taken together, this chapter underlines earlier critiques (for instance, 
Hadiz 2010) of the inadequacy of policy measures adopted after the fall of 
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the New Order due to their technocratic nature. Measures to change the 
functioning of state bureaucracies had often been adopted at the behest 
of multilateral organizations like the World Bank. By wishing away or, at 
least, paying insufficient attention to the broader (clientelistic) political 
context in which these reforms are carried out, the measures often end up 
having little effect, and sometimes even make things worse. The liveli-
hoods of the actors involved – local contractors, but also politicians and 
administrators – depend on finding ways to circumvent or undermine the 
implementation of reform measures. As a result, the measures end up 
having the unintended effect of strengthening rather than weakening cli-





Fig 7. PONTIANAK:  The city is built on top of a swamp, with houses on stilts 
or piles; sometimes when a big truck passes by, you can almost see the asphalt 
ripple like a wave under its tires (and you can definitely feel the hollow rever-
berations). In some neighbourhoods the only dry land is the cemetery, which 
therefore doubles as a playground.
May 2010: photo by  S. Chris Brown 
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1 Editorial introduction
Connie Lay’s memories of this quiet provincial town in the late 1960s and the 
1970s are bathed in the radiant light of adolescence. As he and his mates roamed 
the deserted shopping street in the dark, he recalled, ‘there was no other sound 
besides our chatter: Kupang at night was a peaceful village, our village.’ Happiness 
was belonging; it was knowing what everyone was eating and even knowing their 
underwear. Given a chance to choose again, he would have it no different, he tells 
us at the end. The question for the reader is how reliable these memories are. 
Do they tell us something about Kupang in the 1970s, or do they merely reveal the 
mid-life nostalgia of a successful academic, who left this city behind almost 
35 years ago, and, with it, his kampung origins? These memories are, after all, just 
that – there is no box with letters, diaries, photos, favourite books, clippings or 
homework assignments. The answer is probably a bit of both. The technique of 
‘interviewing the self ’ brought back a flood of detailed memories that had for 
decades lain dormant. Stories of freedom any well-adjusted boy retains – of 
racing after kites, of watching big boys fight, sneaking into the movies, and teas-
ing the town idiot. But also stories that grow out of middle-age nostalgia, wishing 
to honour parents and friends, polite memories from which, for example, adoles-
cent voluptuous fantasies have been purged. Kupang has been good to Connie 
Lay. We cannot help wondering whether the mates who were left behind in the 
market, functionally illiterate, shut out from the easy life of the ‘boss boss’ civil 
servants, and by now with numerous children to support, have memories as 
suffused with warmth as this.
Nevertheless, like Carolyn Steedman’s (1987) autobiograpy of life in the 
British lower class, in which critics also saw middle class romanticization of an 
GROWING UP IN KUPANG
Cornelis Lay (edited, translated and with an introduction  
by Gerry van Klinken)1
Yogya
On 15 May 1979 I left Kupang for the famous student town of Yogyakarta, 
in the heart of Java. Flying on a Merpati Airlines Fokker 27, my friend 
George Eman and I – he was of Dutch descent and we always called him 
Ge or just Whitey (Bule) – transited in Denpasar and reached Surabaya in 
the afternoon. It was my first time in an aeroplane. All my childhood 
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impoverished past, this one depicts something beyond an unusual personal 
success story. Lay’s recollection of an urgent desire for upward mobility was not 
unique to him. His mother felt the same urge and worked hard to satisfy it 
through her son. Many lower-class kampung dwellers in provincial towns today 
continue to share the dream, as we can read in Wenty Marina Minza’s and 
Jan Newberry’s contributions to this volume. In that respect Kupang of the 1970s 
differed from Clifford Geertz’s stagnating Mojokuto of the 1950s, which was 
‘stranded, at least for the moment, between the heritage of yesterday and the 
possibilities of tomorrow’ (1963b:17). The poor in Kupang had no cultural reserva-
tions about tomorrow. They just had the devil of a job to get there.
Lay is as fascinated with class difference as with the possibilities of bridging it. 
In this respect, too, his account confirms those of Minza and Newberry. Yes, he 
denies the class differences were sharp. In his memory the town was as united, 
peaceful, plural and accepting as any town could be. The boys’ games seemed to 
be a cross-class celebration of solidarity among kids against adults, reinforced by 
an esoteric youth language. Yet the differences remained real, and I would not be 
surprised if they were sharper than Lay’s warm feelings towards his home town 
now allow him to admit. The poor deployed a clear terminology for the rich. They 
called them ‘big people’, ‘big boss’, ‘boss boss’, or, as the ultimate condemnation 
for exclusive behaviour, ‘rich people’. Granted, the lack of neighbourly solidarity 
the well-off showed towards others might, at least on the surface, also be seen as 
their own form of poverty. And not everything about the peculiar obsessions the 
‘big people’ seemed to hold dear was necessarily attractive. Their concern for 
hygiene seemed excessive, as did their fixation with the orderly practices of 
prayer and church attendance. Yet, a lower-class boy who sat at school with them 
still felt inferior in their presence. Their parents had an ease of access to the state 
and the church that his own parents did not, much as they tried to contort their 
speech into formal Indonesian. Other contributions in this volume (notably by 
Nico Warouw and Sylvia Tidey) confirm that this access defined the boundary 
between the indigenous middle and lower classes.
Kupang at this time had around 50,000 inhabitants and was growing rapidly. 
It had been the capital of the large province of East Nusa Tenggara since 1959. The 
oil-fueled New Order regime began transforming provincial townscapes all over 
the archipelago in the 1970s. Leirissa, Kuntowidjojo and Soenjata Kartadarmadja’s 
(1984) post-war social history of Kupang, and I.H. Doko’s (1982) description of a 
drive around the town in the same period makes delightful reading, but neither so 
convincingly portrays life ‘from below’ as Cornelis Lay does here. Connie’s father 
dreams of flying came rushing back during the long flight. An extraordi-
nary sensation. We were met by a business partner of Ge’s dad – after he 
retired from the police, Uncle Eman had become an agent for Comfeed 
chicked feed – and were put up in a small hotel in a part of Surabaya that 
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was a papalele, an itinerant trader. The draft book from which this chapter was 
extracted relates the constant moving that this life involved. Arriving from Sabu 
in the late 1940s, he first laboured in the harbour, then rode trucks into the inte-
rior to buy cattle skins, tamarind and candlenut, and finally ran a succession of 
stalls with the whole family in the heart of Kupang. As a local government full of 
development plans repeatedly evicted them, the stall crept gradually down the 
street and from one marketplace to another. Now father was selling rice, now 
meat off-cuts (jeroan). Young Connie, meanwhile, roved the town selling cakes 
and packets of cooked rice, finding pretty stones to sell, gambling with his friends 
at a funeral, or looking for scrap timber to repair the house. Or else he spent bor-
ing afternoons looking after mum and dad’s stall.
Bonds of patronage sometimes reached across the class divide. Connie Lay’s 
own story starts when his mother engages in a spectacularly brave claim on such 
patronage on behalf of her son. She confronts both the local head of education 
and the provincial deputy governor and announces she is their ‘sister’, though she 
hasn’t seen either of them more than once in two decades. It works like a charm. 
They embrace her and write the necessary letters. And of course Connie Lay has 
the native talent to repay their faith. But there is a less tractable side to the class 
difference as well. During the anti-communist purges beginning in late 1965 sol-
diers carried off several inhabitants of the poor Dendeng neighbourhood where 
they lived; they were never seen again. We do not learn here how many people in 
the kampung had been interested in politics, but these events put an end to all 
that. Violence was said to be rare, yet when it did erupt, it was often related to the 
military. Kupang was the mobilizational base for the invasion of East Timor in 
late 1975. Once back in town, East Timor veterans acted out their violent feuds 
with the police on the streets. Young military men who lost their ‘duels’ would 
call on their mates to trash the house of a non-military winner.
Put together, we have a tantalizing glimpse from below of provincial-town life 
in a developing country at a moment of rapid change. The sense of being con-
nected to ‘events and places in various ways’ touched every corner of this appar-
ently quiet town. The subtle tension in the story arises when one of the ‘people 
with woes’ (orang susah) sets out on a quest to get even closer to the action, and 
discovers that small-town intimacy by no means implies equality.
Gerry van Klinken
Our thanks to Amalinda Savirani for suggesting the outline of this chapter, and 
to Chris Brown for suggesting the Steedman reference.
happened to be called Kupang also. The next evening we took the night 
bus to Yogya and arrived before dawn. Using a cycle rickshaw (becak) – 
another first, since the only one I knew in Kupang was used by a Sabu man 
to carry foodstuffs at the Pelita market – we headed for the home of a 
relative who taught at Gadjah Mada University. I called him Uncle Josef. 
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His full name was Josef Riwu Kaho, he was related to my mother. The fam-
ily came from Sabu, a little island between Timor and Sumba, but he had 
been born and raised in Atambua, a small town that I only visited once, 
before the 1977 election, 240 km from Kupang. Uncle Josef ’s nuclear fam-
ily probably had ten members, but there were about 60 others sleeping in 
a long barracks there, too. As was the custom, migrants from the kampung 
were put up with family already there. He had come to Yogya in 1959, fin-
ished his studies and stayed on as a lecturer. Thousands of his students 
remember him, mainly for his tough discipline. We called him a ‘killer’, 
with ‘Dutch discipline’. When Uncle Josef was in junior high, in the early 
1950s, he lived right next door to us, in a house owned by the labour boss 
Simon Boeboe, who was affiliated with the communist party. It is said that 
Uncle Simon was killed in the big purge of ‘communists’.2 The land we 
lived on was a gift from him.
When we got to his house it was still very early, about 6 a.m., but he 
was up. The house, which he still occupies, lay in the Baciro area and 
was a Home Affairs Department residence for lecturers at Gadjah Mada 
University (UGM) training mid-level bureaucrats for all of Indonesia. 
The house looked friendly and there was the sound of birds. We both 
spontaneously greeted him by kissing noses – a Sabunese custom for use 
whenever and wherever. He knew we were coming and told us to sit 
down. Uncle Robert had sent a telegram. Once inside I gave him a letter 
from Uncle Robert. I suspected it told him who I was and entrusted me to 
his care, as was the custom.
After chatting a while and listening to his advice, we were invited to 
breakfast. Never in my life had I had breakfast. Not because it was not 
common in Kupang, but because we didn’t have enough food. I remember 
several times nearly passing out from hunger – once actually passing 
out – on the way home from primary school. But I tried the breakfast and 
got it down. It was the first time I ate tempe (fried soybean cakes).
Uncle Robert’s letter had a history. The day after I told my mother that 
I wanted to go to Yogya, she went to visit two important officials. One was 
Uncle Robert, provincial head of the Education Department, the other 
Uncle Adi Boeky, East Nusa Tenggara deputy governor. I was astonished, 
because as far as I knew she had in all my 20 years only once before visited 
them, when I was still small. She told me they were relatives, but didn’t 
communicate much. To me and to everyone in Kupang, they were ‘big 
2 He actually died in 1962, some say of poisoning, but in any case just before the purges 
started late in 1965 (ed.).
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people’. Even more amazing was their reaction when they saw my mother; 
they greeted her warmly, called her ‘susi Edo’ and kissed her lightly nose to 
nose. This to Sabunese is the equivalent of shaking hands in Java, and at 
the same time a way of ‘forgiving’ each other. We children always did it on 
those rare occasions when Babu and Nene – our names for mum and 
dad – were angry. I don’t know why, but once nose touched nose, the anger 
evaporated just like that.
As we sat in the guest room – in Uncle Adi Boeky as well as Uncle 
Robert’s houses – mother introduced me in the Sabu language – or what 
Sabunese call Hawu, since they can’t produce the letter ‘s’. She said: ‘This is 
your child Ney’ – this was my name in Kupang – ‘Mone Miha’, the eldest 
child. She confidently explained that I was ‘going to school in Java’ and 
asked for their advice. Uncle Adi immediately said, ‘Yes, go to Yogya’. At first 
I was sure he would forget, but he didn’t. When he came to Yogya two years 
later he asked me, via someone else, to meet him in the Garuda Hotel. 
Uncle Adi said lots of things, in the vein that I had to study hard, avoid bad 
friends and ‘don’t go with other people’s kids’. Exactly what all old people 
tell their own kids. The conversation with Uncle Robert was even stricter. 
He didn’t just support the Yogya plan, but he touched the small gold brooch 
my mother wore and said: ‘If necessary Susi (the word for older sister that 
apparently comes from the Dutch), you have to sell this brooch.’ He said 
lots more, then wrote a letter to Uncle Josef, whom he called Usu, even 
though in Yogya Uncle Josef was always known as Comrade (Bung) Jossie 
or Uncle Jossie, just as I am always known there as Connie.
To cut a long story short, I passed the test at last, and started my politi-
cal science studies at UGM in 1980. Seven years later I graduated and 
became a lecturer, until today.
Dendeng
I was born on 6 September 1959 in Dendeng, along a dead-end road south 
of the old town. My family still live there. I don’t know when they came 
here, but dad once hinted it might have been 1948. Dendeng is actually 
the name of a small river, the only one in Kupang, which flows from the 
western side of town and has water even in the dry season. The Mapoli 
and Air Nona rivers flow into it from further south. But the name also 
refers to its small, sloping eastern bank, where our family lives along with 
a few others. People say the Dutch used to come to this cool place to swim. 
A lot of large banyan and cananga trees grow here, also right next to our 
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3 Gestok = Gerakan Satu Oktober, the 1 October Movement, i.e. the failed communist-
military putsch in Jakarta of 1 October 1965 that triggered bloody anti-communist purges 
in the months to follow.
house. There are fruit trees such as the tamarind, mangoes, lots of coconut 
and banana trees, breadfruit, guava and a few soursops.
Dendeng also supplies clean water. Right below our house the small 
tank the Dutch built still holds water. From here it flows through a pipe to 
the benteng, the Dutch fort at the river mouth that still serves as army bar-
racks today. We thought of it as a military reservoir. Every year a group of 
soldiers came from the benteng to clean the inside of the tank, which was 
always covered. We never played on the tank when they were there. 
Sometimes they would come for an unannounced inspection, move off 
anybody illegally tapping water through a hole in the pipe they had made, 
and fix the holes.
The dam the Dutch also built here survived until the flood of early 1973. 
It had a little ‘waterfall’ in the middle, with a natural swimming pool below. 
This is where people swam, or learned to swim, and even held swimming 
races. They played ‘water ball’ with a plastic ball, or two people just splashed 
each other as hard as they could in the face using their hands in turn. In the 
end one would give up with stinging eyes. In the right corner of the pool 
there was a place with coloured clay – brown, red, white, yellow, blue and 
green – which we used to make dolls. A lot of fun. The clay also served as 
‘shampoo’ and ‘toothpaste’ – we put some in our mouth and rubbed with 
the index finger. Crushed charcoal also made good toothpaste.
Electricity only reached Dendeng in 1982. In very small quantities, 
because it would go off every time someone used the electric iron. I never 
saw a telephone. Almost no one had electric lighting. Just the houses of 
the ‘big people’, the shops that were almost all owned by ethnic Chinese, 
and a few houses next to the power line, if they could afford it. By the way, 
having a house on the main road was not a question of socio-economic 
status. Lots of poor families lived along the main road, although some 
roads had mainly ‘big people’.
My birthplace Dendeng lay only two or two and a half kilometres from 
the centre of town. It was a dark place, but not isolated. Two cars could 
pass on the road in. But not many people wished to live there. Only a few 
families were there until the 1960s. There was Markus and his family, he 
was a communist who was condemned to death after Gestok.3 Their 
house had a stone wall, a zinc roof and a cement floor. It lay next to ours 
and until today his eldest daughter, Tante Net, still lives there with her 
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children and grandchildren. Her twin children, Adi and Kaka, were my 
playmates. Below that, near the river, was the Malada family home, the 
independence hero who gave his name to the road into Dendeng, Cak 
Malada Road. ‘Cak’ is a popular term of address equivalent to the ‘bung’ 
used by the Surabaya revolutionaries. In all of Kupang only two people 
were called Cak: Cak Malada and Cak Doko, the pioneer in education who 
was once education minister in the federal period of the late 1940s. The 
Malada family are highly educated. Their house is made of stone, with a 
zinc roof and a cement floor and surrounded by a large garden on the edge 
of the river. We called his daughter Tanta Malada. She once had a position 
in the Social Welfare Department, and died a spinster at the age of more 
than 80. We had many other neighbours less famous than these.
With money my dad gave me I sometimes bought iced drinks from a 
middle-aged woman called Tante Kudji. She got the ice from the big fac-
tory called Minerva, owned by Koen Seong, a Chinese trader who was said 
to be the richest person in town. There were only two factories in town: 
the Minerva ice factory and a meat-processing factory called ICAFF, not 
far from the home of the raja of Kupang in the Mapoli area. I don’t know 
who owned it, but it was said that Raja Nisnoni was one of them and that 
the others were foreign. It closed in the mid-1970s. Koen Seong’s business 
went down because his children chose other professions and moved out 
of Kupang. His place as the town’s richest was taken by the owner of Toko 
Piet, who built a five-storey shop, the biggest building in the heart of town. 
Toko Piet had the monopoly on the distribution of kerosene and petrol, 
perhaps until the present day.
Koen Seong’s house stood on a sharp bend in the road just in front of 
the police station, close to the ‘40 Steps’ and to the mouth of Cak Malada 
road, which led to Dendeng. It was a large house with a big garden, sur-
rounded by a high fence topped with barbed wire. It was probably the 
only house in Kupang with such a high fence. Right behind it stood a huge 
mango tree. We often threw stones at it from Cak Malada road, trying to 
bring down the fruit. If any fell down, we climbed in through a gap 
between the wires on top of the wall. This was risky because, as the sign 
‘Beware of the Dog’ said at the entrance, we often had to bolt to get away 
from the dog.
The ‘40 Steps’ at the upper corner of Koen Seong’s house was a stairway 
with that many steps. I always took a break there after selling my cakes 
and packets of rice. A number of shady tamarind trees stood there, a place 
for people to rest. We often went up and down these stairs counting the 
steps, but we could never agree on how many there were. Some counted 
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40, others 41. The steps were a shortcut to the main road between Oeba 
and Kuanino, coming out just below the governor’s residence – now the 
deputy governor’s house. Next to the governor’s house, and a little below 
it, stood Kupang’s finest building, the Bank of Indonesia. It was built early 
in the 1970s on the old Chinese cemetery, which had been moved to who 
knows where. The opening ceremony was most impressive, as there were 
singers from Java. The ‘40 Steps’ were one of many stairways in Kupang. 
I remember Kupang as a ‘city of stairways’. All of them were shortcuts.
Neighbours
Life among the neighbours in Dendeng – as, I think, in Kupang generally – 
was very happy. Of course there were enormous social differences. 
Sometimes this became a matter for gossip, particularly if someone from 
a wealthy family ‘did not want to mix’. Other than that, interaction was 
intensive, familiar and egalitarian. When we went into the neighbour’s 
house, we discovered that their rooms and kitchen were just normal. 
Women sitting down gossiping together while ‘looking for lice’ was a com-
mon sight. Of course, some people liked it more than others. Certain 
homes became ‘gathering places’. In Dendeng that was Uncle Wielawa’s 
house, followed by our own.
The most extraordinary economic difficulties never made people self-
ish. On the contrary, it merely increased the ‘resource exchange’ taking 
place among neighbours. My mother often sent me to the neighbours 
for salt, cooking oil, little chiles or some spices, because we had run out. 
And the neighbours gladly gave it. The reverse also happened. Sometimes 
they would just shout from the house or from the road, and we kids would 
take it over at a trot. That way everyone knew that family A was short of 
something and had asked the neighbours. But quite often any random kid 
that happened to be passing by would be asked to fetch it from the neigh-
bour. Bringing food over was just as normal. It could be a piece of meat, 
fish, some vegetables or fruit, but also a slice of cake, some boiled maize 
or cassava, or anything else.
In Dendeng, in fact in any kampung, except where the government offi-
cials lived, it wasn’t simply a matter of ‘taking over some food’. Every fam-
ily knew what their neighbours were eating every day. Asking what people 
were eating was normal. And everyone answered honestly, without hid-
ing anything. If there was nothing besides rice they would say, ‘we’re out 
of food’. This answer would only stimulate the neighbour to offer their 
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4 ‘Masak apa? Su masak ko?’
5 ‘We bosong makan apa di rumah?’
own vegetables (lauk) or immediately take some over to the neighbours. 
The question ‘what are you cooking?’ or ‘have you cooked yet?’ was heard 
every day in neighbours’ chat.4 Whenever we children played at the neigh-
bour’s house – which was every day – their first question would be ‘what 
are you eating at home?’5 We would answer without hesitation. Often the 
neighbour would get us to take some food back before returning to play.
We all knew each other’s clothes. If anyone left clothing behind at the 
river – after the wash, or drying on the rocks by the creek – we knew 
exactly whose it was, even underclothing. This was easy for us because 
everyone had few clothes. We even knew whose soap was left behind, or a 
bucket, or anything. Life in Dendeng, and probably in any Kupang kam-
pung at that time, had no secrets, no privacy. But of course it was like the 
‘resource exchange’, people had their own preferences: some kitchens we 
visited rarely, in some houses the neighbours rarely ate. Some neighbours’ 
clothing everyone knew, others we had to ask first.
These relationships took no account of ethnicity or religion. The 
Chinese family just up the hill from our house – we called them ‘Ence’, a 
word like ‘Baba’ for Chinese generally – often exchanged resources with us 
and other neighbours. We kids spent a lot of time eating and playing at 
their house. The father was a Chinese migrant who we all believed was a 
Kuntao (Chinese martial arts) expert. He married a Sabu woman. He had 
a difficult life. His house was the same as ours and like most in the kam-
pung – a grass roof and earthen floor. Their children –Johny, Big Mea and 
Dickson (who died in a motorcycle accident in year 2 of junior high) – 
were my close mates. They sold food as I did. Likewise, my dad often 
received little gifts from ‘Aci Kanaan’, the owner of the Kanaan shop built 
in 1970 on the main road heading up to Kuanino, in front of the Sudimampir 
shop that had been there a long time. The Kanaan-Sudimampir area was 
a hangout for the (mainly Sabunese) kids from the Fontein neighbour-
hood, of which Dendeng was a part. Other families got such gifts, too. 
These intimate neighbourly relations were common in every kampung, 
except perhaps the elite neighbourhoods of government officials. When 
I first began regularly visiting an elite area like Tingkat I in the late 1970s, 
I didn’t immediately notice the kind of intimacy we had in Dendeng. They 
had neighbourly relations involving various kinds of exchange, but it 
wasn’t obvious on the surface.
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6 Although these terms also mean ‘father’ and ‘mother’, they are more formal and 
‘Indonesian’ and so best translated as ‘mister’ and ‘missus’ (ed.).
7 ‘Beta baru toki si ……; Ho …betul su… biar dia kapok.’
Until the 1970s, when Kupang people said they were relatives or family, 
they didn’t mean something genealogical, but something social. Blood 
relations were of course an important foundation, but not the most 
important. Social relations were more decisive. Marriage relations, neigh-
bours, mixing around and work were the points of reference for turning 
‘relative’ into a social concept. The denser the relationship formed, the 
more strongly we would say they were relatives (saudara). All the neigh-
bourly social relations in Dendeng – and in other kampungs, including 
the market (pasar) – were indicated by family terms: aunty, uncle, little 
sister, big sister, little brother, big brother (tanta, om, usi, kakak, a’a, bu). As 
far as I know, we only ever used the terms mister or sir, mistress or missus 
(bapak or pak, ibu or bu) for teachers and officials in the office.6 That 
wasn’t even completely true for the latter, because unwittingly the more 
intimate expressions of uncle, aunty, brother or sister would bubble up in 
conversation in government offices, too. Occasionally we would use the 
word pak or ibu to a neighbour, but only to tease them if they had just 
become an official. We would jokingly greet a big brother who had just 
become a civil servant by saying ‘good afternoon, ooh mister civil 
servant’.
Being our elder or big brother or sister gave these social relations rights 
as well as obligations. They had the right to shout at us and often handed 
out punishment – a twist around the ears (kuti telinga), a slap (tempeleng) 
or tap (toki) and, most often, a tap or a whack with a twig (dipukul dengan 
ranting kecil) – and to boss us around, forbid things, et cetera. Not one of 
us minded, nor did any of our parents. Generally, after getting annoyed at 
us, they would tell another elder or older sibling, including our biological 
elders, and say, ‘I just gave a tap to…’, and the answer would always be the 
same: ‘Ho.. that’s OK…that’ll teach him’ – an expression of agreement and 
at the same time of thanks for doing the right thing and fulfilling social 
obligations to the young one.7 Sometimes we children would fall asleep at 
the neighbour’s house. If that happened they would surely let us sleep, 
even till the next day. They would shout or send a message to our parents 
that we ‘were sleeping next door’, something that truly reflected the inti-
macy between neighbours. The neighbours’ houses in Dendeng were my 
own house, and my house belonged to all the neighbours.
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Things to Do
That Dendeng was a quiet neighbourhood, even if that was not the whole 
picture, was true of Kupang in general. Of course there were exceptions, 
such as the shoot-out between military units around the time of Gestok. 
Shoot-outs between the police and the army were quite common in the 
mid-1970s. A really tense moment occurred just before dawn one morning 
in 1976. An armed unit of soldiers led by Jopy Makaraung – son of the 
Kupang Raya movie theatre guard – that had just come back from East 
Timor8 deliberately waited underneath Merdeka Bridge for a police unit 
that usually passed by there. Just as in war, they were lying on their bellies 
near the bridge that carried the main road, about 150 metres from Merdeka 
Field, the town’s only football field and sports complex, and even closer to 
two technical high schools and the Catholic schooling complex. When a 
truck passed over the bridge the order to fire rang out. After several bursts 
they realized it was an air force truck carrying other soldiers. I never heard 
the end of it, but the whole city was tense and full of gossip. I have no idea 
why the enmity between police and army had run to weapons.
Dendeng itself also once nearly had a fatal incident. In the early 1970s a 
Buginese man ran around swinging a badik, a traditional Buginese sword, 
at people along the way. Several were wounded and, if I’m not mistaken, 
one person died. This almost led to an ethnic brawl. But once everyone 
understood the guy was crazy, the problem ended without revenge. The 
same thing happened with a Madurese saté seller in Kampung Baru in the 
late 1970s. And in the mid-1970s there was a rumour that a group from Alor 
armed with arrows – the traditional weapon in the island of Alor – were 
going to ‘attack’ or ‘be attacked by’ a group of Rotinese from a small neigh-
bourhood called RRD (Republik Rakyat Dengka, the Dengka People’s 
Republic) in the suburb of Kuanino. I’m not sure what the reason was. But 
as I heard it from Big Brother Kias Mauguru, an Alorese man who married 
my school friend Ande Leo’s oldest sister Merie, it was triggered by a previ-
ous brawl in which one Alorese guy was seriously injured. I saw Alorese 
come and go across the Dendeng creek two or three nights in a row, 
because most Alorese live in Mantasi, the kampung across the creek from 
ours. But it all ended just with a rumour, without open conflict.
Massive brawls were rare in Kupang. Before the Alorese story I had never 
heard of anyone being mobbed like that. One-on-one fights happened 
8 The Indonesian invasion of the Portuguese colony of East Timor in October 1975 led 
to years of warfare. Kupang was an important staging post for the war.
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more often, though even these could be counted on the fingers of one 
hand. It seemed to be a rule that the two sides wanting to duel would 
agree the location and time. Once it was over, regardless of who won, they 
would agree on the next time and place. Consequently these fights had 
lots of spectators, and no one intervened except to watch either passively 
or while actively encouraging one side. I remember clearly the ‘serial duel’ 
between two pairs of brothers, Brother Aba and Brother Dato (husband of 
my eldest sister) versus Brother Yunus Radja and Brother Minggus Radja. 
This duel took place repeatedly in the late 1960s on the Dendeng creek 
dam. Each time it went on for a long time. Lots of people watched, many 
came specially to see it. The end of the story is that Brother Yunus Radja 
decided to leave for Surabaya to ‘sign up for the army’ (teken tentara) as a 
marine (KKO), while Brother Minggus Radja took off for Jakarta.
There were a few others like that, but the pattern was nearly always the 
same all over Kupang. Each one would be widely discussed. One that devi-
ated from the pattern was a ‘duel’ between Ony Keang and ‘Mister 
Moustache’, a navy man. Ony Keang was a rascal, the mixed Chinese-Rote 
son of a tailor whose little brothers Elvis and Rickhy were my school 
mates. In this case a whole group of navy soldiers came looking for him 
afterwards and smashed up his house in Kampung Merdeka. He had to 
run away for a while. We heard from his little brothers that his father had 
been terrified.
At the market I had lots and lots of time. Dad was nearly always waiting 
for stuff, except when he was travelling into the interior. For me, after 
years of walking all over town from one end to the other with a clear pur-
pose, selling things, this new atmosphere was extremely boring. That’s 
when my friends and I tried to think of an alternative. At first we were 
happy just to stroll the lanes between the shops, looking for boards we 
might be able to use at home or to make games. But that got boring, too, 
after a while. At night we were busy around the Kupang Raya movie the-
atre. We ‘sold stones’ – a kind of white stone we found on the beach – 
although with declining profits as the stones began to run out.
Gambling was another form of entertainment. I am not sure exactly 
when and who started to transform mete into a gambling affair. A few 
years earlier, in the late 1960s, we children had often watched the adults 
play cards at the home of the deceased until dawn. This was called mete. 
At first it didn’t involve money. People just played ‘hang the ear’ (gantong 
telinga), the same as we did in the market. But gradually games for money 
like ‘41’ grew into the main reason to go and express one’s condolences. 
I was clever at it, had a good instinct and some luck. My friend and 
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neighbour, Ande Leo, financed my play, and joined in as well. We some-
times won big time, and bought lots of textile that Johny Hede sewed into 
clothes.
This doesn’t mean, though, that there was no history of gambling. 
People say gambling had been part of market life practically for ever, even 
though I never saw or did it in the Pelita and the Oeba markets. According 
to mother, Sister Yaty and also people who had known father in the 
Kupang city market, gambling had been widespread. Father had been 
very much part of it. But in the 1950s and 1960s the players were restricted 
to a number of big papalele and Chinese entrepreneurs. They used to play 
more or less clandestinely at the market. The owner of Toko Timor, where 
we changed mother’s large number of coins to help me on my way to 
Yogya, was one of my father’s gambling mates from the past. Other social 
worlds had their forms of gambling: cock fighting and horse racing. I was 
involved in mete gambling for about a year. After that, I just returned to 
market life in 1976. I heard that the mete became more and more extreme, 
until they were doing roulette. Up until the time I left Kupang, at any 
house of mourning you would definitely see the gambling boss (bandar 
judi) setting up a game of roulette. Eventually the card games were aban-
doned and more and more people came to the mete places to play 
roulette.
The market where my parents had their stall for a time was right next to 
the navy headquarters, which occupied both sides of the road for hun-
dreds of metres. On the seaside of the headquarters was a cemetery used 
by muslims from Kampung Solor. This cemetery was important to us, 
street kids from the market, especially after the late 1960s, because at low 
tide it offered a shortcut into the navy complex via the reef. We could 
sneak in without being detected by the guard, notably by Mister 
Moustache, the navy man with a thick moustache and an athletic body 
whom we called go’eng. Every night films were projected on an outdoor 
screen. People had to buy a ticket, but here’s the problem – we had no 
money. For those times when the tide was up and we couldn’t get in via 
the sea, we had made a hole in the corrugated iron fence by bending the 
zinc sheet up in one corner. We always covered the hole with branches so 
they wouldn’t see it. But it was a risky entrance, because the electric lights 
were bright and it was close to the main gate. We were often caught and 
then the punishment was – other than being shouted at; we were never 
beaten – to be locked in the toilets until the film was over. Sometimes those 
in charge forgot we were in the toilets and we would have to stay there all 
night. All the street and market kids had experienced it, at least once.
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9 A Mexican cowboy adventure (1960).
10 The German two-part series Heintje (1969 and 1970).
11 Si Buta dari Gua Hantu, Bambu kuning, Panji tengkorak.
12 Tuan tanah Kedawung, Ratapan anak tiri.
13 Bernafas dalam lumpur, Perkawinan dini.
The films varied a lot, and each one would be on for two or three weeks. 
Mandarin films were mainly martial arts. That’s how we knew about David 
Chiang, Wang Yu, Ti Lung, and so on. One film we talked about for months 
was The magnificent seven.9 Afterwards we would act out the film in fights 
among ourselves. Most enjoyable. Then there were the cowboy films, with 
names like Charles Bronson, Telly Savalas and Clint Eastwood, that we 
memorized. The most impressive was Clint Eastwood’s For a few dollars 
more. We made pistols from kapok branches and imitated his way of 
shooting. Then there were the tear-jerker musical dramas, especially 
touching for us kids, such as the Dutch film – maybe it was Heintje – about 
a little singer with an extraordinary voice.10 Indonesian films came in two 
categories. Martial arts (silat) films like The blind man from Ghost Cave, 
Yellow bamboo and, especially, The skull poem11 familiarized us with stars 
like Ratno Timur and Dedy Sutomo. And love dramas in various settings, 
such as The Kedawung landlord, with its lovely star Suzanna, and a film 
like Tears of a stepchild, which made us cry with sadness.12 Quite often we 
would watch adult films like Breathing in the mud or Early marriage.13 
It said ‘For ages 17 and up’, but no one ever cared if children were 
watching.
Bioskop Raya was a real movie theatre, a long and very old building 
next to the ice factory. The films here were newer than those in the navy 
complex. This was the only one in town, but it went broke after Bachtir 
built a luxurious new one in 1976. Bachtir was an ethnic Arab business-
man, who owned a sawmill and a welding shop in Kampung Bonipoi next 
to the old mosque. He was the richest Arab in town. This one, too, went 
bankrupt after the first television came to town in 1977. TV radically 
changed the way we spent our evenings. Also, his tickets were too pricey 
for everyone except the few. Apparently the bankruptcy hit the whole 
Bachtir enterprise. A hotel he was building in Surabaya was abandoned 
and eventually sold to pay back the debts he had made to build his Kupang 
Theatre.
Mister Makaraung – I have no idea where he came from – we knew as 
the guard at the Bioskop Raya. He was already quite old, but still firm. In 
the front part of the theatre it narrowed a bit and there in a corner lived a 
crazy fellow we called Uncle Ako. He came from Rote and always wore the 
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same full military uniform, military boots and red beret. Some people said 
he had not always been crazy, but because he had killed his Dutch supe-
rior officer, named Jongker,14 he pretended to be crazy to avoid justice. 
There were not many crazy people in Kupang. Besides Uncle Ako there 
was Crazy Wadu (Wadu Gila) from Sabu, who always walked around town 
naked and did ‘yoga’ every day. He always slept with his head down and 
his legs straight up in the air next to the bridge and the Pancasila monu-
ment near the mouth of the Dendeng creek, less than a hundred metres 
from the benteng. He could do this for hours, and would fall fast asleep in 
this position. Wadu Gila lived in the wreck of a wooden boat on the beach 
next to the pier.
Between 1969 and 1973, our market stall moved four times along the 
town’s main road named Lahi Lahi Bisi Kopan. At first we stood at the 
threeways, on the corner of Ho Khian Hwat’s shop, in the heart of town. 
After being evicted from there we moved a few dozen metres to the mouth 
of an alley leading to the home science junior high school where my sister 
Tina went, just next to Toko Baru. We stayed there a few months until we 
found a more strategic spot which, moreover, was more or less under 
cover and, even more important, had electric lighting. This was on the 
streetside corner of the old Toko Timor, which no longer functioned as a 
shop. It was about 30 metres from the previous place.
The front of Toko Timor was my favourite place. I often spent the night 
there. Actually, not many people slept on the street, except a few traders 
from the interior who had no house to go to. Most of my friends who 
played on the street and in the market went home at night. But I, Ony 
Sinlaeloe, Semi and, sometimes, one or two of my friends often slept on 
the ground in front of the shop. For me the reason was simple. When 
I returned from play I would sometimes find that father and the rest of the 
family had already gone home by themselves because the road home was 
unlit. Like most kids in Kupang, I was afraid of ghosts. Since we were little 
we were told stories of ghosts and along the road to my house there were 
many spots which they said ‘had a ghost’. But this was just one third of the 
reason. Another third was that sleeping in front of the shop was closer to 
the beach where I could catch fish. Another reason was that I had to help 
my dad every morning to carry his gear from home to the market. Dad 
would almost without fail be off to the market at about 04:30 in order 
to beat other buyers to the best meat off-cuts (jeroan) that he resold. 
14 Probably this is the honorific ‘jongheer’.
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By sleeping here I didn’t have to get up so early. At about 05:00 dad came 
by my place, which was only 200 metres from the Kampung Solor market. 
If I was still asleep, he would wake me up. But if my friends and I were at 
the beach, he would approach me only after he had completed his pur-
chases. At night, it seemed as if the whole city was our own space, except 
for one or two corners among the shops where Timorese traders were 
snoring. There was no other sound besides our chatter: Kupang at night 
was a peaceful village, our village.
Kites
In July and August everyone flew kites. This is when the wind blew strong. 
Unlike in many other places, in Kupang flying a kite was not a matter of 
showing off its beauty, but to compete – we called it bahoro. The idea was 
to manoeuvre the line so it touched the rival’s line. After that, we would let 
out the line in a certain way (we called it aria). The friction between the 
lines would – sometimes only after hours of this – eventually break one or 
the other’s line, or sometimes both. We called it nao or anyo. It was very 
tense and many people came to watch from all over town. Bahoro required 
a special space, preferably rather high with few obstacles and a good 
strong constant wind. A cemetery on the top of a hill was among the 
favourite sites. In the kite season these places were full of young people. 
The most exciting part was to chase the kite that had been nao. We could 
race after it for 4 or 5 km and even – this was the nicest and happened the 
most often – we would swim way out to sea to fetch one, or climb a tree to 
get it down. Most of us carried a stick with a thorn on the end – called a 
ganco – to catch a kite before it hit the ground. In every season there were 
always one or two kites that never got nao. This was due to a good tech-
nique of letting out the line, and to a good quality of ‘sharpening the line’, 
which we called lolo galasan. Its owner was praised by the public.
There were many other games, also for the girls, and in all these varia-
tions my friends and I from the street and the market, like everyone else in 
Kupang, actively took part without caring about social class, ethnic back-
ground or religion. No game was closed to us. Not one part of the annual 
cycle left us behind, nor the kids from wealthy families. Even kids from the 
poorest families took part. Conversely, the wealth of children of ‘big peo-
ple’ could never dictate a liking for different games to ours, nor did they 
create games exclusive to themselves. Class, ethnicity, religion and all that 
became irrelevant. Nor were the games just for kids – practically the whole 
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15 ‘We bosong omong apa tu?’/ ‘Kalo sonde mangarti pi jao-jao.’
town was involved. I could even say the whole city became one giant play-
ground, with everyone participating. These meetings between different 
social circles created bonds of friendship and strengthened a collective 
identity. I feel that our identity and solidarity as Kupang people was to a 
great extent shaped here. Kupang in this period was nothing less than a 
gemeinschaft with a strong face, intensively interconnected through 
games and the language they created.
Most of the language we created during play, and which we later trans-
ferred to our daily conversation, was practically incomprehensible to our 
families. Father and mother didn’t understand most of what we talked 
about. At home mother always spoke Sabunese. Father combined 
Indonesian, Kupang Malay and Sabunese. He was most exposed to Kupang 
Malay, because at the market that was the standard language, yet even he 
could only understand a bit of what we said. It took him a long time to 
understand and then begin to use some of it. This was the case in most 
families.
We didn’t just produce words, we also disseminated them intensely 
through our cycles of play, even in quite dictatorial ways, to ensure they 
were widely used. It was always the same: we would insist on a word, 
regardless of whether other people understood it or not. Any kid who 
could not follow our pronunciation, or used one of our words at the wrong 
time, would be quickly expelled from our circle of play. We had several 
ways of doing this: laughing uproariously when anyone mispronounced a 
word was the most common. A more instinctive way was not inviting that 
person any more, or breaking up when the person concerned tried to 
become part of the game. In order to enter the circle of play everyone had 
to know the ‘passwords’; this meant pronouncing words correctly and 
using them at the right moment. For older people we had another way. If 
anyone asked us what we were talking about, we would spontaneously 
answer: ‘If you don’t understand, go away!’15
Big People
In front of the Kupang market stood a neat row of shops selling household 
needs. In the corner to the north, separated by a narrow street, was an 
Indian shop selling ‘cita cloth’, mainly with flower motifs. On both sides of 
that shop, further north still, towards the beach, were two more shops, 
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16 ‘Bapa lai tidor siang.’
17 ‘Usir ana-ana dong pi barmain.’
18 ‘Baju baru oo!’
owned by ethnic Chinese; these shops didn’t sell much, but functioned 
more as residences – the house with a shop. On the corner on the right 
was a photographer, a Chinese married to a Sabunese. In front of it was a 
streetside foodstall that closed down early in the 1970s. For about a kilo-
metre towards the east, on both sides of the road, there were rows of 
Chinese shops, with just a few houses or businesses in between them, 
owned by indigenous people. Between 2 and 5 p.m. all the shops were 
closed. Their owners were ‘taking a siesta’ (tidor siang), while the shop 
attendants had gone home for lunch to do the same: tidor siang. The city 
was deserted during those hours.
Tidor siang was a very common practice. Probably it was due to the 
heat. Lots of adults, even in the market and the kampung, did it. It was 
practically universal among civil servants. Should a guest happen to come 
to the home of a civil servant, moreover a senior official, between the 
hours of 2 and 4 p.m. the normal answer would be ‘father is taking his 
siesta’.16 Children were told to go out and play17 so as not to disturb the 
adults having their tidor siang. As for us children, tidor siang for the adults 
was the moment we had been waiting for, because it meant we could play 
without being disturbed by shouted orders from adults. We had usually 
taken off before we could be told to go.
Although I only ever went to church a few times, I knew it was full of 
worshippers every Sunday. Church and Sunday was not just for worship. It 
was a place and time to wear one’s best clothes. Many families were very 
busy on Saturdays making clothes ‘neat’ (necis) – ironing them with the 
charcoal iron – for church. Church was the place where people first wore 
their new clothes. The main reason to buy new clothes was for church – a 
church shirt. Indeed the very first thing someone did who had just gotten 
a job with a salary, especially if they were a civil servant, was to ‘buy a 
church shirt’. At Christmas time it was an absolute law for everyone. You 
went to the Christmas service in a new shirt – ‘a Christmas shirt’. People 
knew when others wore a new shirt. ‘Ooh a new shirt’18 is what friends, 
acquaintances or relatives said to each other at church. So church was at 
the same time a fashion show, a place where clothing sense was evaluated 
and shaped.
Important officials always sat in the front seats at church. Some helped 
out as ‘elders’, who arranged the Sunday service and circulated the black 
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collection bag. Everyone wore the very best and newest clothes they 
owned. Officials who made gifts sometimes did it anonymously, but more 
often by name. One of the elders read out the amount collected over the 
previous week, complete with names.
At primary school I had not a single book, not even an exercise book. 
I didn’t even buy a pencil. Nor did I ever buy textbooks at junior or 
senior high school, but by then I did have some exercise books and 
pencils. After grade 2 the slate was no longer used, and pupils began to 
write in a book. I remember ours were always coloured blue, with white-
ruled paper and a white square label on the front cover for the name. 
‘Leces’ was the brand. We used a pencil to write. Ballpoints were unknown. 
Even in junior high few pupils used them. But I was not alone. Most of my 
Dendeng friends didn’t have an exercise book either, except Abe. That’s 
why my friends, Tinus Leo, Ande Leo and Darius Dimu, and I called by 
nearly every day at the rubbish heap outside ‘Ikes’, an office associated 
with the hospital less than a hundred metres south of our school, looking 
for waste paper. We scrabbled over anything we found. Fortunately there 
was always something there, even if it was mixed up with carbon paper. 
These were our ‘books’ at primary school. We never took them home. We 
had a ‘safe storage place’, in a convenient hole in the big ironwood tree 
about a hundred metres before our house. In the morning we came past 
there and retrieved our ‘book’ and pencil. I bought no books because I had 
no money.
This didn’t mean I had no interest in reading. On the contrary, I loved it. 
If there was a book, I would read it. I remember living at Uncle Ney Dimu 
Djami a few months and reading the H.C. Anderson fairy tales that he had 
for his children Moni, Welly and Wati. But after that there were no books 
in my environment, and no one read. At home, my sister Yaty occasionally 
borrowed a novel from Sister Is Amos Pah. There were almost no newspa-
pers. No one I knew subscribed to a newspaper. To the end of senior high 
school I had only occasionally read a newspaper, except when in year 3 we 
tried to find papers for a wall magazine we were making. Nor did I even 
read many school textbooks at primary or even junior high. The primary 
school had no library. Junior high had a small reading room with a little 
reading matter.
There’s not much to say about junior high school. I certainly did not 
stand out academically. In three years I achieved nothing of note. Socially, 
too, I felt a bit isolated. I never visited school friends at home, or had them 
over to mine. I had friends to play with at school, but we didn’t visit each 
other. Some of them I still remember: Kele Bala, Alo Koten, Fred Kaseh, 
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Ako Nafie, Mat Kiwang, Yabes Kore, Paul Nggeok, Ney Hermanus, Alosius 
Dias Vera, Suk Dobleg, Alo Dembo, and some others who were quite close. 
But except for those who lived in the same Fontein neighbourhood as I – 
Dickson and Johny Hede (the kids of ‘Ence’), Lius Kore from around the 
cemetery, and a few others – they did not become playmates beyond 
school. My playmates were still the kids from the market and the street, 
and, of course, the neighbours. I felt junior high school was a time when 
I had little self-confidence, not sure why. Maybe because part of my soul 
was in another world, that of the market and the street. I still spent a lot of 
time in those places, and often still travelled into the interior as a papalele, 
skipping out on school. Nearly every week I missed some school, and 
every evening I was running around on the streets.
This was, I think, the period when I became aware of class differences. 
I realized I lived in a totally different world to that of my other friends who 
only seemed to know the world of school and play. This feeling of inferior-
ity is a bit strange, because not one of my friends ever questioned anyone 
else’s background, and being hard up was the rule for most people in this 
period. No other student ever remarked on my clothing or that of friends 
who were like me. Nor was there any discrimination in general conversa-
tion. Everything was as normal as anywhere else in Kupang. Maybe it was 
because they were no longer my familiar primary school playmates. 
Several of my primary school mates were now one year up on me, since 
I did not continue immediately after graduating then. Until now, I don’t 
really know.
In 1976 I went back to the market, just as we moved from the Pelita to 
the Oeba market. Until my second semester of year 3 at senior high school 
I spent most of my time there. There wasn’t a lot to do except to look after 
our goods. Occasionally I travelled into the interior, sometimes I worked 
casually on a building site to pour cement. I spent time with my high-
school and kampung friends. But gradually hanging out by the side of the 
road or at the beach became rarer, and communicating with my street 
friends became more sporadic. We were each busy with our own little 
worlds. Even with my kampung friends I mixed less and less, except with 
one or two that I had known for a long time, even though the Pelita mar-
ketplace was right in the middle of a residential area. But Oeba was a new 
environment for me. My life became more routine. Reading, mainly non-
school books, became the new way of using my time. I especially read Ko 
Ping Ho martial arts stories. But I also liked borrowing books from the 
school library. The legendary Karl May serials left a big impression on me. 
I only learned after arriving in Yogya that Karl May never put a foot in the 
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United States. Time for play also decreased drastically, although I still did 
it and I especially kept up my self-defence activities.
The junior-high-school principal was Mrs Karels, a highly respected 
disciplinarian from Rote. Most of our teachers were either Rotenese or 
Sabunese. There were Mr Fandu, Mr Pingak, Mr Adoe, Mr Piet and several 
others, all from Rote. But there was also Mr Gomang from Alor. And 
Mr Alex Rang, Mr Riwu and several others came from Sabu. Our Arab lan-
guage teacher – we had Arab at junior high school – was Mrs Bamualim, 
who was of Arab descent. Among the students, on the other hand, the 
level of pluralism was very high. They came from practically every ethnic 
group in Indonesia, except Papua. Our school even had a student from 
Australia. I don’t know what his parents did. Likewise, our senior high 
school had the whole range of social classes. Starting from the military 
commander’s kids (two girls and a boy) – until about that time Kupang 
was the centre of some military region whose name and function I forgot – 
through the children of the district head (bupati) Rol Adi and his younger 
sibling, down to kids from lower-class families such as mine.
Low interest in reading was the norm in Kupang at this time. Just a 
handful of people, usually senior officials, read the newspaper routinely – 
and that was when the paper was nearly a week old. Even fewer people 
read books. Among students, very few read even school textbooks. Lack of 
interest eventually forced the Cempaka Wangi bookshop to move its busi-
ness to Malang in Java in the late 1970s. My friend Dullah, when I met him 
in Yogya years later, as he was opening another bookshop there, told me 
he had to leave Kupang because no one was buying books. Most books on 
display were not touched for years. People would come in to borrow a Ko 
Ping Ho comic and that was it. Another little bookshop, called Merdeka as 
I recall and located near the benteng, went broke and closed down before 
that. But the amazing thing is that reading the Bible was apparently differ-
ent. Many people read it all the time, and had even memorized parts of 
the Christian holy book.
George Eman, who accompanied me to Yogya, became a closer friend at 
this time. Both Ge’s parents knew me well, and my parents knew that Ge 
belonged to the ‘big people’ (anak orang besar) who were prepared to be 
friends with ‘little people’ (orang kecil). These terms were very common 
social classifiers. ‘Big people’ was a general category for all bureaucrats 
(pejabat). I suspect it reflects the Sabunese custom of addressing officials 
as ‘Mone Ae’ – ‘big person’. The term ‘boss’ was also used, or even repeated 
for emphasis as ‘boss boss’. We often said ‘he’s a boss boss kid’ (itu bos bos 
pung ana), sometimes adding the word ‘big’ so it became ‘big boss’. It was 
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19 ‘Bosong mau makan apa?’
20 ‘We lu pi pinjam beras do di….’
used for officials and for anyone with money, including big Chinese trad-
ers. In the market, traders with strong capital were called ‘big papalele’ 
(papalele besar). The term ‘businessman’ (pengusaha) was hardly ever 
used. ‘Rich person’ (orang kaya) was only used when gossiping about a 
friend or neighbour who ‘didn’t want to mix’. Occasionally the phrase was 
‘now he’s really become someone’ (su jadi orang na), indicating social 
mobility for the whole family of someone who had become a civil servant. 
Lower-class people were generally called ‘people with woes’ (orang susah) 
or ‘little people’ (orang kecil). This was the general term for the lower 
classes, among families like our own and those of officials or businesspeo-
ple alike. Ge was called a ‘big people’s kid’ because his father, a full-blood 
Dutchman, was a police lieutenant colonel, a former Dutch policeman 
who had decided to become an Indonesian citizen. As I recall he was one 
of the most senior policemen in Kupang, besides the Ully family.
Going in and out of the houses of friends whose parents were mainly 
officials like this gave me an opportunity to see how the ‘big people’ lived. 
There was little noticeable difference, except that my friends did not have 
to do any chores. They had a servant to do everything for them – cook, 
clean, wash dishes and clothes, and even make drinks. This was so differ-
ent to the world I lived in every day, where we had to do everything our-
selves. I also saw that their daily needs were never something to be 
discussed, unlike the houses of most lower-class people, where the prob-
lem of ‘eating’ was a daily topic of discussion. Children and parents always 
talked about the rice or the salt being finished. Parents in wealthy families 
routinely discussed ‘appetite’ instead: ‘What do you feel like eating?’19 
Whereas in most of our homes the commonest expression was: ‘Hey go 
and borrow some rice from neighbour so-and-so!’20
I also noticed their lives were much neater and more hygienic. The 
water they drank had to be boiled first. They washed their hands before 
eating, and some even started the meal with prayer. That was something 
we never did at home, except at Christmas and New Year (kunci taon). 
Their lives were so organized that they had a fixed time for their meals; 
and the same for drinks. Whereas in our world eating time was set by 
how hungry the stomach was, and you might say drinking time had no 
place in our agenda at all. Whenever they ate they sat down at the table, 
at a plate with a spoon and fork neatly laid on either side. Every type of 
food had its own dish and even spoon. We never had such order in our 
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home. We usually just took our food straight out of the rice pot or out of 
the frying pan (tacu) whenever we felt hungry. We sat wherever as we ate. 
There was no dining table, no dining room. In short, the main difference 
between our world and that of the ‘big people’ was that for them eating 
was a cultural event, whereas for us it was simply a matter of survival, of 
filling the stomach.
Conclusion
During the funeral of my father in August 2006 I said: ‘If I had to live my 
life over again and could choose, I would not hesitate to choose the same 
father, the same mother, the same family, the same city and the same life.’ 
Beyond that, the long dialogue between the young Cornelis Lay and the 
old one – my method of self-interview – produced something new. I was 
astonished to discover that, in various ways, I was connected with almost 
every event and every place in Kupang. Whether this is the special charac-
ter of a ‘middle town’ I don’t know. But evidently every individual in a 
mid-sized town somehow becomes part of the complex yet paradoxically 
simple matrix of events taking place in that space. Almost no event hap-
pened of which I was not a part. There was no place in which I had not 
been. And I think all my friends in Kupang experienced the same thing. 
We were part of the process of creating and filling those spaces.
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Fig. 8. PONTIANAK:  An elementary teacher helps a forlorn student, waiting out-
side the schoolyard, arrange for a ride home.
June 2010: photo by S. Chris Brown
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BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL:  
NEGOTIATING ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN PROVINCIAL INDONESIA
Noorhaidi Hasan*
After 9/11 many observers saw the sprouting of religious symbols in public 
spaces of Indonesian provincial towns as an indication that Islam was 
undermining the country’s secular democratic system. Some imagined a 
future as bleak as Pakistan or even Iraq today, countries that are gradually 
being sucked into a maelstrom of political and religious violence. But this 
alarmist perspective fails to capture the realities of post-Suharto Indonesia. 
The mushrooming of religious symbols is also coupled with the rise of a 
new middle class and the flourishing of democratic activities. Despite the 
fact that some sceptics still judge Indonesia’s emergent democracy as super-
ficial and procedural rather than functional, one cannot deny that the elec-
toral system evolving in Indonesia today is rooted in the opening of political 
opportunity structures, bolstered by social mobility, economic growth and 
broader participation in education and politics. The driving force behind 
this phenomenon is the middle class. Particularly in the provincial towns, 
its members have become active negotiators between the global and the 
local, and between the cosmopolitan centre and the hinterland. In their 
attempts to boost their identity and social status, the middle class is at the 
forefront of calls for the compatibility between Islam and modern values 
such as democracy, tolerance and human rights. They play a significant role 
in the way Islamization and democratization are interacting in Indonesia.
This chapter analyses the changing role of Islam in Indonesian provin-
cial towns, as a new middle class is becoming more aware of the impor-
tance of religious identity for their social status and lifestyle. Focusing on 
developments in two medium-sized towns – Kebumen in Central Java and 
Martapura in South Kalimantan – it aims to show how two major transfor-
mations shaping contemporary Indonesia – democratization and global-
ization – are generating a public sphere in which politics and religion are 
subtly intertwined. Mass education and mass communications have facil-
itated an awareness in Muslims of the need to reconfigure the nature of 
religious thought and action, create new forms of public space, and 
* An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Hasan 2011.
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encourage debate over meaning. Within this context Islam has become 
the subject of dialogue and civil debate. Open contests over the use of the 
symbolic language of Islam and its meanings have increasingly shaped 
this new sense of public space that is discursive, performative and partici-
pative. The appearance of ‘public Islam’ in the Muslim world has coin-
cided with the emergence of a new middle class which involves itself in 
the debates about objectifying Islam. This class is mainly distinguished by 
the capacity of its individuals and households to accrue surplus income, 
beyond that needed for the necessities of life. Their rising demands for a 
more nuanced lifestyle urged them to adopt Islamic symbols as a mode of 
modern cultural expression in public spaces. Islamic symbols provide a 
sense of legitimacy and moral value for members of the new middle class, 
and a means by which its members’ social identities are formed.
The trend for the metropolitan urban middle class to adopt Islamic 
symbols to claim distinction and moral legitimacy for their consumptive 
lifestyle has resonated through Indonesian Islam, and profoundly 
impacted the dynamics also in provincial towns. Due to the development 
of massive infrastructure and the advancement of mass communications, 
the boundaries of big cities and provincial ones have become increasingly 
blurred. Any trends that are developing in the big cities can easily progress 
to provincial ones. But they are not just copied. This chapter aims to show 
the particular way in which ‘public Islam’ has been appropriated in pro-
vincial towns. The process of appropriation also involves agency, shaping 
the form of Islam that will prevail in the provincial town’s public spaces. 
The growing middle class is facilitating the burgeoning of a new form of 
market-friendly piety, which accepts the idioms of modern democracy. At 
the same time, this market-friendly piety needs to be legitimized by show-
ing a continuity with local history and culture. Institutional symbols of 
traditional religion often resurface and require affirmation from religious 
actors who, in turn, have sought sources of legitimacy in their effort to 
offer Islam in provincial public spaces. This chapter thus examines the 
way in which the middle class plays a pivotal role as an agency facilitating 
the growth of public Islam in provincial Indonesia where ideas about 
locality, tradition, modernization and globalization, as well as ideas about 
Islam’s significance for urban public life, are mutually reinforcing.
Islamization in Provincial Indonesia
In a country like Indonesia, in political, economic, cultural and adminis-
trative matters, towns play an intermediary role between the cosmopolitan 
centres and the hinterland. They serve as a meeting point and mediator 
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between the outward-reaching national (and global) culture, institutions 
and processes, and the increasingly self-assertive agricultural village 
majority. Unlike the cosmopolitan centres, where there is greater socio-
cultural differentiation, a tension between the global and the local is often 
more explicit in smaller towns, where it is held more in check by cross-
cutting personal ties. The global is spread through modern political, edu-
cational, economic and cultural institutions. Its legitimacy, however, is 
bolstered by means of the appropriation of key concepts associated with 
tradition and local culture. Looking at Indonesia from the vantage point 
of the provincial town allows us to understand how the local, the cosmo-
politan and the global have intertwined in informing multiple manifesta-
tions of the complex relationship between the political, the economic, the 
social, the cultural and the religious.
This is not ungrounded theory. Provincial towns seek to manage ten-
sion between the global and the local by means of appropriation and har-
monization, to some extent. This phenomenon is evident in Kebumen, 
the market and administrative centre for a district bearing the same 
name, located in the southern part of Central Java. This town has vast 
hectares of lush paddy fields that yield around 150,000 tonnes of rice per 
year. Ironically, based on the data on ‘recipients of direct cash assistance’ 
(penerima bantuan langsung tunai, or penerima BLT), in 2007, 46% of 
Kebumen’s population still lived in poverty. When I carried out research 
for this chapter in 2007–2008, Kebumen was led by district head (Bupati) 
Rustriningsih and her deputy, Nashiruddin al-Mansur. It was recorded 
as the fourth poorest district (kabupaten) of the 35 districts and cities 
of Central Java. In addition, more than 17,000 people were recorded as 
illiterate, and 13,957 children aged between 7 and 15 years were not 
enrolled in school. The school drop-out rate was also very high. It was 
reported that more than 66,000 people had not completed their 
primary education. The high numbers of illiterates and school dropouts 
explain why 96,024 families in Kebumen (or 30.43%) are classified as 
poor or ‘pre-prosperous’ (prasejahtera) and 75,052 families (23.78%) 
are in the slightly higher socio-economic status group ‘prosperous 1’ 
(sejahtera 1). More shocking still, 35,311 people, from a total of 315,591 
people in the productive age group, were unemployed. The high unem-
ployment rate is correlated with the fact that a huge number of Kebumen 
workers have migrated for greener pastures abroad (Bappeda Kabupaten 
Kebumen 2006).
Despite its claimed status as a santri town (kota santri) with 99% of its 
population being Muslim, Kebumen had never strongly supported Islamic 
parties. No Islamic party had won a majority since the first elections in 
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1955. However, kyai, traditional religious scholars known as ulama in Java, 
do have an important cultural influence in Kebumen. The latest data show 
that the district has 121 pesantren, traditional Islamic boarding schools led 
by kyai. These religious leaders have long held a special position in the 
Kebumen community, as reported by the sociologist Jennifer Alexander 
during her observations in the 1980s. Her research primarily examined eco-
nomic development, and took place in a district located to the east of 
Kebumen. She concluded that Clifford Geertz’s characterization of Javanese 
society as being divided into santri, abangan and priyayi groups was not 
relevant in Kebumen. Geertz’s santri group practised orthodox Islam, while 
the abangan population practised a more syncretic, Javanese-flavoured 
version. The priyayi were drawn from the traditional Javanese aristrocratic 
class, and often held responsible administrative positions. According to 
Alexander, in Kebumen people tended to reject the santri/abangan distinc-
tion and the trichotomy santri/abangan/priyayi. They generally pictured 
themselves as Muslims with a firm commitment to Indonesian national-
ism (Alexander 1987:16). Unlike other orthodox santri, who stress the for-
malization of religious expression and the pursuit of piety and orthopraxy, 
the majority of the population Alexander described were able to strike a 
compromise between Islam, traditional values and indigenous culture.
Kebumen is probably better pictured as a place where Islamic-Javanese 
moderate practices prevail and abangan beliefs are still alive. The military 
has described several isolated districts in Kebumen as ‘red spots’, once 
under the domination of Communist influences. Kebumen has also been 
described as a ‘tinderbox’, or a place where both the political extreme 
left and extreme right could be found. In 1950 a religious rebellion 
exploded in Kebumen as a consequence of rationalization within the 
body of the Indonesian Republic Armed Forces. This rebellion was led 
by a local militant leader, Machfudz Abdurrahman, the owner of the 
Al-Kahfi Islamic boarding school in Sumolangu and more popularly 
known as Kyai Sumolangu. He refused to merge with the ‘Lemah Abang 
Battalion’ formed by the army. Instead, he formed his own battalion, 
known as the Chimayatul Islam. Unfortunately negotiations between 
the kyai and the army ended in disagreement, and as a result a confronta-
tion with the army was inevitable.1 Given this historical peculiarity, the 
1 Several scholars believe that the Angkatan Umat Islam (AUI, Islamic Congregation 
Force), a rebellious movement in Kebumen in the early 1950s, had connections with the 
wider regional rebellion of that era led by S.M. Kartosuwiryo and known as Darul Islam/ 
Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII, House of Islam/ Indonesian Islamic Army) (Singgih Tri 
Sulistiyono 2000).
<UN> <UN>
 between the global and the local 175
2 Interviews with the chairman of the Al-Iman Foundation, Muhammad Yunus, and 
with the headmaster of SDIT Al-Madinah, Abdullah Munir. Kebumen, 17 October 2007.
highest political position in Kebumen was always reserved for army 
officials.
Only recently have Islamic forces and secular power reached a point of 
convergence in Kebumen. A huge billboard in front of the regent’s official 
residence on Kebumen’s main square shows Rustriningsih wearing a 
trendy colourful headscarf. This was a new – for years she had been bare-
headed in public. Her (male) deputy Nashiruddin wears a green turban. 
Islamic symbols have replaced Javanese insignia as the tools of political 
communication. Islamic nuances are being strikingly incorporated into 
the bureaucratic sphere elsewhere as well. As is occurring at the national 
level, more and more female civil servants in Kebumen are wearing heads-
carves and becoming involved in regular religious activities organized by 
the region’s government units. Arabic maxims promoting efficiency and 
transparency are scattered around the walls of local-government offices. 
The increasingly conspicuous religious symbols in Kebumen’s public 
places reflect the sustained penetration of Islamic orthodoxy into the 
heart of this abangan culture, and its attempts to move towards full inte-
gration as part of a modern, globalizing Indonesia.
As in other mid-sized Javanese towns, Islamic proselytizing (dakwah) 
groups have grown more active in Kebumen over the years. Young people 
are at their core. Their goal is to formalize religious expressions and intro-
duce a more orthodox version of Islam into Kebumen society. Notable 
among them are the Hidayatullah group, which is under the auspices of 
the Al-Iman Foundation, and the PKS, which coordinates the Ibnu Abbas, 
the Perempuan Muslimah and the Iqra Club Foundation. Both groups set 
up educational institutions and introduced what they call integrated 
Islamic schools, in which the younger generation of Muslims are taught to 
internalize the principle of Islam’s totality. These schools are founded on 
the belief that the future of Indonesia lies in the commitment of Muslim 
youth to consistently follow the example of the Prophet Muhammad and 
the first generation of Muslims (Salaf al-Salih – pious ancestors).2 One 
impact (among many) of the dakwah activities organized by the Iqra Club 
is that 90% of female students at SMU 1 and SMK 1, Kebumen’s popularly 
preferred senior high schools, now wear headscarves.
The penetration of the new dakwah groups was not totally unexpected. 
Mainstream Muslim groups, such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, 
had long expressed concern about the weak religiosity and domination of 
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3 Interview with Bambang Purwanto, Islamic teacher and staff at the Regional 
Department of Religious Affairs in Kebumen, Kebumen, 16 October 2007.
4 Interview with Muhammad Dahsyad, a member of the education council of 
Muhammadiyah in Kebumen, and Muhammad Abduh Hisyam, the secretary of 
Muhammadiyah in Kebumen, 12 October 2007.
abangan culture in isolated villages in several of Kebumen’s sub-districts, 
such as Sempor, Buayan, Karangsambung and Mirit. Although many 
ulama and religious teachers were aware that the new ultra-orthodox 
dakwah groups might challenge their established religious practices and 
give new expression to their faith, they generally welcomed them as part-
ners in the struggle for the glorification of Islam (syiar Islam) throughout 
Kebumen. They even acknowledged the creativity of the way they pack-
aged Islam to make it more attractive to the broad Kebumen (or, more 
precisely, abangan) community.3 Fear of the way these new dakwah 
groups have expanded has only recently surfaced as a public concern. The 
catalyst was their systematic campaign to infiltrate schools, many of 
which belonged to Muhammadiyah, to recruit Muhammadiyah youths 
into their cause. A number of the Muhammadiyah faithful openly chal-
lenged the expansion of puritan dakwah into their educational institu-
tions, in Kebumen town itself as well as in its sub-districts of Gombong, 
Kutowinangun, Sadang, Pejagoan and Karanganyar.4
The growth of Islam’s public visibility can also be seen strikingly in 
Martapura, the capital town of Banjar district, which is located 40 km to 
the north of Banjarmasin, the capital city of South Kalimantan province. 
This district is divided into 17 sub-districts with 288 towns and villages. 
Since its establishment in 1950, the Banjar district’s head has changed 
16 times. The current district head is Khairul Shaleh, and his running 
mate is Muhammad Hatim Salman. According to 2006 statistical data, the 
total population was 464,148 people, comprising 238,162 men and 225,986 
women. The most densely populated area was the district capital, 
Martapura, with 2,042 people per square kilometre. School participation 
has risen over time, with increases in the number of schools. Currently 
there are 350 primary schools, 39 junior high schools and 9 senior high 
schools under the auspices of the National Department of Education. 
The total number of students is 55,269. In addition to this, there are 
217 schools at all levels under the Department of Religious Affairs, with 
26,872 students. There are 459,124 Muslims, compared to 314 Protestants, 
209 Catholics, 101 Hindus, and 98 Buddhists and others. Based on the 
same statistical data, there were 2,118 job applicants in 2006, many of whom 
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held senior-high-school diplomas. From this number, 1,136 were report-
edly absorbed in various job markets and positions (Bappeda Kabupaten 
Banjar 2006).5
Close identification of Martapura with Islam can be traced through 
its historical trajectory as the capital city of the Banjar Sultanate before 
the Dutch ruined it in the war of 1859–1863. There, ulama played a pivotal 
role in politics. Muhammad Arshad al-Banjari, a charismatic ulama in the 
nineteenth century, was the first grand mufti of the Banjar Sultanate, 
under Sultan Adam’s rule between 1825 and 1857. As grand mufti he inte-
grated the shariah into the political structure of the Banjar Sultanate, and 
was responsible for issuing the Sultan Adam Law (Undang-Undang Sultan 
Adam) stipulating application of various aspects of the shariah, especially 
the ritual (ibadah) and the social contract (muamalat), in accordance 
with Shafi‘ite legal doctrines. This historical trajectory explains the iden-
tity of Martapura as a town that prides itself on being the ‘front porch of 
Mecca’ in Kalimantan (Ariffin 2004:33–5). In addition, close identification 
of Martapura with Islam has much to do with the self-image of the 
Martapuran Muslims, who portray themselves as a pious, pleasant and 
polite society, thus differing from the other Banjarese clan groups, espe-
cially from the Upper River (Hulu Sungai).
The presence of Islamic symbols in the town’s public space became 
noticeable during Abdul Madjid’s leadership of the Banjar district in the 
mid-1990s. The Light of the Saved Earth (Cahaya Bumi Selamat, or CBS) 
was built on the site of the town square, which had long provided a com-
munity space for Martapuran society. CBS is a jewellery trading centre. 
The vast building is in the architectural style of the Middle East, and at its 
centre a huge monument stands tall, complete with beautiful Arabic cal-
ligraphy. The overall effect is that of a magnificent, stunningly beautiful 
palace. It is a prestigious project intended to enhance the image of 
Martapura as a town built on the trade in jewellery, as well as the front 
porch of Mecca. The image of Middle Eastern architecture dominating 
the Martapura townscape clearly illustrates the deeply penetrative forces 
of Islam. During Abdul Madjid’s leadership, the Sekumpul Religious Study 
Group emerged and rapidly grew to become a religious, political, eco-
nomic and social magnet for Martapuran society and Muslims in South 
Kalimantan in general. This study group was founded in the early 1990s by 
5 Interview with Ahmad Rabbani, staff at the Regional Development Planning Board of 
the Banjar district. See also the annual report by the Regional Development Planning 
Board of Banjar (Bappeda Kabupaten Banjar 2006).
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6 Lev’s analysis received a critical remark from William Liddle, who saw growing inter-
ests among the middle class to trade their independence for a larger share of the benefits 
of state largesse. Liddle had in mind the larger, modern, urban business entrepreneurs and 
professionals, as well as rural lower middle classes such as rich rice farmers, producers of 
various agricultural commodities and even some devout Muslims (Liddle 1990).
Zaini Gani, better known as Guru Zaini, a charismatic cleric who then 
decided to move from his old residence in Keraton sub-district to live in 
Sekumpul. At that time Sekumpul was a quiet, desolate area, full of kara-
munting trees. The presence of Sekumpul is emblematic of the growing 
importance of Islam in Martapura’s public sphere. As a provincial town 
located outside of Java, which sees itself as marginalized in the highly cen-
tralized process of national development, Martapura has drawn strength 
from Islamic symbols to reinforce its local identity and, thereby, negotiate 
its position in the face of the central government.
Middle Class and Lifestyle
Earlier debates on Indonesia’s middle class paid scant attention to Muslim 
groups, while recognizing their existence as one of the drivers of change, 
together with the entrepreneurial and professional intermediate groups 
and the officer corps. However, given the antagonistic relations between 
Suharto’s New Order and Islam, Muslim groups tended to be excluded 
from the circles privileged to benefit from this change. Those circles did 
include entrepreneurs, professionals and military political managers, who 
shared a common interest not only in preserving their acquired comfort 
and status, but also in restraining Islamic political claims (Lev 1990).6 
Historically speaking, Islamic political forces had long been the main 
opponent of the bureaucracy, standing on the front line to challenge secu-
lar power (Samson 1972; Kuntowijoyo 1990).
The failure to make Islam a formal part of the state system served 
as a catalyst for the emergence of a Muslim middle class, centred around 
professionals, civil servants, intellectuals and military officers (Wahid 
1990:22–4). They came from santri-priyayi families, in the Geertzian para-
digm, who sent their sons and daughters to modern schools and through 
this route propelled them into various economic and bureaucratic sectors 
to become professionals in both state and private companies, expert staff 
assisting the ministers, members of parliament, directors general, heads 
of sub-directorates and many other strategic positions. This process of 
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embourgeoisement or priyayization in Aswab Mahasin’s term, led the 
santri professionals to see Islam no longer as an alternative to the existing 
system, but rather as the inspirational base for a national, democratic 
framework for society (Mahasin 1990). The inclusion of santri in the 
bureaucracy and civil services in turn contributed to the New Order’s 
marked shift toward accommodating Islam in politics, shown by Suharto’s 
personal support for the establishment of the Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, or ICMI) 
in 1990. As a consequence of these changes in Indonesia’s political envi-
ronment, Muslim political groups have increasingly become the main 
patrons of the state, complete with a ‘greening’ process in the House of 
Representatives and the cabinet. From within the state system the Muslim 
middle class struggled to give Islam a central role in politics by repudiat-
ing the goal of an Islamic state, mobilizing ecumenical religious support, 
promoting women’s rights and championing Islam-based democratic ide-
als (Budiman 1994; Anwar 1995).
Fluctuations in Islam’s political relationship with the state inform both 
the dynamics and the formation of an Indonesian middle class vis-à-vis 
the state, and this makes it difficult to identify the main characteristics 
of the class from a purely political perspective. The ‘cultural capital’ held 
by the middle class provides a foundation for the emergence of civil 
society associated with demands for representative space in political 
institutions. However, the middle class also has an interest in maintaining 
law and order, political stability and material prosperity, and this may 
lead to their support for authoritarianism (Rodan 1996; Heryanto 1996; 
Saravanamuttu 2001). Beyond political parameters, one can identify 
the Indonesian middle class by its performance in the public sphere 
and its consumer-based lifestyle. Howard Dick reminded us of the impor-
tance of the mode of consumption as a defining characteristic of the 
Indonesian middle class (Dick 1985, 1990). This argument seems plausible, 
since the ‘mode of consumption’ can be seen not only as a cultural repre-
sentation of a class, but also as a political statement. Consumption prac-
tices, though overwhelmingly apolitical in intent, have significant political 
consequences (Young 1999:57). To a large part the mode of consumption 
and lifestyle of the educated urban middle class inspired the image of 
modern Indonesia promoted on the nation’s television screens and 
through government broadcasts, and exemplified by the nation’s leaders. 
The growth of the urban middle class itself is paralleled by the increasing 




A sense of personalized Muslimhood has developed out of this context, 
which allows the middle class to demonstrate their religious identity 
through bodily, purchased practices and goods (J. White 2005; Bayat 2007). 
This model of Muslimhood is indubitably associated with their attempts 
to construct new narratives of themselves and their place in the world 
from creative blends of their own cultural inheritance and global influ-
ences (Heryanto 1999). In the words of Göle, the Muslimhood model has 
enabled Muslims to experience the ‘banalization process’. Actors from 
diverse backgrounds are involved in shaping the face of Islam in the pub-
lic space and entering into the modern urban space with little hesitation. 
By using global communication networks they participate in public 
debates, track patterns of consumption and study the rules of the market, 
while at the same time embracing individualistic, professional and con-
sumerist values (Göle 2006).
Seen from this perspective, Islamic symbols seem significant to class 
mobility and the formation of the new middle class. In contrast to the 
old bourgeoisie, the new middle class, according to Bourdieu, no longer 
prioritizes the ascetic ethic of production and accumulation, but favours 
a morality of consumption based on credit, spending and enjoyment. 
This is in line with his understanding about power as culturally and sym-
bolically created, and constantly re-legitimized through an interplay of 
agency and structure. The main way this happens is through what he calls 
‘habitus’, which is associated with the way in which actors calculate and 
determine future actions based on existing norms, rules and values repre-
senting existing conditions. In Bourdieu’s words, the term habitus refers 
to ‘[s]ystems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be 
objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious 
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order 
to attain them’ (Bourdieu 1977:72). Within this context Bourdieu sees 
social class as something not defined solely by a position in the relations 
of production, but by the habitus which is normally associated with that 
position (Navarro 2006).
The work of Bourdieu provides a useful conceptual framework for 
understanding the new Muslim middle class’s choice of Islamic symbols 
as the way to encourage the reproduction of privileges. They live in a 
social world driven by a new economy which judges people by their capac-
ity for consumption, their standard of living and their lifestyle, as much as 
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by their capacity for production. Bourdieu’s scheme indeed associates the 
new middle class with symbolic consumption and post-modernity 
(Bourdieu 1984:310). This allows us to investigate the new middle class’s 
conception of lifestyle in relation to its habitus, and its concern to expand 
and legitimate its own particular dispositions and way of life. The nexus 
between habitus, consumption and lifestyle proposed by Bourdieu is 
central to the new middle class’s strengthening of its symbolic capital 
by promoting cultural forms other than those enshrined in traditional 
middle-class virtues, and thus to its struggle with the traditional middle 
class (Featherstone 1987:158). To be sure, in Bourdieu’s quite distinct 
definition of class, cultural factors are seen to operate alongside economic 
ones.
As a matter of fact, the rising consciousness among the new Muslim 
middle class of the importance of Islamic symbols, with its willingness to 
engage in debate and objectify religion, looked to the availability of reli-
gious space within the urban landscape of big cities. In view of the grow-
ing demands for such space, governmental and business offices built 
mosques and musalla, small places to pray. Elite housing complexes and 
shopping centres provided meeting places for listening to public lectures 
on Islam (majelis taklim). Convention centres and five-star hotels adver-
tised venues for religious programmes and Islamic study packages. Luxury 
Islamic centres, with a large mosque as the main building surrounded by 
training and educational buildings, shops and a hotel, have been built on 
large tracts of land in major cities like Jakarta, Surabaya and Makassar. 
The new Muslim middle class comes to these places to engage in reciting 
the Qur’an, chanting dhikr (the profession of the faith), and the like, while 
discussing various aspects of Islam. In this way Indonesian Islam has 
experienced a process of gentrification, favouring global high-technology 
and consumerist Islamic appetites (Abaza 2004). While dakwah has some-
how become urbanized, new creative agents and young, popular preach-
ers have emerged to work in both public and private settings. They offer a 
variety of innovative dakwah programmes in the interests of the new 
middle class.
The backdrop of this phenomenon was the Islamic revival that has 
swept across Indonesia since the 1980s. This had a profound effect on the 
urban middle classes’ rising demands for Islamic symbols as a mode of 
modern cultural expression in public spaces (Hasbullah 2000). Islamic 
symbols reflect middle-class attempts to construct new narratives of 
themselves and their place in the world through practices of distinction. 
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The distinctions made in different areas of everyday life are drawn from 
history, memory, friendship, consumption and recreational practices. 
Their inspirations come from multiple sources. The symbols themselves 
are subject to negotiation within the habitus of the class. In this way Islam 
has been transformed into a symbol of modernism and even elitism, and 
become part of a lifestyle. For instance the baju kurung (traditional mod-
est attire of women) and mini telekung (outermost robe worn by women 
when praying), increasingly popular among Malaysia’s Muslim middle 
class, are imbued with Islamic religiosity, whilst modesty, discipline and 
control are upheld. There is some experimentation here, symbolized by 
the exploration of mobility and gender identity of middle-class Malay 
society. Being most forcefully subjected to intensified Islamic require-
ments, women developed ‘a strategic knowledge of dressing as a particu-
lar form of Islamic consumption, situated between public display of class 
and covering the body’ (Fischer 2008:78–9).
A similar pattern of social differentiation is evident among the middle 
class in Martapura. Over time the fascination with Guru Zaini and the 
Sekumpul teaching complex drove thousands of middle-class people 
from Martapura town and other South Kalimantan cities to migrate to the 
Sekumpul area (Alhakim 2006). They built their own homes around the 
seven houses owned by Guru Zaini and his relatives, in the same row as 
the Al-Raudhah, the ‘Kompleks Dalam Regol’ (Complex in the Archway). 
The Sekumpul complex inspired the Martapuran community to the culti-
vation of culture and social refinement. Trends made popular by the fol-
lowers of the Sekumpul religious study group have a wide influence 
throughout Martapura and other towns in South Kalimantan. For instance, 
the trend for men to wear the koko shirt and the white kopiah (a kind 
of rimless cap), and for long dresses and colourful jilbab for women, 
originated at Sekumpul, and this way of dressing is now very popular in 
South Kalimantan. Sekumpul’s role as a lifestyle trendsetter for South 
Kalimantan’s provincial cities has evolved naturally.
Owning a luxurious home in Sekumpul automatically privileges a per-
son as part of the Sekumpul community. This community is very close, 
thanks to Sekumpul’s TV, which features religious programmes from the 
Dalam Regol. The TV helped everybody living in these houses to strengthen 
their communal feeling as members of Sekumpul society. These houses 
are alive with activity for four days of the week, particularly on Friday 
afternoons when people gather to follow the religious activities held in 
the Al-Raudhah. After this, most people return to their respective towns 
and their daily routines as entrepreneurs, traders, civil servants, and so 
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7 For a further account of ethno-religious conflicts in Sampit and other provincial 
towns during the late 1990s, see Van Klinken 2007.
8 Interview with Ismail Morsade, Martapura, 20 February 2008.
9 Interviews with Nafsiah, a religious figure who resides in the Sekumpul neighbour-
hood, 11 February 2008, and with Dede Hidayatullah, a civil servant who also resides in 
Sekumpul, 22 February 2008.
forth, leaving only caretakers in their Sekumpul houses. Some people stay 
permanently in Sekumpul, and partly due to Sekumpul some of them 
have been fortunate enough to develop massive business networks, 
expanding the market for their products throughout southern Kalimantan. 
People like Sarkani, Norhid and Abdullah Assegaf have become successful 
businessmen in coal mining, the traditional Banjarese batik industry 
(sasirangan), precious stones and jewels, and other large-scale enterprises 
in South Kalimantan (Alfisyah 2005). Ismail Morsade is another succesful 
businessman living in Sekumpul. He was originally a Madurese entrepre-
neur from Sampit, Central Kalimantan, who decided to migrate to 
Sekumpul during the bloody ethno-religious Madurese/Dayak conflict of 
the late 1990s.7 For Morsade, Sekumpul is not only a place to enjoy the 
overwhelming atmosphere of Islamic spirituality associated with Guru 
Zaini, who helped him to overcome the emotional trauma of the conflict. 
It also offers him socio-political-religious protection, and a promising 
arena to develop his business activities in South Kalimantan.8
The religious appeal of Sekumpul has made the community prosper-
ous. Gradually, through its complex role at the intersection of multifac-
eted religio-political and economic activities, Sekumpul has come to 
be seen as the ‘kampung urang sugih’ (village of the affluent) of South 
Kalimantan. As a spiritual market, Sekumpul is more than just a site for 
religious ceremonies and rituals; it has become a new source of religious 
and moral guidance. More importantly, it has become a medium for 
religious middle-class consumers in South Kalimantan’s towns to seek a 
new identity and personal meaning – by consuming. At Sekumpul they 
can enjoy a spiritual uplifting by Guru Zaini, but after that they can 
shop for all the accessories and gadgets associated with Sekumpul. Most 
people do not hesitate to spend millions of rupiah for an exclusive Mushab 
Al-Qur’an (Qur’anic edition) signed by Guru Zaini, a tasbih fuqah (a type 
of rosary) or a Sekumpul-stamped rihal jati (a small teak table to put the 
Qur’an on). Even more collectors buy the jilbab and kopiah haji sold in 
Sekumpul.9 Slowly, Sekumpul has evolved its own unique brand identity, 
sought after by its own middle-class market segment of loyal customers. 
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Possessing Sekumpul merchandise and accessories allows a person to 
undeniably claim membership of Sekumpul’s middle-class community.
Commodification
The growing interest of the new middle class in the current wave of 
market-friendly Islam has spread to a large and diverse segment of 
Indonesian Muslims, and this means expanding market opportunities for 
products related to these activities. It is only logical that increased demand 
for the latest models for innovative religious expression has led Indonesian 
fashion designers, the garment industry and other business players to 
launch new products. Again, the middle class plays a pivotal role, not only 
as loyal consumers but also as commercial agents providing affordable 
‘Islamic’ products that follow (or even set) the latest fashion trends. They 
distribute their products widely to reach even remote parts of the coun-
tryside. Religious commodification should not be confused with commer-
cialization. It is not a phenomenon that exists solely to make money. 
Religious commodification entails ideologization of commodities and 
commoditization of religion; it is as much about selling ideology as about 
selling products (Lukens-Bull 2008). Religious commodification has in 
fact very much to do with the way religion, in this case Islam, is packaged 
and offered to a broader audience, and how this has produced a frame-
work for the moral order of society through the objectification and sys-
tematization of Islamic values and practices as a normative model.
Middle-class entrepreneurs are at the forefront to transform Islam into 
a symbolic commodity relevant to an entire social class based on demands 
for lifestyle, modesty and enjoyment, and no longer simply as a set of ritu-
als, beliefs and doctrines. Sociological debate about this phenomenon 
conceptualizes consumption in the modern age as one of the most cru-
cial, defining class experiences, and an expression of identity and repre-
sentation of the self. Since religion has emerged as a symbol of elitism 
associated with the road to success, statements of one’s personal identity 
can involve the use and consumption of religious symbols, as can be seen 
in the Indonesian public sphere friendly to Islam. In the hands of middle-
class entrepreneurs, the symbols of faith have thus become commodified 
as markers of social status. Miller suggested that commodifying religion 
has reduced religious beliefs, symbols and values into free-floating 
signifiers to be consumed like anything else (Miller 2004). As such, it 
takes them from their original contexts and throws them into a cultural 
<UN> <UN>
 between the global and the local 185
marketplace where they can be superficially embraced without being 
actually put into practice.
The heart of the commodification process is found in places such as the 
sprawling Tanah Abang market in metropolitan Jakarta, where countless 
tightly packed stalls are festooned with products from small- to middle-
scale industries. These industries also operate in provincial towns such as 
Tasikmalaya, Pekalongan and Solo. They not only meet market demands, 
but also set market trends nationally. This reciprocal relationship is driven 
by business acumen rather than religious motivation. ‘Islamic industry’ 
thrives in parallel with the emergence of upwardly mobile consumers, 
who seek models of behaviour appropriate to their newly elevated status. 
But the end result is co-determined by those on the economic margins 
who ‘show a fascination with the cultural codes associated with the wealth 
and power of the new elites’ (Young 1990:57).
The sprouting of Islamic symbols in Indonesian provincial towns coin-
cides with middle-class success in expanding their businesses. In 
Kebumen, many of them have been able to open stores along Sutoyo, 
Kolopaking and Kusuma streets, selling mobile phones, electronic gad-
gets, ready-made garments and much more. Market competition has 
been enlivened by the entry of new players, kyai or young figures who are 
closely affiliated with the biggest Islamic organizations in Kebumen, 
namely Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. One of them, Wahib 
Machfudz, owns a number of stores under the label Al-Huda, the same 
name as his pesantren, selling books, clothing and electronic accessories, 
as well as several telephone shops. Another successful businessman, 
Cholidi Ibhar, is a former local parliamentarian from the religiously 
coloured PKB (Party of Nation Awakening) in Kebumen. He specializes in 
selling Muslim fashion under his own label Amanah, in competition with 
similar shops such as Tadzkiya, Zahra, Mangga Dua, Tiara 27, and Asri. As 
well as these retailers, several young NU and Muhammadiyah activists, 
such as Slamet Faisol and Muhammad Dahsyad, have become wholesale 
clothing-supply agents to small retail stores throughout Kebumen. Other 
prominent business players from a santri background have arisen in 
Kebumen to creatively broaden the market coverage of local commodi-
ties. Among them are Yahya Mustafa, Ibnu Ashari, Mastur Soba’i Aziz, 
Ayub, and Slamet Faisol. Yahya Mustafa has become the most prominent 
of them all by expanding basket-weaving craftwork for export. He won the 
(bank) Danamon Award for his hard work. Another success story is that of 
Ibnu Ashari, now the owner of the Sriti plastic-cutting factory located in 
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10 Interview with Ibnu Ashari, 14 January 2008.
11 Interview with Nurhadi, member of the Nadzir Darussalam Mosque, 17 March 2008.
Kelurahan Watubarut, Kebumen. This entrepreneur has an NU back-
ground, and was once active in the NU organizations Ansor and Garda 
Bangsa Kebumen (2002–2007). He opened his own factory after working 
for ten years in the Naga Semut plastic factory, owned by the Chinese 
entrepreneur Tan Han Jian.10
The establishment of the Centre of Muslim Economy (Sentral Ekonomi 
Muslim, SEM), in Sutoyo Street near the Tumenggungan traditional mar-
ket, is emblematic of the emerging middle-class enterpreneurs in 
Kebumen, who have witnessed a marked shift in class formation. In 2004, 
SEM was built on land donated to the Darussalam Mosque, situated in 
Kebumen sub-district. In cooperation with an investor, 68 kiosks were 
built, but unfortunately not more than 10 kiosks in the front row were able 
to stay in business. The remaining kiosks were closed, or never even 
opened. A lot of effort has gone into invigorating this market, mostly to 
settle the debts of the wholesalers who invested Rp 1.2 billion for con-
struction of the kiosks.11 Initially SEM was to be a convenient shopping 
centre where the emerging middle class in Kebumen could spend their 
money and meet their growing need for ‘Islamic’ clothing and accessories, 
thus strengthening their class distinction. However since it was not mod-
elled after luxurious shopping malls in Yogyakarta and other cities in 
Central Java, SEM never evolved into an important shopping centre bring-
ing pride to Kebumen society. This fact indicates that marketing Islamic 
commodities by itself is not enough – they need to be marketed in the 
modern way, and not through kiosks in a traditional market.
In the middle of SEM’s failure, the Jadi Baru Mall (JB) was built, despite 
opposition from the traditional traders and Chinese businessmen of 
Kebumen. JB belongs to a supermarket network centred in Kroya, Cilacap. 
It was built by an entrepreneur from Cilacap, Mahasin, the besan (rela-
tionship between parents whose children are married to each other) of an 
influential cleric, Gus Anam, from Leler Banyumas. The construction of JB 
was supported by local Kebumen entrepreneurs. One of them, Yazid 
Machfudz, is the brother of Wahib Machfudz, the chairman of the consul-
tative council of Kebumen’s NU branch and a businessman. There has 
long been a tight bond between Mahasin and Yazid. Yazid was convinced 
that the development of JB would bring prosperity to the Muslim com-
munity, because the owner is a member of NU and the mall would improve 
Kebumen’s economy by attracting new people and new life to a part of 
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12 Interview with Yazid Machfudz, 7 November 2007.
13 Interview with Ridwan, Former Director Al Zahra, 17 February 2008, and Rizki 
Wijayakusuma, Ahmad Diauddin and Suriani, admin staff of Al-Zahra, 19 February 
2008.
14 Interview with Ismail Morsade, Martapura, 20 January 2008.
town that was at the time deserted.12 JB would have a special section for 
Muslim women’s wear, complete with all the accessories and gadgets 
needed by women who wanted to appear ‘Islamic’ yet modern.
The middle-class ability to expand their business network by selling 
‘Islamic’ products is also evident in Martapura. Realizing Sekumpul’s 
market value, Guru Zaini launched Al-Zahra Productions, a brand name 
for the numerous merchandise, accessories and gadgets associated with 
Sekumpul. The core products of Al-Zahra are Muslim fashion, prayer/ 
ritual attire and accessories, with its production lines located in Tasik-
malaya and Surabaya. Al-Zahra later expanded its production line with 
the opening of the Ar-Ruhama bookstore and Ar-Raudhah publications. 
Both of these businesses were put under independent management, 
and Guru Zaini focused on Al-Zahra. Besides the ritual merchandise 
shops and Muslim women’s fashions under the umbrella of Gallery 
Al-Zahra, Al Zahra now has business lines such as Al-Zahra Fast Food, imi-
tating the model of California Fried Chicken, AZ Bakery and Al-Zahra 
Supermarket. Al-Zahra also produces its own mineral water, branded sim-
ply as ‘Sekumpul’.
Al-Zahra claims the source of its business inspiration was Aa Gym’s 
Management Qalbu Company, but with Guru Zaini as a marketing figure 
to target certain market segments, particularly in the provincial towns of 
South Kalimantan. Al-Zahra’s major selling point was the fact that it was 
owned by Sekumpul, and it grew dramatically. Even after the death of 
Guru Zaini in 2005, Al-Zahra still stands strong. Its consumers are the 
thousands of visitors coming to Sekumpul every day. Although the popu-
larity of Sekumpul as a centre of ritual seems to have faded slightly, 
Martapura still remains a religious and social magnet for the provincial 
towns of South Kalimantan, and the Sekumpul business enterprises 
continue to expand. The expansion has been backed by many succesful 
enterpreneurs, including Sarkani, Norhid, Assegaf and Morsade. The 
enterpreneurs have developed various ‘Islamic’-type business enterprises 
of their own, inspired by Sekumpul.13 For instance, a real estate company 
owned by Morsade has developed exclusive ‘Islamic’ residences in 
Banjarbaru, near Martapura, named the Ismor Housing Complex after the 
abbreviation of his name.14
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15 For critiques of Mahmood’s theory, see Haniffa 2008 and Jasani 2008.
What we have seen here is the prominent role of the new middle class 
as an agency to facilitate the process of religious commodification. Agency 
here specifically refers to the capacity to realize Muslim interests against 
the dominant ideology that makes it difficult to reconcile piety and other 
forms of public religious expression with modernity (Giddens 1984, 1987). 
An active engagement in the construction of religious debate and dis-
course in the public space primarily characterizes this particular type of 
agency, through which a new form of interpretation and meaning is 
offered for religious expression and identity. Inherent in its efforts is a 
criticism of the hitherto hegemonic religious-establishment discourse 
and its traditionalism and passivity. In contrast to Saba Mahmood’s (2005) 
understanding of agency in the case of a mosque women’s movement in 
Egypt as centred on individual intentions to engage in self-transformation 
through passivity and feminine docility, no longer solely through the lens of 
subversion, agency in this Indonesian context involves the process of social 
transformation and strategic choices.15 Instead of giving up religiosity, con-
sidered as a source of backwardness, it liberalizes religion from its tradi-
tionally subservient, passive and docile posture by turning it into a source 
of moral legitimacy and distinction to represent a modern form of life.
The fact that the growing trend for women in Indonesian provincial 
towns to wear headscarves is tied to the larger process of social change 
sheds some lights on the importance of agency in the process of negotia-
tion between tradition and modernity. As Suzanne Brenner (1996) 
observed, the practice of veiling among women in Java represents both a 
new historical consciousness and a transformation of self that challenges 
local tradition as well as Western models of modernity. Veiling is thus per-
ceived as an active process to produce a vision of a society that is distanc-
ing itself from the past as it embarks upon a new modernity. Indeed, 
veiling allows middle-class women in Java to live away from home and 
move into predominantly male social, political and economic spaces with 
a heightened commitment to the profession of Islam (Smith-Hefner 2007; 
Hamdani 2007). In fact, the headscarf helped Rustriningsih, the then 
Kebumen district head, to secure her position as the first woman to hold 
the highest political position in Kebumen. As well as her pioneering 
efforts to improve transparency and good governance in Kebumen, 
Rustriningsih’s politics of veiling played a significant role in her success 
in winning support from the majority of the Kebumen society. No less 
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significant, Rustriningsih’s veiled performance became a style reference 
and established a dress code for many politicians, religious leaders and 
other members of the middle class in Kebumen.16 Once Islamic attire was 
adopted by Kebumen’s elite and middle class, the koko shirt and the trendy 
jilbab became popular throughout Kebumen.
Islam in Local Politics
Because of Islam’s complex relationship with tradition, locality, moder-
nity as well as globalization, it is hard to determine whether Indonesia has 
actually reached the brink of a post-Islamist turning point. Such a point 
could be signalled by a shift in the pattern of Islamic activism from revo-
lutionary collective activism towards an individual activism which accepts 
the imperatives of modern life. If the first is shaped by ideologies, what 
Bayat calls ‘post-Islamism’ distances itself from political nuances and col-
lective militancy, whilst still ensuring harmonization and parallelism 
between Islam and modernity (Bayat 2007:10–11). No doubt, the reality of 
an electoral democratic system that guarantees much broader public par-
ticipation in politics, although this participation may lack depth, serves as 
a catalyst for the burgeoning of public Islam. It is a concept that refers to 
the appearance of an ‘Islamic’ public sphere which enables a large seg-
ment of diverse Muslims to make their voices heard in civic debate and 
public life, thus facilitating modern and distinctively open senses of polit-
ical and religious identity (Salvatore and Eickelman 2004). Being embed-
ded in a combination of public display and public discourse, public Islam 
constitutes a process of ordering and rationalizing that is expressed in 
Islamic terms and coheres into a unified normative principle. In so doing, 
it plays a significant role in channelling social change, securing social 
order and promoting grass-roots democratization in Muslim societies 
(Salvatore 1996). In other words, public Islam is a process that sheds some 
light on the significance of religion in the dynamics of public life of con-
temporary Muslim societies.
The growth of religion’s public visibility in today’s politics is actually 
not unique to Muslims. As Casanova (1994) has argued, religions in the 
globalizing era have entered the public sphere and the arena of political 
contestation to participate in the very struggles that define and set the 




modern boundaries between the private and public spheres; between sys-
tem and life-world; between family, civil society and state; and between 
nations, states, civilizations and the world system. It is the era when the 
wall of secularization separating the secular and religious realms – which 
entails the privatization of religion – breaks down and faces a serious 
challenge. For Casanova, the appearance of religions in the public spaces 
of the globalizing era facilitates a new institutionalization of processes of 
practical rationalization and thus the fading of boundaries between the 
private and the public. By entering the sphere of public communication, 
religions are induced to a ‘reflexive rationalization’ of the life world, which 
entails a reconfiguration of the private-public dichotomy and of its 
boundaries (Casanova 1994:6–10, 228–9).
The burgeoning of public Islam is related to the rapid current of 
modernization and globalization and the nation’s ongoing democratic 
consolidation. Following the shift towards a consumerist society as a 
result of globalization, religion is experiencing commodification as piety 
becomes part of the drama of self–identity and representation, and the 
statement of the self in the public space. As an alternative to religious 
radicalism, it offers Muslims a way to actualize religious beliefs and values 
while still following the path of modernity and globalization, without 
plunging into violence and joining a cycle of militancy. Democratic val-
ues, which form the foundations of practical Islam and the politics of con-
temporary Muslim society, suggest that being a democratic Muslim is no 
longer an oxymoron (Nasr 2005).
The complex relationship between Islam and democracy is made man-
ifest when its symbols have assumed a greater significance in the dynam-
ics of local politics. The importance of religious symbols in local politics 
lies in their ability to legitimize elites in power, and their collaborators, as 
they attempt to respond to challenges from the opposition, including mil-
itant Islamists. This has led those in power to appropriate religious sym-
bols and Islamist idioms for the instrumental purpose of claiming the 
mantle of Islam and delegitimizing the Islamist opposition, while simul-
taneously producing more harmonious state–society relations (Nasr 2001; 
Liow 2009). By mobilizing religious symbols, new political elites from a 
santri background with links to prominent ulama and their pesantren 
were in effect renegotiating the boundaries of political power, economic 
arrangements and group identities. Interestingly, when a multiplicity of 
actors has the opportunity to interpret the symbols, each in accordance 
with their own interests, the Islamists’ attempt to dominate the symbolic 
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interpretation and thereby transform the country’s secular democracy 
into an Islamic state has increasingly lost ground. Religious symbols have 
irrefutably been distanced from their religious moorings and from nar-
row, Islamist understandings, in favour of pragmatic political purposes.
This phenomenon often looks like a paradox. Democracy requires a lib-
eration of public spaces from the domination of narrow religious, ethnic 
and primal sentiments. If these were to resurface in the political arena 
they could affect the very process of democratic consolidation. But on the 
other hand, religious symbols may play a pivotal role in political mobiliza-
tion. They can legitimize the ruling elite and provide the means for them 
to counter and deligitimize their opposition, including the militant 
Islamists. The situation is rendered more complex by the fact that democ-
racy cannot deny interest groups access to those same symbols, which 
they can then use to pursue their own narrow, group-specific interests. In 
exchange for support in local elections, for instance, regional political 
leaders may well exploit religious symbols and align themselves with the 
religious majority in decision making. By ignoring the basic principles of 
democracy, regional autonomy can become more corrupt and exploit-
ative than the highly centralized government of the New Order, and thus 
become a stumbling block to achieving the public good.
When Indonesia adopted regional autonomy and Jakarta decentralized 
many (but not all) of its political and financial powers, the matrix of 
power relations became more complex. The nexus between the interests 
of regional elites to capture power, competition for resources, and 
ethnic-cum-religious divisions seems to have driven the dynamics of local 
politics in Indonesia’s many different regions. All these phenomena are in 
fact symptoms of the weakening of the central state, which interestingly 
does not automatically result in more democratization, good governance 
and the strengthening of civil society. As Henk Schulte Nordholt and 
Gerry van Klinken have shown, despite the process of decentralization, 
political and economic development at the regional level seemed doomed. 
Its process is challenged by bureaucratic sabotage, corrupt power politics, 
short-term opportunism and the absence of a widely shared vision of the 
future. Moreover, the relative weakness of civil society has accompanied 
the emergence of new forms of authoritarian rule and the continuity 
of existing patrimonial patterns. Particular bureaucratic and political 
elites mobilized ethnic-cum-religious sentiments to achieve their goals 
(Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007a). It should be noted, however, 
that approaching the issue from a linear model of democratization, these 
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authors are apparently more tempted to underscore the paradoxes of 
decentralization in post-Suharto Indonesia at the expense of the more 
nuanced dynamics of the process itself.
The case of Kebumen is again worth noting in this context. Rustriningsih 
represents the middle class’s ability to make use of religious symbols, ide-
ologies and solidarities and give them multiple interpretations to legiti-
mize their own claims at a time when democratic idioms have increasingly 
gained ground in Indonesian provincial towns. As a successful, 35-year-
old woman wearing a colourful headscarf and a fashionable two-piece 
suit (with a long skirt) for her public performances, Rustriningsih’s new 
image spoke loudly of the compatibility of Islam with modernity. She 
responded to the harsh critiques of her Islamist rivals, especially those in 
the Front Thariqatul Jihad (FTJ), who questioned her abangan back-
ground as being unfriendly to Islam. She also challenged Islamists’ and 
conservative Muslims’ repudiation of women in public spaces, and their 
right to a political position in the male-dominated region of Kebumen. 
The wearing of a headscarf certainly did not indicate Rustriningsih’s 
agreement with the Islamists’ agenda, by which public moral order and 
personal behaviour should be governed according to the precepts of a 
militant Islamist ideology. Rather, her headscarf can be seen as evidence 
of the gender struggle to reconstruct the segregating social norms that 
subordinate women. Thus Rustriningsih was exercising public agency to 
deconstruct social taboos, and to reconfigure the collective social imagi-
nation to accept that being a good Muslim woman does not require with-
drawal from public spaces and social relations (Mahmood 2005:5–10). 
Becoming a good Muslim woman may instead mean having the courage 
to stand tall in public, and to lead others through change for the better. 
Once Rustriningsih started wearing a headscarf she no longer hesitated to 
talk about good governance, democracy and poverty reduction.
The importance of religious symbols in the dynamics of local politics 
following Suharto’s demise appears also to be linked to incremental efforts 
by district- and municipal- level governments to redefine their regional 
identities. Suharto’s highly centralized New Order government discour-
aged real regional identity, and maintained close control over the 
resources of the nation’s various regions, as well as their political and eco-
nomic development. In fact, ‘the New Order government was ethnocen-
trically controlled by the Javanese, and therefore, all forms of Javanese 
culture supported and underpinned the regime’s cultural policies and 
imaginings’ (Clegg 2008:177). This ‘Javanization’ of Indonesia was increas-
ingly seen as exerting a strangehold on the lives of the Indonesian people. 
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17 Interview with Anang Armawan, former bupati candidate, Martapura, 10 February 
2008, and with Fauzan Saleh, the chairman of the executive council of the NU branch in 
Martapura, 13 February 2008.
Especially outside of Java, many felt that they had never really enjoyed 
the fruits of 30 years of New Order development, but instead bore the 
brunt of corruption, collusion and nepotism from the centre (Priyambudi 
Sulistiyanto and Erb 2005). Law No. 22/1999 on local autonomy was there-
fore welcomed with enthusiasm. This law drastically limited the authority 
of the central government, and devolved considerable authority to district 
governments, thereby strengthening the position of the local government 
at the district and municipal levels (Pratikno 2005). Despite the fact that 
regional, religious and ethnic identity politics assumed much greater 
importance, decentralization is widely recognized as a major and neces-
sary step towards nurturing a flourishing democracy by giving space for 
people to participate in local political processes (Priyambudi Sulistiyono 
and Erb 2005; Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007a).
Local-elite political groups adopted a range of strategies to redefine 
and strengthen regional identity as a means of increasing their electoral 
support. As well as reinventing historical legacies and memories, they 
mobilized religious symbols and other forms of cultural capital, including 
support from the ulama. As evident in the case of Martapura, Rudy Ariffin 
sought to secure sympathy and support from the ulama shortly after he 
was elected as the district head in 2000. The most charismatic ulama in 
Martapura, Guru Zaini, did not initially support Ariffin and his running 
partner, Mawardi Abbas. Yet to have Guru Zaini’s support could be enor-
mously important. As the murshid (Sufi adept) of the Sammaniyah Sufi 
Order, he had wide influence among Muslims throughout Kalimantan. 
Ariffin made all-out efforts to persuade Guru Zaini. His relentless efforts 
were blessed with a stroke of good luck when he was made responsible for 
arranging President Abdurrahman Wahid’s visit to Sekumpul in 2001, thus 
providing him a golden opportunity to make closer contact with Guru 
Zaini.17
Ariffin’s drive to reinforce the image of Martapura as the front porch 
of Mecca underpinned his proposal to enact shariah by-laws. For the 
political elite of Martapura, the complete congruence of Islam and Ban-
jarese culture is unrefutable. Referring to the thesis proposed by local 
anthropologist Alfani Daud, the main conceptor of the by-laws insisted 
that ‘Islam is Banjar and Banjar is Islam.’ In his opinion, however, the 
pressures of rapid modernization and globalization and Jakarta-centric 
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18 Interview with Mashuri, former chief of the social office, and now of the economic 
office, at the Banjar district, 16 February 2008.
19 Interview with Mawardi Abbas, Martapura, 16 February 2008.
20 Interview with Rizki Wijayakusuma, former NGO activist, Martapura, 19 February 
2008.
21 On the notion of the bureaucratization of Islam and how this policy has begun to 
work out, especially in the context of Malaysia under Mahathir’s government, see Liow 
2009:46–8.
development had resulted in the fading influence of Islam as the most 
important source of reference among the Banjarese people. As a conse-
quence, social problems and moral diseases such as gambling, adultery, 
drug addiction and other forms of ‘vice’ had spread widely, especially 
among Martapura’s younger generation. He argued that this problem is of 
concern not only to the government, but also to ulama and ordinary citi-
zens, and thus urged the local government to enact the by-laws.18
Matters assumed a greater urgency when a paramilitary organization, 
Garusikat (the Movement of Muslims to Remove Social Ills), was estab-
lished with support from such conservative ulama as Anang Jazouly 
Seman, and actively took to the streets calling for the shariah.19 Its organi-
zational structure and operational concept were proposed by Badru ‘Ain 
Sanusi al-Afif, a former NGO activist who was also active in advocacy pro-
grammes. A daring religious teacher, Suhaimi, was appointed as the 
group’s commander, backed-up by former influential thugs, including 
Hasan Sinso. The police saw Garusikat as a challenge to their authority, 
and eventually responded by sponsoring the establishment of a similar 
organization named Dalas Hangit under the leadership of Utuh Hirang, 
another former thug. There was considerable tension between the two 
groups, resulting in actual conflict. They only reached peaceful agreement 
after mediation by Guru Zaini.20
The shariah by-laws allowed Ariffin to systematically locate Islam at the 
epicentre of the town’s bureaucratic orbit. What has been called the 
bureaucratization of Islam has taken place through a conscious decision 
to Islamize the government, and by the policies adopted to achieve this 
end.21 When Martapura started promulgating shariah by-laws, every part 
of the bureaucratic machinery began competing to demonstrate its supe-
rior commitment to Islam. All manner of bureaucratic cogs in the govern-
ment machinery became active in organizing religious lectures and other 
religious activities. To strengthen his policy of Islamizing the bureaucracy, 
Ariffin then issued a circular recommending all female civil servants in 
the Banjar administration and related institutions throughout the region 
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22 Interview with Masnur Manurung, a Christian female civil servant in the Banjar 
regional administration office, 12 February 2008.
23 Interview with Khairul Saleh, the regent of Banjar, Martapura, 21 February 2008.
to wear headscarves. Although this only had the strength of a recommen-
dation, the letter made no allowance for women working in government 
offices who happened to be Christians, Hindus or Buddhists. They should 
all wear headscarves. They were made to feel uncomfortable if they did 
not wear headscarves in their interactions with superiors or other civil 
servants.22
When Khairul Saleh replaced Ariffin, the policy of redefining regional 
identity and Islamizing the bureaucracy by insisting on the need for sha-
riah by-laws continued unabated. He ratified a proposal by the local legis-
lators for a regulation requiring the insertion of Jawi (Malay-Arabic) script 
on office nameplates in all of Martapura’s government offices. He claimed 
that this policy was part of his drive to disseminate the Islamic ethos 
throughout all government units and offices in the region, an ethos that 
packages the internalization of piety, honesty and good performance. His 
rationale was that the Jawi script uses the Arabic alphabet to write the 
Malay language, and this script had once been common in the Banjar 
Sultanate and other Malay Islamic kingdoms. Its significance for Saleh 
was that the Jawi script is identical to the alphabet of the Qur’an, which is 
the ultimate guide to Muslim behaviour in both public and private life.23 
Saleh is known as a qari (Qur’anic reciter in rhythmic tones), and he inter-
sperses his public speeches or briefings with fluent quotations from the 
Qur’an and the prophetic traditions (Hadiths). Reinforcing Islam’s public 
voice in Martapura’s bureaucratic sphere, salawat (salutation to the 
Prophet Muhammad) and Qur’anic verses are often used instead of patri-
otic and national songs as interludes at important government events. 
Every morning, civil servants in the Banjar district listen to a short ser-
mon, piped to their offices, on the importance of such virtues as piety, 
transparency, honesty and the ethos of meritocracy for the success of 
regional development, laced with Qur’anic quotations.
Conclusion
The mushrooming of Islamic symbols in the public spaces of Indonesian 
provincial towns after Suharto should be understood in relation to 
Indonesia’s democratization process and the social mobility generated by 
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the country’s economic growth. The growing public visibility of Islamic 
symbols in towns like Kebumen or Martapura should not be seen as indi-
cations of the spread of a stricter, scripturalist interpretation of Islam. 
While it has often been argued that the anxieties caused by globalization 
make people seek comfort in stricter interpretations of religious texts, 
I have tried to show that economic development in Indonesia’s provincial 
towns is also generating a more pragmatic and consumerist, lifestyle- 
oriented attitude towards Islam. A new middle class is looking to Islam for 
inspiration both to claim distinction and social status and to legitimize 
their consumptive lifestyle. The newly pious become active negotiators 
between the global and the local as well as between the cosmopolitan 
centre and the hinterland. They also play a pivotal role as an agency that 
liberalizes religion from its traditionally subservient, passive and docile 
posture by turning it into a source of moral legitimacy and distinction to 
represent a modern form of life.
The growing interest of the middle class in a market-friendly, Islam-
based lifestyle has spread to a large and diverse segment of Indonesian 
Muslims, including those on the economic margins who show a fascina-
tion with the cultural codes associated with the wealth and power of the 
new elites. The expansion of market demands and opportunities for com-
mercial products related to Islam facilitates the phenomenon of religious 
commodification, which is very much to do with the way religion is pack-
aged and offered to a broader audience. The role of the middle class is 
crucial, not only as loyal consumers but also as commercial agents that 
widely distribute the ‘Islamic’ products that follow the latest trends to 
reach remote areas in the contryside. They are at the forefront to trans-
form Islam into a symbolic commodity which is not totally uprooted from 
tradition and culture, but relevant to upwardly mobile consumer demands 
for lifestyle, modesty and enjoyment. The end result of this process is 
determined by the way in which Indonesian provincial towns are will-
ing  to distance themselves from the past as they embark upon a new 
modernity.
Given its intimate relationship with locality, tradition, modernity as 
well as globalization, Islam has increasingly assumed a greater impor-
tance for local politics. Political elites have used Islamic symbols for the 
instrumental purpose of extending their political legitimacy and mobiliz-
ing constituency support, in a political environment of open competition 
and increased public participation in decision making. In this process 
religious symbols have irrefutably been distanced from their religious 
moorings and narrow, Islamist understandings, in favour of pragmatic 
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political purposes. Thus the adoption of the headscarf (jilbab) by 
Kebumen’s district head, Rustriningsih, in her official performance 
remains an empty gesture, or even a middle-class elitist symbol, unless 
the jilbab has become an authentic expression of her lifestyle. Seen from 
a similar perspective, the application of shariah bylaws in Martapura is 
best understood not as evidence of the growing influence of Islam in poli-
tics, but rather as the manoeuvres of the town’s political elites in their 
efforts to secure their own interests. The by-laws nonetheless allowed the 
elites to systematically attempt to locate Islam at the heart of the town’s 
bureaucratic orbit. Islam has emerged as a source of legitimacy for politi-
cal leaders, but always in relation to tradition and local culture.
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Fig. 9. KUPANG:  Late at night, residents congregate at the edge of the main 
street near the mouth of their kampung. From this vantage they can sip tea, 
exchange jibes, and both monitor the comings and goings of their fellows while 
mingling themselves. 
August 2009: photo by  S. Chris Brown
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IN SEARCH OF MIDDLE INDONESIAN:  
LINGUISTIC DYNAMICS IN A PROVINCIAL TOWN
Joseph Errington
Middle Indonesian cities like Kupang, capital of the province of East Nusa 
Tenggara, present a kind of linguistic puzzle.1 There, as elsewhere in 
Indonesia, the Indonesian language (bahasa Indonesia) has uncontested 
primacy within a far-reaching network of state institutions, a rapidly 
developing political economy, the mass media and an urban consumerist 
culture. In these and other ways Indonesian serves and symbolizes the 
integrationist dynamic that has driven Kupang’s growth from the time it 
became a provincial capital in the late 1950s up to the present. Its present 
population of about 350,000 testifies to Kupang’s attractive power for 
members of the province’s many ethnic groups, particularly younger peo-
ple who see it as a point of access, through new avenues of geographic and 
social mobility, into a burgeoning Indonesian middle class. Yet fluent, 
standard Indonesian is not much heard in Kupang.
Even educated, middle-class people there commonly converse about 
sophisticated matters and in formal situations in a local dialect of Malay 
known as ba(ha)sa Kupang (‘Kupang language’ or ‘Kupangese’) or bahasa 
Melayu Kupang, ‘Kupang Malay’. Structural similarities between 
Indonesian and Kupang Malay allow them to be classified as dialects of a 
single language, but they are sufficiently different so that Kupang Malay is 
far from fully intelligible to anyone who knows only standard Indonesian. 
So, after two generations of modernization have made the national 
language increasingly important throughout the country, including 
Middle Indonesian cities like Kupang, Indonesian’s inroads into everyday 
urban life seem surprisingly shallow. Kupang Malay continues to be spo-
ken as the distinctly native language of 220,000 people in the city and its 
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surrounds, and is the non-native vernacular for tens of thousands of oth-
ers (Jacob and B. Grimes 2006:510).
It also seems puzzling that at the same time as Kupang Malay 
has proven to be such a durable urban idiom, it is ignored and often 
despised not only by some of its speakers, but also by many teachers and 
government officials, who have a tendency to look down on it as a stigma-
tized language (see Jacob and B. Grimes 2006:1). Though differences 
between these two dialects of Malay are clear, both in their forms and 
social values, people are not always able to ‘tell you which language or 
register [Indonesian or Kupang Malay] they are using’ (C. Grimes and 
Jacob 2008).
These are puzzles I frame here as aspects of a broader dynamic of 
sociolinguistic contact in Kupang described from three related angles. 
Most obviously and concretely, ‘contact’ occurs between Indonesian and 
Kupang Malay when people ‘mix’ them in talk. I draw on recordings and 
transcriptions of casual conversation in Kupang to foreground two such 
contact phenomena that speak to these larger questions. This requires 
that I first provide the social background for two broader kinds of contact. 
One involves a biographical approach, considering the ways that 
Indonesian and Kupang Malay figure into the social trajectories of differ-
ent kinds of speakers, who acquire them in different ways. From this 
point of view, ‘contact’ between the two languages is considered with an 
eye to the ways people learn and come to value each from different posi-
tions in the region’s integrationist dynamic. The middle of this chapter 
suggests that distinct social trajectories and language attitudes can be 
broadly attributed to speakers I describe as ‘natives’ and ‘newcomers’ to 
Kupang.
This biographical contrast, in turn, needs to be preceded by an even 
broader sketch of the historical contexts, national and urban, in which 
Indonesian and Kupang Malay developed before coming into increasing 
contact with each other. This account is crude, but suffices to show how 
these structurally similar dialects of Malay have come to be regarded as 
categorically distinct although their elements are commonly used 
together. It is important here that, although Kupang may seem a marginal 
or unusual scene of language contact, sociolinguistic dynamics there have 
parallels in other Middle Indonesian towns. With an eye to this possibility 
I first sketch Indonesian’s rise as a national language without native speak-
ers, and Kupang Malay’s status as a native language without an ethnic 
group.
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2 For more on different aspects of this complex situation see Hoffman 1973 and 1979, 
Maier 1993, and references cited there.
The Indonesian Success Story, Reconsidered
Ideological and institutional issues have always been clearly bound up 
with Indonesian’s status as the nation’s standard language, widely referred 
to as bahasa Indonesia yang baik dan benar (literally, ‘good and true 
Indonesian’). They are also obvious because Indonesian does not have a 
native speaking community. Nowhere in Indonesia, including Kupang, is 
there a location where people claim standard Indonesian as a ‘first’, 
‘mother’ or ‘native’ language, and this issue has recurred in discussions of 
Indonesian political culture for fifty years. But it has not been considered 
a factor that shapes the ways Indonesian is learned and used by native 
speakers of hundreds of ethnic languages. In effect, then, questions about 
Indonesian’s place in local communities can help develop a finer-grained 
understanding not just of the national language, but of the nation whose 
language it is (cf. Van der Putten 2010).
To develop such a focus on Kupang and its region, I call Indonesian a 
language that is spoken ‘un-natively’, rather than ‘non-natively’, to block 
habits of thought that are misleading in this context. ‘Non-native’ charac-
terizes something contrastively, presupposing a dimension of difference 
between entities that lack or possess ‘nativeness’. To describe English 
usage as ‘non-native’ is thus to contrast it with usage that is ‘native’. But 
there is no universally recognized reference point for ‘native’ Indonesian 
usage, which makes any such comparison invalid. Describing it instead as 
a language spoken ‘un-natively’ blocks a tacit and invalid assumption 
about the ways Indonesian is learned and evaluated.
Most languages cannot be described in historically specific terms, but 
Indonesian can. Its proximate origins can be traced to the literate variety 
of Malay established for the administrative needs of the Dutch empire in 
the late nineteenth century.2 This dienstmaleisch, or ‘service Malay’, served 
official communicative purposes across lines of language difference 
between regions, ethnic groups and colonial classes. As an institutionally 
defined lingua franca, service Malay was an un-native language. But 
thanks to its un-nativeness it could be taken over by an anticolonial, pan-
ethnic nationalist movement that gave it new political purposes and 
prominence by baptizing it Indonesian (bahasa Indonesia) in 1928. They 
were able to pirate the regime’s language partly because no group, Dutch 
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3 These figures are reported in Sneddon 2003. Statistical evidence for a more critical 
view of the project can be found in Montolalu and Suryadinata 2007.
or otherwise, had prior, ‘inalienable’ claims to it as a native language. 
So, too, Indonesian’s uses and values have been shaped by the national 
project it has served and symbolized.
Recently, under the New Order, Indonesian’s lack of native/ethnic 
associations transparently linked it to the state’s self-legitimizing project 
of national development. Because Indonesian served to propagate a 
nationalist ideology, and was used in state institutions, it helped to natu-
ralize the New Order’s efforts to extend its power of oversight across 
Indonesian territory. The propagation of Indonesian was a state project, 
designed in Jakarta and extended outward to the peripheries, that served 
‘integralistic’ efforts to overcome ‘incessant and divisive polycentrism’ 
(Elson 2008:248). Through a state-fostered network of educational insti-
tutions in Middle Indonesian cities like Kupang, it could be taught as 
an ethnically neutral instrument that assimilated those who learned it 
‘to the larger national identity…expressed only within its homogenising 
contours’ (Elson 2008:253).
Fifty years after it began, the success of the national language develop-
ment programme seems quite clear. Already in 1990, according to the 
national census, 83% (131 million) of Indonesia’s population (157 million) 
already knew Indonesian (bisa berbahasa Indonesia).3 Results about 
knowledge of Indonesian from the 2010 census were not available at the 
time of this writing, but will surely indicate that an even greater propor-
tion of Indonesians – regardless of their gender, occupation, locale and 
ethnicity – count as Indonesian speakers. But this statistical evidence of 
increasing linguistic sameness – knowledge of the language’s prescribed 
forms and meanings – provides no insight into situated particularities, 
that is, how Indonesian’s forms figure in everyday talk and vary across 
communities whose members speak other languages natively. Indonesian’s 
un-nativeness has shaped the ways it has spread at least because there are 
no self-evidently native, authoritative exemplars who can serve as refer-
ence points for evaluating how it is acquired and used.
Speech in any language has features that necessarily go unspecified in 
its written representations: the way sounds are articulated, patterns of 
accent and stress, intonation and vowel length, grammatical elements, 
stylistic variation, and so on. Learning a language from, or in proximity 
with, native-speaking models helps bridge such ‘gaps’ between codified 
rules, usually set out in prescriptive texts, and actual speech. But in the 
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4 Further discussion with regard to Indonesia’s largest ethnic language, Javanese, is in 
Quinn 2010.
5 ‘Seharusnya, bangsa Indonesia menempatkan bahasa Indonesia, bahasa daerah, dan 
bahasa asing pada posisinya masing-masing sesuai dengan kedudukan dan fungsinya seb-
agaimana dinyatakan dalam politik nasional.’
case of Indonesian, the absence of embodied examples makes ‘Indonesian’ 
a kind of rubric for a range of registers or styles that are shaped by users’ 
native habits of speech (Ewing 2005). ‘Interference’ or ‘transfer’ effects 
that result from native knowledge of another language can be ubiquitous 
and persistent, particularly in the absence of Indonesian native-speaking 
exemplars.
From a social and political point of view, heterogeneity in Indonesian as 
a spoken language is more tolerable than lack of agreement in values and 
functions ascribed to it as the national language (bahasa nasional). Partly 
because of its un-nativeness, the New Order could assert Indonesian’s pri-
macy over the country’s ethnic languages without asserting the primacy of 
one linguistic group over others. This was done by establishing Indonesian’s 
superordinate relation not to languages of ethnic groups, but of regions, 
that is, bahasa daerah.4 As a 2007 report by the governmental language 
development office (Pusat Bahasa) puts it, for instance, ‘national language 
politics’ (politik bahasa nasional) requires that ‘the Indonesian people 
should locate bahasa Indonesia, bahasa daerah and bahasa asing (‘foreign 
languages’) in their respective positions, each in accordance with its place 
and function, as determined by national politics’.5
Leaving aside the issue of foreign languages here, this statement pre-
scribes a hierarchy between languages analogous to others described as 
diglossic. Diglossia is a term used to describe hierarchical relations 
between languages in a society, ‘high’ and ‘low’, whose values, ‘positions’ 
or ‘functions’ are hierarchical and complementary. Structural properties 
of a ‘high’ language tend to be less variable than those of a ‘low’ language. 
A ‘high’ language is also closely associated with institutions of literacy, 
and is acquired not as a native language but only by participation in those 
institutions. Its prestige is rooted in contexts of use associated with ele-
vated and formal issues, including ‘one to many’ genres of public speech 
and writing. ‘Low’ languages, on the other hand, are those acquired 
natively from early childhood, in day-to-day interaction in the home and 
neighbourhood as the idiom of everyday life.
The report quoted above speaks to Indonesia’s linguistic diversity by 
presupposing, without explicitly stating, that languages are bound to 
regions (daerah) by speakers who form groups that are primordially 
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‘native’ to their respective territories. Notions of primordial bonds 
between people, land and language are common parts of nationalist ide-
ologies, but in Indonesia they serve instead to fix differences between 
indefinitely many ‘low’ native ethnic languages and a unitary ‘high’ un-
native national language. This is an important point here because Kupang, 
as I show next, has no place in this overarching view.
Kupang Malay: Emerging Koiné?
One reason Kupang Malay is ‘ignored and despised’ is that it lacks the sort 
of ‘region’ or ethnic group presupposed by the dominant ideology of 
‘national language politics’, discussed above. In this way it resembles 
urban vernaculars in other provincial towns, and is worth considering 
with an eye to Kupang’s sociolinguistic development over the course of 
sustained colonial encounter.
A variety of Malay was spoken from the time that the Dutch built a fac-
tory on Kupang Bay in 1653 among members of a heteroglot group (Dutch, 
Chinese, Buginese, Javanese, Malays, and others). Typological and com-
parative data have led Scott Paauw (2008) to conclude that in this way 
Kupang Malay is one of several eastern Indonesia varieties that originated 
in what he calls Eastern Indonesia Trade Malay, a contact variety that can 
ultimately be traced back to the ethnic Malay homeland of southwestern 
Borneo.
As a kind of lingua franca, Kupang’s Malay vernacular expanded in use 
across lines of ethnolinguistic difference, particularly in the sorts of con-
texts suggested by one of its common names: ‘market Malay’ (bahasa 
Melayu pasar). Children born in Kupang had this lingua franca as a tem-
plate or model for patterns of speech that they assimilated for use as a 
distinctly local, native Malay. However, usage varied depending on 
whether speakers acquired it along with other languages, or among peo-
ple who spoke it as a second language along with interference or transfer 
effects from their native languages. Among those growing up and acquir-
ing it in communities of migrants from regions of inland Timor or neigh-
bouring islands (Rotenese, Sabunese, Alorese, Solorese, and others), 
Kupang Malay was spoken in ways reflecting their social background. In 
this respect their usage would have resembled that of older, less educated 
speakers in Kupang today, whose accents and other features of usage indi-
rectly mark their ethnic background. Kupang’s ethnically plural character 
was indirectly reproduced in a range of Malay varieties which were dis-
tinctive not just of the town, but of its various ethnic enclaves.
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A comparison of the speech of older Kupang natives and younger peo-
ple suggests patterns of change in Kupang Malay usage that have occurred 
over the same period that new social dynamics shaped the city and region. 
In the 1970s the New Order’s integralistic project began to transform 
Kupang into an increasingly important node in a national network of 
state institutions, media, transportation and commercial infrastructure. 
Over this period Kupang became an attractive destination for younger 
people seeking higher education and middle-class occupations, especially 
in the civil-service system (see Wenty Marina Minza’s contribution to the 
present volume). So, institutions of the nation-state are reshaping the city 
at the same time that they elevate Indonesian’s visibility and importance 
as the ‘high’ language in a local diglossic situation: it is the language of 
official concerns, the civil service and advanced education, but also of the 
mass media and consumerist lifestyles identified with a pan-Indonesian 
middle class. Young newcomers from inland Timor and neighbouring 
islands, including those mentioned above, arrive as products of primary 
and secondary schools with competence in the national language.
Yet, everyday life in the city demands facility in ‘low’ Kupang Malay as 
well. This is the common idiom of young people who grow up in Kupang; 
they acquire it natively, as a matter of practice, and commonly use it 
together with Indonesian. Our research suggests that they do this in situ-
ations which, under a normative diglossic profile, would be restricted to 
the national language. In elementary schools, for instance, teachers 
explain material in Kupang Malay to make younger students feel less 
awkward and unfamiliar; in secondary schools teachers may use more 
Indonesian, but they do not reprimand students who habitually discuss 
lessons or answer questions in Kupang Malay, instead of ‘correct’ 
Indonesian. In universities students speak Kupang Malay with each other 
and with the teachers, who intersperse their lectures in Indonesian with 
jokes or anecdotes in Kupang Malay. At this level, too, it is a matter of 
pedagogical practice to permit Kupang Malay to be used to answer ques-
tions and participate in class discussion.
Our research shows that governmental offices present a similar situa-
tion. Kupang Malay is commonly used for conversation centred on official 
business, sometimes to the virtual exclusion of entirely standard 
Indonesian. Civil servants use Kupang Malay as commonly with each 
other as with those seeking their services; no clear line can be drawn 
between their habits of speech at work, on the street or in the home and 
neighbourhood. Children learn to speak Kupang Malay as easily with 
their parents and teachers as with each other; patients use it with a doctor 
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6 J.B.: ‘Yang menonjol dalam kehidupan sosial adalah bahasa yang digunakan. Bagi 
kalangan muda, bahasa yang digunakan di Kupang lebih berprestise, sehingga mereka 
seakan dipaksa oleh situasi sosial untuk harus cepat berbahasa Kupang agar tidak menjadi 
asing di antara teman-temannya.’ http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=1042044 
02968840, last accessed 7 August 2012.
7 G.T.: ‘Yang patut dibanggakan adalah tida ada suatu aturan baku untuk memprotes 
ketika bahasa Kupang dilafalkan dengan aksen daerah masing-masing. Malah penutur itu 
sendiri akan berusaha menyesuaikan diri dengan lawan bicara atau lingkungan di mana ia 
tinggal. (Facebook page Bahasa Kupang).
as readily as with a friend; a bus driver will use it with his boss as readily 
as with a passenger; and so on.
Put briefly, then, social dynamics have brought Kupang’s vernacular 
Malay into contact with standard Indonesian in a broadening range of 
contexts and among an expanding, increasingly diverse group of people. 
At the same time, Kupang Malay is closely enough bound up with the 
urban environment that facility in its use is taken to be emblematic of 
membership in the urban community. As one young newcomer observed 
(using standard, written Indonesian) in a post to the Kupang Malay 
Facebook page:
What stands out in social life is the language used. For young people, the 
language spoken in Kupang is more prestigious; it’s as if they [that is, new-
comers] feel obliged by the social situation to quickly learn Kupang lan-
guage so as not to become estranged from their peers.6 (J.B.)
Newcomers need to learn Kupang Malay in order to engage new contexts, 
new topics and, more generally, to meet expectations shared in their new 
peer groups. Another young newcomer to Kupang elaborated on the pre-
vious comment as follows:
What we can be proud of is that no standard rule exists to protest when 
Kupang Malay is pronounced with different regional accents. Rather, speak-
ers themselves will try to fit in with their speech partners or environment 
where they live.7 (G.T.)
G.T. notes that Kupang’s vernacular lacks ‘standard rules’ like Indonesian’s, 
but that newcomers nonetheless acquire a sense of how they should learn 
to speak it if they want to fit in. This young observer recognizes, like them, 
that a stigma will attach to them if they speak too much Indonesian, or if 
their speech shows too much interference from their native languages. 
They learn this, despite the absence of ‘standard rules’, partly through 
strategies their more fluent peers can use to evaluate and ‘correct’ them in 
day-to-day interaction.
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8 Ka marks the truth or salience of a preceding expression. For instance, in their 
response to the question: ‘Does the top scorer get an award?’ a speaker replies ‘Dapat ka 
pasti’. This can be translated colloquially as ‘Of course’. Word by word it translates as ‘GET’ 
ka ‘CERTAINLY’.
For instance, a newcomer from Manggarai, in the western part of the 
island of Flores, may inadvertently let an element of his or her native lan-
guage slip into his or her Kupang Malay, for instance, the discourse parti-
cle ka.8 This habit of speech shows that they have not yet fully habituated 
to the city. It suggests a lack of urban smarts and sounds, in a single 
Indonesian word, kampungan, ‘bumpkinish’. Soon after using that parti-
cle, though, someone more fluent in Kupang Malay might speak to them 
while deploying it as well, informally and perhaps jokingly throwing the 
dysfluency into relief. Strategic echoing of interference phenomena – 
intonation and stress patterns, articulations of particular speech sounds, 
lexical choices – can indirectly instruct less fluent speakers as to how to 
‘improve’ their language, despite the absence of ‘standard rules’.
Such interactional techniques presuppose and convey a diffuse, nor-
mative sense of what Kupang Malay sounds like, and they may be contrib-
uting to decreasing heterogeneity in the way it is spoken, at least among 
young speakers. Though we were not able to gather cross-generational 
data to fully document this process, young people’s opinions of use indi-
rectly suggest that they are participating in a progressive levelling of eth-
nic variation in Kupang Malay usage. Convergence between formerly 
distinct varieties of Kupang Malay would be analogous to processes 
observed elsewhere that result in a ‘reduction of inter-systemic variation 
by a gradual abandonment of local dialect features in favor of more 
regional or standard ones’ (Røyneland 2010:261). This ‘bottom up’ process 
could be giving rise to a koiné, that is, a relatively uniform dialect emerg-
ing from contact between several dialects which it progressively displaces. 
And if younger people are at the ‘leading edge’ of such a dynamic, they 
would be helping to develop a kind of Kupang Malay that is an idiom of 
‘innovative urban insularity’, similar to others described in very different 
situations (Taeldeman 2005:269).
Homogeneous or not, Kupang Malay continues to count as ‘bad 
Indonesian’ for those who judge it by diglossic norms as being ‘separate 
and unequal’. Certainly, they can find grounds for complaining about the 
ways young speakers ‘mix’ elements of Kupang Malay and Indonesian, 
many of them difficult to categorize on structural grounds. This ‘mixed 
talk’ is ubiquitous, fluent and communicatively effective in context, but is 
not uniformly valued or categorized by its users or critics:
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9 This is drawn from 42 audio recordings of spontaneous conversations of between 15 
and 45 minutes in length. These were transcribed into an electronic database consisting of 
55,000 records, each a short utterance or phrase.
Many speakers mix Indonesian and Kupang Malay, and can’t always tell you 
which language or register they are using. Some of these, including many 
university students in Kupang, think they are targeting formal Indonesian, 
but do it imperfectly and are often scorned by those who control Indonesian 
better. (C. Grimes and Jacob 2008.)
Part of the current puzzle in Kupang, then, is not just the divergence 
between widely accepted norms and practices, but also between different 
perceptions of norms and practices, particularly among younger, 
educated people. To understand how distinctions between the two lan-
guages are blurred, conceptually and practically, I next sketch two 
ways that competence in each is acquired by newcomers and natives in 
Kupang.
Social Trajectories and Language Attitudes
I noted above that young people born and raised in Kupang are comfort-
able using Kupang Malay in contexts in which, by official standards, 
Indonesian would be normative. Those who enroll in Kupang’s universi-
ties and other tertiary educational institutions are joined there by new-
comers from surrounding regions who also acquired Indonesian as an 
object and medium of education. But their native ‘regional’ or ethnic lan-
guages, much more structurally distinct from Indonesian, are also more 
socially distinct as ‘low’ or ‘informal’ varieties relative to prestigious, pre-
scribed Indonesian.
Newcomers facing the practical challenge of acquiring the city’s 
idiom, then, feel more sharply than their native peers the disjunction 
between Indonesian and Kupang Malay. Each language has links to differ-
ent parts of their lives, and so produces a stronger sense of contrast 
between them. For the same reason, newcomers to Kupang can experi-
ence tension between two attitudes to Kupang Malay – as urban idiom 
and ‘bad usage’ – when they take habits of vernacular speech acquired in 
Kupang back home. The resulting tension sometimes surfaces in casual 
conversation, like that transcribed and translated in Table 1.9
<UN> <UN>
 in search of middle indonesian 209
Table 1: Prescriptivism in Alor.
I: Saturday I’m going home. I: Hari Saptu be su pulang.
L: Going home to Alor? Don’t go, 
I’ll be alone here.
L: Su pulang Alor, ado jang dolu 
pulang ko, nanti kita sendiri saja 
di sini ni.
I: I’m going. Last night Mama 
phoned, told me to come home.
I: Pulang la. Tadi malam Mama 
tua dong telpon suruh pulang.
L: When I get off, when the ship 
docks, I get off and have to flick 
my tongue…
L: Pas mau turun ini, pas kapal 
sandar di pelabuhan tu, turun 
harus kuti lida ooo
I: What for? I: O supaya apa?
L: So I don’t use ‘beta sonde,’ no 
‘sonde.’ When I get to Alor it has 
to be ‘saya.’ ‘Saya am going to the 
market, Saya am going 
shopping’… no, later you let that 
language sneak in…sometimes 
they tell me, the first time, one 
time ‘don’t bring lu, pung sonde 
here, we don’t need that lu and 
sonde here, no.’
L: Supaya jang omong logat  
‘beta sonde’ ko sonde ee  
ko tida. Sampe di Alor tu  
harus ‘saya.’ ‘Saya mau pi  
pasar, saya mau pi belanja…  
tida nanti terahir omong  
su kecolongan bahasa …  
kadang-kadang bilang ini 
pertama satu kali ‘sonde  
ma, hmm pikol-pikol lu pung 
sonde datang sini, orang sonde 
butuh lu pung sonde di sini tidak’
R: Kefa folks are like that too, 
‘saya, tidak.’
R: orang Kefa dong ju begitu 
‘saya, tidak’
beta: Kupang Malay first-person 
pronoun
saya: standard Indonesian first-
person pronoun
lu: Kupang Malay second-
person pronoun
sonde: Kupang Malay ‘no, not’
tidak: standard Indonesian ‘no, not’
Alor: neighbouring island
Kefa: city on Timor
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These young women had come to Kupang from nearby Alor two years 
earlier to study at one of the city’s universities. When Ina tells Lia (neither 
a real name) that her mother has summoned her home, the conversation 
turns to a linguistic problem they all face. Lia complains, and her friends 
commiserate, that she can’t suppress habits of speech she has acquired in 
Kupang, even by ‘flicking her tongue’ with a finger to try to get Kupang 
Malay out of her mouth. Still, she fails to avoid common Kupang Malay 
words – using beta (‘I, me’) and sonde (‘no, not’) instead of standard 
Indonesian saya and tidak – and becomes a target for criticism and com-
plaints. Much as she dislikes being lectured about ‘bringing that sonde’ 
back with her from Kupang, she has trouble keeping the urban vernacular 
from ‘sneaking in’.
Whether family and acquaintances back home aim simply to correct 
her speech, or to warn her against putting on airs, they invoke Indonesian’s 
normative forms and place in the community, over and against the nearby 
city’s vernacular. Recountings of personal experience like these throw 
into relief a challenge faced by newcomers to Kupang, who must not only 
learn to adapt to new ways of urban life, but also to internalize a new set 
of attitudes to standard Indonesian relative to Kupang Malay. In the city, 
as a matter of practice, the two varieties can generally serve to comple-
ment each other, but back home they are categorically distinct, ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ language. Even if this difference only occasionally emerges overtly, 
as in the conversation cited above, it reflects a slippage between evalua-
tive stances that also can be seen to shape views of the two languages we 
elicited during our research.
To study language use and attitudes, we elicited responses to a range of 
statements and questions using questionnaires. These were completed 
in the course of interviews with 30 respondents who were, like their inter-
viewers, fairly young and educated. Most of each interview was devoted to 
gathering a range of information about respondents’ and family mem-
bers’ social backgrounds, linguistic competences and reports on habits 
of language use in a range of situation types. Based on the autobiographi-
cal information they provided, I group and discuss some of their 
responses here as being provided by Kupang natives (a total of 17) or new-
comers (13).
Of interest here are responses to two other questions posed towards the 
end of these interviews. The first, translated at the head of column 2 in 
Table 2, was one of five presented for respondents to evaluate by saying 
whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed 
with each. Of interest here is the statement ‘Young people in this city can 
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10 The original: ‘Kaum muda di kota ini pada umumnya bisa berbahasa Indonesia den-
gan baik.’
11 Two natives and two newcomers chose ‘strongly disagree’ to respond to this query.
generally speak Indonesian well’.10 For brevity’s sake I collapse their 
responses into the categories ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’.11 On this matter, as the 
Table shows, opinions were divided. A little later in the interview they 
were asked, among other open-ended questions, ‘Do/have you ever felt 
awkward speaking Indonesian?’ Column 3 tabulates the gist of their 
answers as ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In fact some people responded at length, as illus-
trated by a few that are edited and translated in Table 3.
Responses to this second question correlate with respondents’ social 
backgrounds. Most newcomers indicated that they never felt awkward 
speaking Indonesian, in effect claiming to avoid ‘mixing’ Kupang Malay 
with it when formal occasions demand it. Most of their native peers, on 
the other hand, acknowledged that they were unable to do this even in 
situations they recognized as presupposing standard Indonesian. This dis-
crepancy can be mapped onto the differences between the social biogra-
phies of members of the two groups, sketched above.
Column 3 of Table 2 indicates the number and proportion of each 
group, natives and newcomers, who responded ‘yes’ to both queries. On 
the face of things these responses seem inconsistent, unless respondents 
were consciously excluding themselves from the social group they were 
asked to evaluate in query 1, ‘young people in Kupang’. Given that this is 
unlikely, it seems that they indirectly contradicted themselves by later 
acknowledging their own occasional lack of fluency in Indonesian. It also 
seems unlikely that, for some reason, newcomers are better observers of 
linguistic life in Kupang than are their native peers.
Table 2: Responses to two queries.
Social 
Background
# agreeing that 
‘Young people in 
this city generally 
speak good 
Indonesian.’
# answering ‘yes’ 




# agreeing with 
query 1 AND 
answering ‘yes’ 
to query 2
Native (n=17) 9 (52%) 13 (76%) 7 (41%)
Newcomer 
(n=13)
7 (53%) 5 (38%) 3 (23%)
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It is more plausible to interpret these responses as evidence of the broad 
ambiguity or slippage between two senses of bahasa Indonesia, as noted 
above. Query 1 foregrounded Indonesian as a linguistic competence 
shared within a segment of Kupang society, one the respondent belongs 
to. As such, it is easily construed as a question about differences in linguis-
tic knowledge across segments of the city’s population: those who are 
young, versus those who are not. In this context ‘Indonesian’ refers to 
everyday speech in which elements of Indonesian are used, perhaps with 
elements of Kupang Malay. Query 2, on the other hand, drew respondents’ 
attention to consequences of their own failures to demonstrate compe-
tence in Indonesian in particular contexts. Rare or common, such occur-
rences obtrude strongly enough that speakers can recall and report them.
Those who provided affirmative answers to both queries appear to slip 
between these two perspectives or evaluative stances. Natives do this 
more than newcomers, who identify Indonesian both as part of Kupang’s 
urban idiom, but also as a codified language that they have mastered, and 
Table 3: Selected translations of responses to open-ended query ‘Do you 
ever feel awkward speaking Indonesian?’.
Male, 21,  
college student:
‘I always feel awkward speaking Indonesian in 
formal situations, for example in front of class. I feel 
embarrassed but I anticipate by taking a long breath 
before starting to talk.’
Male, 25,  
college graduate:
‘When interviewing for work. Because I don’t use 
formal Indonesian often I feel awkward. I’m usually 
careful speaking. To overcome the awkwardness  
I usually prepare first. Sometimes I guess what 
questions are going to be asked, and then practise 
answering them in good Indonesian.’
Male, 22,  
college graduate:
‘When I’m in meetings, giving speeches or lectures 
at the office, or instructions to subordinates.’
Female, 22,  
college student:
‘Interviewing for work. Sometimes I try to break the 
ice with a joke. If they answer in standard 
Indonesian I’ll answer in Indonesian. But 
sometimes I also use Kupang language.’
Female, 22,  
college student:
‘In class, because every day I use Kupang language. 
Aside from that, if I speak with friends in 
Indonesian, I feel awkward.’
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that is separate from Kupang’s vernacular. This is an ambiguity that can be 
seen as grounded in two senses of Indonesian as a social modality: the 
language of ‘modern’, urban people on one hand, and of citizens of the 
nation on the other.
These views, in turn, are asymmetrically related, along with the metrics 
they involve for evaluating different kinds of speech. Indonesian’s place in 
the fabric of city life is a practical fact, and people internalize it as such 
when they assimilate into urban interactional networks. Indonesian’s dis-
tinctness as a superordinate code is associated with the nation-state that 
indirectly backs its prescribed norms. Thanks to its covert grounding in 
interactional practice, the first of these stances can endure without 
becoming apparent for those whose answers to the two queries discussed 
here appear ‘inconsistent’.
Two Ways of Mixing Language
Given this brief sketch of attitudes to both languages, I briefly consider the 
‘microlevel’ of contact between Indonesian and Kupang Malay. The goal is 
to present socially salient patterns of ‘mixed usage’ which show elements 
of the two languages excluding, co-occurring, and shaping each other. This 
kind of bilingual usage often includes so-called interference or transfer 
phenomena, which are effects of native habits of speech on use of a non-
native language. (One example is the use of the Manggaraian discourse 
particle in Kupang Malay mentioned in footnote 8.) Contact phenomena 
can occur in patterns of pronunciation, grammar, and word choice. They 
can also vary from speaker to speaker, and context to context.
I sketch here two kinds of ‘mixed use’ that require little structural 
description. Both are suggestive of broader interactional dynamics within 
the setting sketched above. Each involves Kupang Malay elements in talk 
that is otherwise heavily or entirely Indonesian. To show how this pattern 
might allow for a distinct interactional style, I offer a few examples of 
people speaking from a ‘middle’ position, that is, blurring what otherwise 
count as lines of difference between their statuses as educated Indonesians 
and as co-members of a local community.
1) Where ‘a Kupang Accent’ Matters
Accent, taken to refer to distinctive articulations of speech sounds, covers 
a range of interference phenomena that commonly index speakers’ social 
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backgrounds. But Indonesian’s and Kupang Malay’s sound systems are 
quite similar, and it is plausible to expect that contact between them 
would lead to a levelling of differences between them. If it turned out that 
speakers were pronouncing words of Indonesian provenance so as to 
resemble similarly patterned Kupang Malay words – speaking with a 
‘Kupang accent’ – that could be taken as evidence of the local idiom’s 
durability and speakers’ unspoken loyalty to that vernacular. Conversely, 
if ‘native’ Kupang Malay words were to be pronounced in a manner that 
fitted distinctly Indonesian sound patterns, that would indicate that in 
this respect at least the vernacular is being ‘Indonesianized’ among at 
least some speakers. Younger, educated people are important participants 
in such dynamics, because they presumably represent a ‘leading edge’ of 
contact-induced change and model usage others may emulate.
Drawing examples from our database of recordings and transcriptions 
of spontaneous speech, I focus here on just a few items that do not fit 
either convergence scenario exactly. Consider in this regard commonly 
used cognates in Indonesian and Kupang Malay listed in Table 4. 
Indonesian members of these pairs are pronounced with closed final syl-
lables – ending with the consonants p or t or a glottal stop (transcribed 
here as k) – whereas their Kupang Malay counterparts have open final 
syllables and end with a vowel. Numbers of instances of use of each pro-
nunciation that occurred in the speech we recorded and transcribed are 
indicated in parentheses.
Except for baik/bae (‘good’), the greater frequency of Indonesian 
pronunciations suggests that younger peoples’ habits of pronunciation 
are being extended from Indonesian to Kupang Malay, since many tokens 
of the former pronunciation appear in otherwise heavily Kupang 
Malay speech. This could be taken as an indirect effect of widespread 
borrowing of Indonesian lexical items into otherwise Kupang Malay 
usage. These borrowings are routinely pronounced in the Indonesian 
Table 4: Pronunciations of some cognates (# tokens in parentheses).
Gloss Indonesian Kupang Malay
‘good’ baik (42) bae (71)
‘many, much’ banyak (47) banya (20)
‘main, basic’ pokok (30) poko (9)
‘see’ lihat (56) lia (38)
‘closed’ tutup (7) tutu (0)
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12 Thomason and Kaufman (1988) discuss other examples of change leading from 
structurally ‘shallow’ patterns of lexical borrowing to ‘deeper’ patterns of structural 
change. It is plausible to conjecture that even if Kupang Malay is not displaced by 
Indonesian, some of its features will be reshaped by it.
manner: the words politik, ‘politics’, and or sifat, ‘attitude’, for instance, 
are not pronounced with ‘a Kupang accent’ (that is, politi or sifa). In this 
way a sound pattern that is introduced into otherwise Kupang Malay 
speech through borrowings can generalize to Kupang Malay cognates like 
these.12
But a small number of cognates do not seem to fit this trend, and in our 
recordings are commonly pronounced with ‘a Kupang accent’. These 
are the kin terms listed in Table 5. Standard Indonesian bapak, kakak 
and anak are pronounced with a final glottal stop, while their Kupang 
Malay cognates – bapa, kaka and ana – end with open syllables (and have 
slightly lengthened first syllables). That these latter terms seem to share 
a resistance to Indonesianization goes together with their distinctively 
expressive meanings in interaction. They serve to mark or presuppose 
something about the relation between the person who utters them 
and the person addressed with them. In Kupang, as elsewhere in 
Indonesia, concerns for politeness often lead speakers to avoid using sec-
ond-person pronouns to non-intimate or superior persons. For that rea-
son, kin terms or titles are common alternatives, sometimes combined 
with a form of his or her proper name. Used to speak of a third person, 
they can similarly mark the speaker’s respect or feeling of distance from 
that person.
These Kupang Malay kin terms occur even in usage that is otherwise 
heavily or entirely Indonesian, as illustrated with two instances from our 
recorded data:
Table 5: Pronunciations of some cognate kin terms (# tokens in 
parentheses).
Gloss Indonesian Kupang Malay
‘father’ full form bapak (1) bapa (215)
short form pak (92) pa (232)
‘elder sibling’ full form kakak (6) kaka (194)
short form kak (8) ka (440)
‘child’ full form anak (180) ana (426)
short form nak (25) na (13)
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1.   Mo dengar cerita bapa tentang proses dan tahapan pemilihan umum 
tingkat propinsi sekarang ini.
(I) want to hear your (bapa’s) story about the process and the steps in the 
general provincial election at present.
2.  Apalagi khususnya masih di Kupang ini kaka boleh omong seperti itu.
All the more, especially in Kupang you (kaka) can still talk like that.
These same speakers regularly pronounce words of Indonesian prove-
nance (like tingkat, in example 1) in the Indonesian manner, with final 
closed syllables.
From the point of view of sound structure, these seem to be anomalous 
‘contact’ phenomena that can’t count as either ‘interference’ or ‘borrow-
ings’ from native Kupang Malay in Indonesian usage (unless one chooses 
to regard them as having different ‘meanings’ from their Indonesian 
equivalents). Instead, it seems more plausible to say that these terms 
constitute a functionally distinct class whose elements modulate the 
interactional feel of talk which may otherwise be in Indonesian. ‘Mixed’ 
usage like that in examples 1 and 2 is unlikely to be the primary target for 
complaints about widespread inability to speak good Indonesian, but it is 
important as a point of assimilation of the national language into interac-
tionally enacted senses of local community.
2) Personal Pronouns, Personal Relations
Another kind of mixed use follows a similar but clearer pattern. Listed in 
Table 6 are Indonesian and Kupang Malay personal pronouns, along with 
numbers indicating how often they appear in our collection of recordings 
and transcriptions.
Personal pronouns serve social functions like the kin terms discussed 
above because they affirm and modify face-to-face relations between the 
persons interactionally engaged in their use, as speakers and addressees. 
But unlike those kin terms, Kupang Malay and Indonesian pronouns have 
sound shapes that are quite different. Pronouns of Indonesian provenance 
Table 6: Personal pronouns (# tokens in parentheses).
Gloss Indonesian Kupang Malay
1st singular saya (29) beta (470), be (271)
1st plural inclusive kita (49) kotong (183)
1st plural exclusive kami (0) botong (50)
2nd person kamu (1) lu (218)
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figure very rarely in the usage we recorded, and Kupang Malay terms pre-
dominate even in heavily or entirely Indonesian talk (see Table 7). Most 
interesting of these is the last. The speaker ‘quotes’ a judge who is making 
a legal decision known, and portrays that judge as having addressed his 
own interlocutor with distinctly Kupang Malay lu, not Indonesian saya.
From a structure-centred point of view, such ‘mixing’ of Kupang Malay 
personal pronouns into Indonesian may be more obvious than kin term 
pronunciations, but they serve parallel interactional functions. From a 
social point of view, they can be seen as allowing habits of interaction 
among younger, educated people to expand as they participate in the 
broader geosocial shift sketched above. One can use Kupang Malay per-
sonal pronouns or kin terms in Indonesian without necessarily demon-
strating incompetence in the national language; rather, this use reflects on 
that language’s ambiguous uses and meanings in Kupang society. This 
kind of mixing helps speakers to neutralize norms that dictate a forced 
choice between ‘separate and unequal’ languages, and allows them to deal 
with each other as middle-class Indonesians and, at the same time, as co-
members of a local, but non-ethnic, community.
In Search of Middle Indonesian
Historical, structural and biographical factors help make the language sit-
uation in Kupang seem less puzzling, because they bring to the fore issues 
of perception and practice, not just norms and competences. Examined 
through the lens of a ‘national language politics’ – from a translocal, 
Table 7: Kupang personal pronouns in Indonesian conversation.
Bukan ilmu akuntansi yang beta terapkan di hidup
It’s not accounting that I do for a living.
Sebenarnya bukan seperti yang kotong buat-buat sekarang.
Actually it’s not like that, what we’re doing now.
Sesuai dengan daerah yang botong menyanyi
According to the region where we’re singing.
Hakim putus ‘oh ini KPU salah lu yang benar’ ya silakan.




national perspective, as it were – usage in Kupang appears structurally 
interstitial between separate and unequal language systems. This prescrip-
tive attitude to Indonesian and Kupang Malay surfaces in the city and 
regions alike. From a more situated, interactional point of view, mixed use 
of the two languages serves to create a way of talking that is socially inter-
mediary. It allows speakers to enact middle-class identities grounded in 
both the city and the nation. Using the label ‘Middle Indonesian’ helps to 
move beyond norm-based framings of the two languages, and to see 
‘mixed use’ as emergent and mediating in an integrationist dynamic.
My strategy for bringing subjective attitudes to the fore has been to link 
speakers’ answers to queries about language with their social trajectories. 
From this point of view, newcomers can be seen as those who, after mov-
ing to the city, recognized practical limits on the ‘separate and unequal’ 
view. To become ‘Kupang people’ they acquired a distinct attitude and 
associated habits of language use that are common among people in the 
city more generally.
This sketch of Kupang Malay’s relation to Indonesian is worth compar-
ing, finally, to that between another non-standard dialect of Malay and 
standard Indonesian in another urban setting: what is now commonly 
called Jakartanese (bahasa Jakarta). Jakartanese, like Kupang Malay, has 
native and non-native speakers, but no strong ethnic association; it, too, 
was once officially stigmatized, as is Kupang Malay now, though it has also 
become increasingly uniform through a process of koinéization (Wouk 
1991). Especially since the end of the New Order, Jakartanese is viewed less 
and less as bad Indonesian, and more as standard Indonesian’s colloquial 
complement in everyday Jakarta life.
This development was in fact tacitly acknowledged in the 1980s by 
Anton Moeliono, at the time regarded as the dean of Indonesian language 
development. Noting that standard Indonesian has no colloquial variety, 
he suggested that Jakartanese might come to play this role not just in the 
city, but in the country at large. Dede Oetomo, who cites his remark, sug-
gests also that this development was already in process at that time 
(1996:200). In fact, Jakartanese is now recognized all over Indonesia as 
emblematic of modern urban Indonesia; youth in many other cities, 
including Kupang, have made elements of Jakartanese part of their own 
distinctive argots.13 But Kupang’s youth language is also distinct from the 
much more widely known Jakartanese.
13 Space does not allow for discussion here of Kupang’s version of so-called bahasa 
gaul, or comparison with other varieties that have been described in Jakarta or Yogyakarta.
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If developments in Kupang in fact parallel those in Jakarta, Kupang 
Malay, far from being marginalized, might in the future become more 
widely recognized and valued in the province. Though I have only anec-
dotal support for this suggestion, younger peoples’ comments to mem-
bers of our research team strongly suggest that Kupang Malay is in fact 
becoming more widely known elsewhere in NTT. Several young newcom-
ers suggested that older people are those most prone to complain about 
Kupang Malay as ‘bad Indonesian’ when it is used in their home regions; 
they are also less directly invested in the modern city, and more sensitive 
to its influences, for better or worse, on ways of life in their own communi-
ties. When younger educated speakers like Lia and Ina return home as 
exemplars of urban sophistication, their Kupang Malay (and ways of mix-
ing it with Indonesian) may be emulated by others. In this respect Kupang 
Malay’s non-ethnic character would promote its social value as a regional 
language. Just as un-nativeness helps Indonesian serve as a language 
across ethnic groups in the nation, mixed usage and unethnic Kupang 
Malay may become the language and emblem of a new provincial 
identity.
This reading of Kupang’s language puzzle places it within the broader 
process of geosocial integration and class formation in Indonesia at large. 
But it would be hazardous to generalize this sketch too broadly to analo-
gous sociolinguistic processes in other Middle Indonesian cities. These 
other sociolinguistic situations differ with respect to the languages (and 
kinds of Malay) Indonesian is coming into contact with. The kinds of 
Malay spoken among ethnic Malays living in Pontianak, West Kalimantan, 
for instance, figure into a very different ethnopolitical dynamics. And 
where Indonesian is in contact with other urban Malay vernaculars, like 
that of Ternate in North Maluku Utara, broader ethnopolitical differences 
affect use of both. Whether patterns of language variation and change like 
that in Kupang are emerging elsewhere is an empirical question, but in 
every Middle Indonesian city, language change intimately mediates geo-
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